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Abstract - The Right to be Present at 
Trial in International Criminal Law 
By Caleb Henry Wheeler 
 
 International criminal law considers the accused’s right to be present at trial to be 
a key component of his or her right to a fair trial at international and internationalised 
criminal courts and tribunals. The central research question this thesis explores is: what 
does the accused’s right to be present at trial mean in international criminal law and are 
the accused at international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals receiving 
the benefits of its protection? This thesis answers that question in eight substantive 
chapters examining a variety of issues relating to the right to be present at trial.  
 In answering the research question this thesis makes four different contributions 
to knowledge.  First, it brings together the rules and practices of all of the international 
and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals and provides analysis about how each 
one treats the right to be present at trial.  Second, it challenges existing assumptions about 
how different courts and tribunals protect the right to be present at trial and show that 
even those courts and tribunals that are thought to emphasise the right also allow trial to 
continue in the accused’s absence under some circumstances.  Third, it takes a more 
nuanced approach to trial absences by breaking absence into four categories and 
examining how the differences in the type of absence may affect the right to be present.  
Finally, it considers the procedures of the international and internationalised criminal 
courts and tribunals established since the introduction of the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon’s Statute and finds that they generally take a more flexible approach to the 
accused’s right to be present.     
 This thesis concludes that international criminal law provides the accused with a 
qualified right to be present at trial.  The right confers on the accused the choice to attend 
trial and is coupled with a duty imposed on the court or tribunal attempting to conduct the 
trial whereby it cannot prevent the accused from attending trial if he or she so desires.  
The right to be present can be voluntarily waived by the accused if he or she has received 
notice sufficient to make an informed decision about whether he or she wants to appear. 
This approach creates a balance between respecting the accused’s right to be present 
while also allowing trial to continue if the accused does not wish to participate. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 This thesis examines the accused’s right to be present at trial in international 
criminal law and how that right functions at international and internationalised criminal 
courts and tribunals.  The main research question is: What does the accused’s right to be 
present at trial mean in international criminal law and are the accused at international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals receiving the benefits of its protection?  To 
provide an answer it assesses several other questions and issues including: Is presence at 
trial a right, a duty or both? How did the right to be present become part of international 
criminal law? Does trying an accused in absentia serve the goals of international criminal 
law? What are the different types of absences from trial and how does accused’s right to 
be present change depending on the manner of his or her absence from trial?  How has 
the right evolved since it first became part if international criminal law?  
 This thesis is made up of eight substantive chapters designed to answer the 
questions set out above.  The first three chapters are grouped together because they each 
address more theoretical aspects of the accused’s presence at trial.  The first chapter 
discusses whether the accused’s presence at trial is a right, a duty or both under 
international criminal law. It also considers whether the right to be present and the duty to 
be present are co-extensive or if they actually pertain to different aspects of presence.  
The second chapter examines how the right to be present developed in international 
criminal law. It specifically looks at the impact different legal systems, particularly those 
rooted in the accusatorial and inquisitorial traditions, have on how the right to be present 
was interpreted during the creation of different international and internationalised 
criminal courts and tribunals.  The third chapter considers how trials in absentia serve the 
goals of international criminal law with a particular focus on the needs of the different 
participants in the international criminal process.  It also attempts to understand how 
trials conducted in the absence of the accused can meet the needs of those different 
participants.   
 The fourth through seventh chapters introduce the idea that there are four different 
types of absences from trial and that the right to be present requires the trial court to deal 
with each type differently.  The fourth chapter specifically considers trial in absentia, 
defined as a trial occurring entirely in the absence of the accused where the accused 
knows the trial is taking place but chooses not to attend.  It also discusses the issues of 
notice and waiver and the role they play in ensuring that the accused’s absence is 
	   2 
voluntary. The fifth chapter follows on from the previous chapter and looks at trials by 
default, defined as a trial taking place in the accused’s absence, but where the accused 
either has not received notice about the proceedings or notice is uncertain. It questions 
the voluntary nature of the resulting absence and whether conducting trial under such 
circumstances complies with the right to be present. The sixth chapter studies short-term 
absences from trial and how the perceived voluntariness of those actions impacts whether 
trial can continue in the accused’s absence. It also looks at the manner through which 
international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals find an implied waiver of 
the accused’s right to be present. The seventh chapter examines the last of the four 
categories of absence; situations in which the accused is physically present in the 
courtroom during trial but unable to understand and participate in the proceedings. It 
explores the idea that the right to be present requires more than just the physical presence 
of the accused in the courtroom and instead emphasises the importance of the accused’s 
participation in the trial.  The final chapter examines how the right to be present has 
continued to evolve since the inclusion of a trial in absentia procedure in the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute.  It studies five international or internationalised courts 
and tribunals that have been established or proposed since the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon and how the right to be present has continued to evolve at those institutions.  
 The issues raised in each chapter are examined through an analysis of primary and 
secondary sources. Most of the issues are first approached through a consideration of the 
primary source material, particularly: international and regional human rights treaties and 
conventions, statutes of the different international and internationalised criminal courts, 
domestic constitutions and statutes, United Nations General Assembly and Security 
Council resolutions, other law-making instruments including rules of procedure and 
evidence and case law.  The statutes, rules and case law of the International Military 
Tribunal, the International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia, the European Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights 
Committee all receive in-depth consideration.  These particular institutions have made the 
most significant contribution towards understanding and interpreting the accused’s right 
to be present in international criminal law.  Other courts and tribunals, including the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, the American Court of Human Rights 
and the African Court of Human Rights receive some attention as well. Secondary 
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sources are used to support and challenge the analysis and conclusions derived from the 
primary sources.  
 This thesis contributes to knowledge in multiple ways.  First, it brings together the 
practise of the various international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals 
with regard to the accused’s right to be present in one place, which has never been done 
before.  To date there is no existing comprehensive look at the accused’s right to be 
present at trial at the various international and internationalised courts and tribunals.  
Generally, analysis of this issue has been done in a cursory way, or focused largely on the 
practise of one or a few courts without looking at the overarching picture. This thesis 
conducts a critical analysis of the practise of all of the various international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals to gain an overall picture of the right.  This 
thesis brings together information about how all of the courts and tribunals have 
considered and applied the right to be present at trial to give a wide-ranging picture of the 
right to be present at trial. 
 Second, this thesis challenges some of the existing assumptions about the right in 
an effort to better understand what it means to be present, or absent, from trial, and the 
real implications of those designations. This thesis also contributes to knowledge in that it 
challenges some of the existing orthodoxies about the right to be present at trial. It is 
generally believed that those international and internationalised criminal court and 
tribunals that do not permit trials in absentia strongly protect the right to be present that 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is less interested in protecting the right to be present 
because it allows for trials in absentia. This thesis addresses these fallacies by showing 
that court hearings take place in the absence of the accused at every international and 
internationalised criminal court and tribunal and that a court or tribunal’s commitment to 
protecting the accused’s right to be present is largely dependent on other factors.  
 Third, it seeks to re-imagine the right to be present at trial in a less binary way and 
take a more multifaceted approach to understanding the different types of absence from 
trial. The term trial in absentia has been used to describe many different factual scenarios 
involving an accused’s absence from trial and as a result has no set meaning in 
international criminal law.1  It is used broadly to describe any situation in which trial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Niccolò Pons, ‘Some Remarks on in Absentia Proceedings before the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon in Case of a State’s Failure or Refusal to Hand over the Accused’ (2010) 8 
JICJ 1307, 1309; Chris Jenks, ‘Notice Otherwise Given: Will In Absentia Trials at the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon Violate Human Rights?’ (2009) 33 Fordham Intl L J 57, 68; 
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occurs outside of the accused’s presence and more narrowly to describe a trial occurring 
in its entirety without the accused being present but where the accused is aware that trial 
is taking place in his or her absence.  When used broadly, some commentators separate 
trial in absentia into two categories, partial in absentia and total in absentia, in an effort 
to describe the different legal rules that apply to each situation.2  Total in absentia refers 
to a trial which entirely takes place in the absence of the accused while partial in absentia 
exists when the accused is present for some parts of the trial and absent for others.3 
However, this approach is too limiting to the extent that it does not adequately account 
for the difference types of total and partial absences from trial.  This thesis introduces 
four categories of absence from trial and analyses them individually in an effort to better 
explore the contours of how the right to be present can accommodate an accused’s 
absence from trial. 
 Finally, this thesis considers the ways in which the right to be present has 
developed since the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute was introduced. It finds that 
those international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals introduced or 
proposed since the Special Tribunal for Lebanon have taken a more nuanced approach to 
the right to be present and have attempted to employ methods that respect that right that 
also make sense in the context of the overall practices of the particular court or tribunal.  
It also finds that the right to be present, which had been fairly static prior to the 
introduction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute, is now approached with 
greater flexibility. This indicates that the strict adherence to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights approach to presence at trial is diminishing in favour of 
adopting practices that respect the interests of the accused while also fulfilling the needs 
of other trial participants. This change is a good one as it appreciates the important 
purpose of supplying the victims of atrocity crimes with a sense that justice has been 
done.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Stan Starygin and Johanna Selth, ‘Cambodia and the Right to be Present:  Trials In 
Absentia in the Draft Criminal Procedure Code’ [2005] Singapore J Legal Stud 170, 171. 
2 Jenks supra note 1 at 67-9; Mohammad Hadi Zakerhossein and Anne-Marie de 
Brouwer, ‘Diverse Approaches to Total and Partial In Absentia Trials by International 
Criminal Tribunals’ (2015) 26 Crim LF 181, 183; Alexander Schwarz ‘The Legacy of the 
Kenyatta case: Trials in absentia at the International Criminal Court and Their 
Compatibility with Human Rights’ (2016) 16 African Human Rights Law Journal 99, 
102. 
3 Zakerhossein and de Brouwer supra note 2 at 183; Schwarz supra note 2 at 102. 
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 This thesis concludes that international criminal law provides the accused with a 
qualified right to be present at trial.  The right confers on the accused the choice to attend 
trial and is coupled with a duty imposed on the court or tribunal attempting to conduct the 
trial whereby it cannot prevent the accused from attending trial if he or she so desires.  
That right can be voluntarily waived by the accused if he or she has received notice 
sufficient to make an informed decision about whether he or she wishes to appear. Trials 
in absentia are permissible so long as the accused’s absence is the result of an informed 
decision on the part of the accused and does not constitute a deprivation of the right to be 
present. Trials by default may also be conducted, however an accused tried in this manner 
must have the right to a new trial or some other fresh assessment of the charges after he 
or she comes under the control of the responsible court or tribunal.  This approach creates 
a balance between respecting the accused’s right to be present, which can be instrumental 
to preserving the accused’s fair trial rights, and ensuring that the interests of the other 
trial participants can also be fulfilled.      
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CHAPTER 2: IS PRESENCE AT TRIAL A RIGHT, A DUTY OR BOTH? 	  
 The right to a fair trial is a basic principle of a democratic society and is 
considered a central feature of the rule of law and a part of customary international law.1  
It is expressed as “a right to procedural safeguards to prevent an unjust conviction” the 
purpose of which is to achieve “the proper administration of justice.” 2 Fair trials are 
realised by providing the participants, and particularly the defendant, with a set of rights.3  
One of the defining components of the right to a fair trial is the accused’s right to be 
present at trial.4   
 The presence of the accused at trial is described as “an essential element of 
procedural equality” that gives meaning to the principle that “criminal defendants are 
legally entitled to be personally present at their own trials.” 5  One reason it is thought 
important for the accused to be present during trial is to give him or her the opportunity 
to participate and understand the proceedings against them, particularly during the 
presentation and examination of the evidence.6 Generally, the accused should be present 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Council Directive (EU) 2016/343 of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain 
aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in 
criminal proceedings [2016] OJ L65/5 at para 33; Dominic McGoldrick, The Human 
Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (Clarendon Press 1994) 396; Patrick L. Robinson, ‘The Right to a 
Fair Trial in International Law, with Specific Reference to the Work of the ICTY’ (2009) 
3 Berkeley J L Intl L Publicist 1, 11; Mohamed Shahabuddeen, International Criminal 
Justice at the Yugoslav Tribunal: A Judge’s Recollection (OUP 2012) 161-62; citing 
Prosecutor v Aleksovski (Judgement) IT-95-14/1-A, A Ch (24 March 2000) para 104; 
Prosecutor v Simić et al. (Judgement) IT-95-9-T, T Ch II (17 October 2003) para 678. 
2 Kristen Campbell, ‘The Making of Global Legal Culture and International Criminal 
Law’ (2013) 26 LJIL 155, 167; United Nations Human Rights Committee, ‘General 
Comment 13, Article 14: Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994) para 1. 
3 Mark Klamberg, ‘What are the Objectives of International Criminal Procedure? - 
Reflections on the Fragmentation of a Legal Regime’ (2010) 79 Nord J Intl L 279, 286. 
4 Council Directive 2016/343 supra note 1 at para 33; Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, An 
Introduction to the Law of the International Criminal Tribunals: A Comparative Study 
(Transnational Publishers, Inc 2003) 175; M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Human Rights in the 
Context of Criminal Justice:  Identifying International Procedural Protections and 
Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions’ (1993) 3 Duke J Comp & Intl L 235, 
267. 
5 Richard May and Marieke Wierda, International Criminal Evidence (Transnational 
Publishers, Inc 2002) 280; Neil Cohen, ‘Trial in Absentia Re-Examined’ (1973) 40(2) 
Tenn L Rev 155, 156. 
6 Sarah J. Summers, Fair Trials: The European Criminal Procedure Tradition and the 
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throughout the entirety of the proceedings so that he or she can exercise other fair trial 
rights including: assisting in his or her own defence; consulting, and in some cases 
selecting, his or her own counsel; confronting the witnesses or the evidence presented 
against him or her; and testifying on his or her own behalf at trial.7   
 It is generally believed that individuals accused of international crimes have a 
right to be present at his or her trial.  This is evidenced by the fact that all of the modern 
international criminal statutes either explicitly refer to the accused’s right to be present or 
describe the presence of the accused at trial as one of the minimum guarantees of a fair 
trial.  However, international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals also 
agree that the right to be present at a trial can be derogable under some circumstances. 
There is growing sentiment that an international criminal trial can continue outside of the 
accused’s presence in recognition of his or her duty to be present at trial.    
 It is necessary, as a preliminary matter, to define the terms ‘right’ and ‘duty’.  
Surprisingly, these terms are generally undefined in international law. None of the most 
influential human rights documents, including the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the European Convention on 
Human Rights, define a right or a duty in a general sense. The American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man rather unhelpfully states in its Preamble that “[w]hile rights 
exalt individual liberty, duties express the dignity of that liberty.”8   Therefore, recourse 
to more general legal sources is necessary to produce a working definition of these terms.  
A ‘right’ is “[s]omething that is due to a person by just claim, legal guarantee or moral 
principle” and is defined by the ability of the holder of the right to “decide whether to 
exercise it or not and to bear the consequences of that decision.”9 It is also a “recognized 
and protected interest the violation of which is a wrong.”10 By contrast, a duty is a “legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
European Court of Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2007) 117; Fawzia Cassim, ‘The 
Accused’s Right to be Present: A Key to Meaningful Participation in the Criminal 
Process’ (2005) 38 Comp & Intl L J S Afr 285, 285-286. 
7 Daryl A. Mundis, ‘Current Developments: Improving the Operation and Functioning of 
the International Criminal Tribunals’ (2000) 94 AJIL 759, 761. 
8 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res XXX adopted by the 
Ninth International Conference of American States (2 May 1948) preamble.  
9 Bryan Garner (ed), Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed, Thomson Reuters 2014) 1517; 
Martin Böse, ‘Harmonizing Procedural Rights Indirectly: The Framework Decision on 
Trials in Absentia’ (2011) 37 NC J Intl L & Com Reg 489, 503. 
10 Garner supra note 9 at 1517. 
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obligation owed or due to another and that needs to be satisfied.”11 A duty is also 
connected to a corresponding right held by another and the person with the duty is bound 
to do perform the described activity.12   
 The definitions of these terms demonstrate the significant difference between the 
two.  A right may be exercised freely while a duty creates an obligation, requiring the 
holder of the duty to act.  Therefore, if the presence of the accused at trial is considered a 
right, the accused may decide to appear for trial of his or her own volition and cannot be 
unilaterally deprived of that choice. If it is considered a duty, the accused is required to 
appear at trial. Failure to comply with a duty can result in consequences.  In the context 
of presence at trial those consequences can include the relevant tribunal conducting a trial 
in absentia against the accused.13  
2.1 THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT TRIAL 
 Historically, international criminal law did not guarantee the accused’s right to be 
present at trial. Article 12 of the International Military Tribunal Charter, which formally 
established the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, specifically permitted 
proceedings to be conducted against an absent accused if that accused “has not been 
found” or if the Tribunal “for any reason, finds it necessary, in the interests of justice, to 
conduct the hearing in his absence.” 14  The Nuremberg Tribunal demonstrated its 
willingness to proceed in the absence of an accused by allowing Martin Bormann to be 
tried in absentia. 15  Bormann was convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity 
and sentenced to death in his absence.16 
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was the first 
international instrument to address the accused’s presence at trial as a right.  The 
International Covenant sets out a wide-ranging rights regime impacting numerous areas 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid at 615. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Niccolò Pons, ‘Some Remarks on in Absentia Proceedings before the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon in Case of a State’s Failure or Refusal to Hand over the Accused’ (2010) 8 
JICJ 1307, 1309.  
14 United Nations, Charter of the International Military Tribunal – Annex to the 
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis (8 August 1945) art 12. 
15 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, 
Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 - 1 October 1946, vol 2 (1947) 25. 
16 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, 
Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 - 1 October 1946, vol 1 (1947) 341, 366. 
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of life including the right to a fair trial.  Article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant 
specifically asserts that “[i]n the determination of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: (d) [t]o 
be tried in his presence…”17 This article is significant for multiple reasons.  First, and 
most importantly, it is the genesis of the notion that the accused has a right to be present 
at trial in international criminal law. Although the International Covenant does not 
explicitly call presence at trial a right, the Human Rights Committee later confirmed that 
it should be regarded as such.18  Second, many of the Statutes of international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals modelled their articles on the accused’s 
right to be present on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and, in 
some instances, copied Article 14(3)(d) almost verbatim. Finally, there are 168 State 
Parties and 7 signatories to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
making its provisions applicable to the vast majority of the world.19   
 Regional human rights bodies have also codified the accused’s right to be present 
at trial. In 2007, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights issued its 
‘Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa’. 
Those Principles and Guidelines specifically indicate that a person accused of a crime has 
“the right to be tried in his or her presence.”20  To give effect to that right the African 
Commission has found that the accused “has the right to appear in person” before the 
relevant judicial body and that “the accused may not be tried in absentia.”21  If the 
accused is tried in absentia the accused has the right to petition to have the proceedings 
re-opened on the grounds that there was inadequate notice of trial, that notice was not 
personally served or his or her failure to appear was the result of exigent circumstances.22   
 The language used by the African Commission when discussing trials in absentia 
highlights how important it is for the accused to be given the opportunity to choose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 14(3)(d). 
18 Mbenge v Zaire Comm No 16/1977 (25 March 1983) para 14.2; Maleki v Italy Comm 
No 699/1996 (27 July 1999) para 9.3; ‘General Comment 13 supra note 2 at para 11. 
19 Status of Ratification Dashboard, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
http://indicators.ohchr.org (accessed 15 August 2016). 
20 The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, ‘Principles And Guidelines 
On The Right To A Fair Trial And Legal Assistance In Africa’ DOC/OS(XXX) (2003) 
section N(6)(c)(i)–(ii). 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
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whether he or she will appear for trial. The Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa set out three grounds for re-opening 
proceedings conducted in absentia.  All three involve situations in which the accused did 
not choose to absent themselves from trial and where their failure to appear was outside 
of their control.  Trials conducted in the accused’s absence are not strictly forbidden, 
rather, they are only considered illegitimate if they are conducted under circumstances 
that suggest the accused did not actively choose not to be present. This emphasis on the 
accused’s choice confirms that the African Commission views presence at trial as a right. 
 The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights reiterated the importance of the 
presence of the accused, particularly when he or she is unrepresented, in Alex Thomas v 
Tanzania. There, the African Court concluded that Article 7(1)(c) of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, as interpreted in light of the provisions of Article 
14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, require that the 
accused be present at trial to defend himself. 23  Although there is no explicit mention of 
presence in Article 7(1)(c) of the African Charter, it is significant that the Court found 
that presence was implicitly required through the operation of the provisions of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  This gives meaning to the African 
Commission’s determination that courts and tribunals are obliged to conform to 
international human rights standards to ensure the accused is guaranteed a fair trial.24 
 Two other regional human rights bodies have also addressed the right to be 
present.  The European Convention on Human Rights does not contain a specific 
reference to the right to be present at trial.  However, the European Court of Human 
Rights has found that the accused’s right to be present is implicit in the object and 
purpose of Article 6(1) of the European Convention because the accused is entitled to 
take part in a hearing against him or her.25  The European Court of Human Rights has 
also specifically referred to the presence of the accused at trial as a right and concluded 
that “it is difficult to see” how the accused could exercise other explicit Convention 
rights, including “the right ‘to defend himself in person’ (Article 6(3)(c)), the right ‘to 
examine or have examined witnesses’ (Article 6(3)(d)) and the right ‘to have the free 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 In The Matter of Alex Thomas v United Republic of Tanzania (Judgment) App No 
005/2013 (20 November 2015) para 91. 
24 Avocats sans Frontières (on behalf of Gaëtan Bwampamye) v Burundi (Decision) App 
No 231/99 (6 November 2000) para 26. 
25 Colozza v Italy (1985) 7 EHRR 516, 12 February 1985 at paras 27-28. 
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assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court’ 
(Article 6(3)(e)), without being present during trial.”26  Based on this holding, even 
though the right to be present is not an enumerated right, it is implicit in the European 
Convention as it makes operative other important rights held by the accused, including 
the overarching right to a fair trial.27  
 The European Court of Human Rights’ decision that a right to be present exists in 
the European Convention also focuses on the accused’s ability to make a choice as to 
whether he or she wishes to participate in proceedings.  Where the accused has no notion 
that criminal proceedings are being conducted against them, the accused cannot be found 
to have made an effective choice not to participate.28 Absent the ability to make such a 
choice, the accused is entitled to a new determination of the charges.  This indicates that 
an in absentia conviction is only valid if the accused makes an active choice to absent 
him or herself from court. 
 The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union have also 
identified presence at trial as a right.  The European Council stated in a 2016 directive 
that presence at trial is a right held by the accused that directly emanates from the right to 
a fair trial.29   It acknowledged that it is a qualified right that can be waived by the 
accused under appropriate conditions.30  Such a waiver can be explicit or tacit, but it must 
always be unequivocal.31  An accused can only be tried in his or her absence if he or she 
has been informed of the trial and the consequences of non-appearance and still decides 
not to attend trial or if he or she has been removed from the courtroom for being 
disruptive.32 Limiting trials conducted in the absence of the accused to these narrow 
exceptions reinforces the notion that presence at trial is a right.  In both instances the 
absence is the result of a conscious decision by the accused not to exercise the right to be 
present rather than a consequence for failing to comply with a duty.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ibid.  
27 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice:  Identifying 
International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National 
Constitutions’ (1993) 3 Duke J Comp & Intl L 235, 267; Sarah Podmaniczky, ‘Order in 
the Court: Decorum, Rambunctious Defendants, and the Right to be Present at Trial’ 
(2012) 14(5) U Pa J Con L 1283, 1289.  
28 Colozza  supra note 25 at para 28. 
29 Council Directive 2016/343 supra note 1 at para 33. 
30 Ibid at para 35. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid at paras 36 and 40.	  
	   12 
 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights less explicitly endorses the right of 
the accused to be present at trial in the Case of Valle Jaramillo et al. v Colombia. There, 
the Inter-American Court found, “the trial and conviction in absentia of members of 
paramilitary groups, who have benefited from the ineffectiveness of the punishment, 
because the warrants for their arrest have not been executed” reflected the impunity 
inherent in the situation.33 Interestingly, this decision approaches presence at trial from a 
different direction.  Rather than finding that the accused were deprived of an opportunity 
to effectively exercise their rights, the court determined that the in absentia trial was little 
more than a show trial held so that Colombia would appear to be complying with its 
international fair trial obligations set out in Article 8 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights. 34  The in absentia trial actually protected the accused because the 
authorities had no real intention of punishing them for their acts even after their 
conviction.35 It can be extrapolated from the Jaramillo decision that the Inter-American 
Court prefers that trial take place in the presence of the accused, not only to ensure the 
rights of the accused are adequately protected, but also to guarantee that the trial will 
result in a sufficient remedy.  The Inter-American Court has been largely silent as to 
whether it considers the accused’s presence to be a right or a duty. 
 When the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (collectively, “the ad hoc tribunals”) were 
established in the early 1990’s, the Statutes of both tribunals closely followed the 
example of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and indicated that the 
presence of the accused at trial was one of the minimum guarantees of a fair trial.36  
Article 21 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
and Article 20 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Statute are both titled 
‘Rights of the Accused’ and both explicitly state that the accused is ‘entitled’ to be tried 
in his or her presence.37  The use of the word entitled suggests that presence of the 
accused is regarded as a right held by the accused and not a duty to be imposed on him or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Case of Valle Jaramillo et al. v Colombia (Judgment) Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights Series C No. 192 (27 November 2008) para 165.  
34 Ibid at para 168. 
35 Ibid. 
36 UN Security Council, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (25 May 1993) art 21(d)(4); UN Security Council, Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (8 November 1994) art 20(d)(4). 
37 Ibid. 
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her. This interpretation is reinforced by former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali’s report issued in 1993 in which he asserted that the Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia reflects the fact that trials in 
absentia are not consistent with the accused’s entitlement to be ‘tried in his presence’ as 
expressed in Article 14 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights.38 
 Like the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals, the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court also defines the accused’s presence at trial as a right.  Article 63(1) of the Rome 
Statute unequivocally states that “[t]he accused shall be present during the trial.”39  This 
statement, taken alone, does not indicate whether the accused has a right or a duty to be 
present at trial because it allows for the possibility that the accused’s presence can be 
required rather than resulting from the exercise of a right.  However, if the Statute is read 
as a whole, it becomes evident that the accused has a right to be present at trial.  That is 
because Article 67, much like Article 21 of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia’s Statute and Article 20 of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda’s Statute, sets out the ‘Rights of the Accused’ and identifies presence at trial as 
one of the entitlements contained therein.40   
 The Trial Chamber decisions in Prosecutor v Ruto et al and Prosecutor v 
Kenyatta relating whether trial could continue in the absence of the accused confirmed 
that Article 67(1)(d) sets out the accused’s right to be present at trial.41  The Ruto Court 
found that “there is no doubt that presence at trial is a right for the accused” as expressed 
by Article 67(1)(d) of the Statute.42  In a similar vein, the Kenyatta Court also announced 
that “[i]t is recognised that the presence of the accused during the trial is ... a right” and 
that the “[p]resence of the accused is the default position.”43  The Ruto Court, citing the 
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, went on to explain 
that the purpose of the right to be present is to protect the accused from outside 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38  Report of the Secretary-General, ‘Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Counsel 
Resolution 808’ (3 May 1993) U.N. Doc. S/25704 at para 101. 
39 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998) art 63(1). 
40 Ibid at art 67(1)(d). 
41 Prosecutor v Ruto et al. (Public Decision on Mr Ruto's Request for Excusal from 
Continuous Presence at Trial) ICC-01/09-01/11, T Ch V(A) (13 June 2013) para 35; 
Prosecutor v Kenyatta (Public Decision on Defence Request for Conditional Excusal 
from Continuous Presence at Trial) ICC-01/09-02/11, T Ch V(B) (18 October 2013) para 
124. 
42 Ruto (Trial Chamber Decision) supra note 41 at para 35. 
43 Kenyatta supra note 41 at para 124. 
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interference that might prevent him or her from effectively participating in trial.44 
Implicit in this finding is that the decision to appear lies with the accused, and that 
absence is only permissible if it is the product of the accused’s own free will.  It further 
supports the position that presence at trial is dependent on the accused’s active choice to 
participate in proceedings.  
 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia also has a strong 
preference in favour of conducting trial in the accused’s presence.  Like Article 63 of the 
Rome Statute, Rule 81 of the Extraordinary Chamber’s Internal Rules stands for the 
general proposition that “the accused shall be tried in his or her presence” limited only by 
the exceptions contained therein.45 Although that statement, taken alone, is largely 
neutral, the enumerated exceptions suggest that the Extraordinary Chambers require the 
accused to be present.  Rules 81(2) and (3) include provisions authorising the arrest or the 
use of force to compel the accused to be present during trial.46 The willingness of the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia to use physical force to compel the 
accused’s presence during trial demonstrates that, unlike many other international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals, it does not consider the accused’s 
unexplained absence from trial to be a valid waiver of the right to be present. The Internal 
Rules do allow trial to proceed in the accused’s absence after he or she has made his or 
her initial appearance, and in the following situations: when the accused refuses or fails 
to appear for hearings; is expelled from the proceedings for causing disruptions; or is too 
ill to attend.47 These scenarios, with the possible exception of absence due to illness, meet 
the criteria of notice and waiver suggesting that although the Extraordinary Chambers 
generally require the accused to be present, his or her absence can be interpreted as an 
exercise of his or her right to be present.   
 Article 17(4)(d) of the Special Court for Sierra Leone Statute mirrors the relevant 
Articles found in the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals.48  It is interesting to note that 
although the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s Statute was concluded three and half years 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Ruto (Trial Chamber Decision) supra note 41 at para 37; citing Nahimana et al. v The 
Prosecutor (Judgement) ICTR-99-52-A, A Ch (28 November 2007) para 107.  
45 Internal Rules, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (as amended 16 
January 2015) rule 81(1). 
46 Ibid at rule 81(2)-(3). 
47 Ibid at rule 81(4)-(5). 
48 UN Security Council, Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (16 January 2002) 
art 17(4)(d). 
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after the International Criminal Court’s Statute, the United Nations and Sierra Leone 
opted to follow the examples of the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals, and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and not the International Criminal Court. The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone ultimately found that Article 17(4)(d) was insufficient for 
its purposes. In 2003 it amended its Rules of Procedure and Evidence to specifically 
identify those situations in which trials may be conducted in the absence of the accused. 
Rule 60 authorises the Special Court for Sierra Leone to conduct trials in absentia in two 
situations, both arising after the accused has made his or her initial appearance before the 
court.  The first arises when the accused has been afforded the right to appear but refuses 
to do so.  The second occurs when the accused “is at large and refuses to appear in court.  
In both instances, the matter can proceed if the Judge or Trial Chamber “is satisfied that 
the accused has, expressly or impliedly, waived his right to be present.”49  By limiting 
trial in absentia to situations in which the accused has appeared before the court, and 
following a finding of an express or implied waiver on the part of the accused, the Court 
tacitly endorsed the accused’s right to be present at trial.  
 Even the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute, which famously contains a 
provision permitting trials in absentia, describes the accused as having a right to be 
present at trial.  Article 16(4)(d) of the Statute is modelled on Article 14(3)(d) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Articles 21 and 20 of the ad hoc 
Tribunals.  Like the relevant provisions found in the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals, 
Article 16 is titled ‘Rights of the Accused’ and indicates that one of the minimum 
guarantees of a fair trial is that the accused “be tried in his or her presence.”50  However, 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon makes the exercise of that right contingent on the terms 
of Article 22, the article that sets out the Tribunal’s trial in absentia regime.  Although 
the right to be present at trial at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is circumscribed by its 
approval of trials in absentia, the Special Tribunal tried to create a system that respects 
both the accused’s right to be present while also allowing trial in the absence of the 
accused.  
 It is clear from these Conventions and Statutes that a right to be present at trial 
exists in international criminal law.  All of the Statutes governing the conduct of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Special Court for Sierra Leone (as amended 7 March 
2003) rule 60(B). 
50 UN Security Council, Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (30 May 2007) art 
16(4)(d). 
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different international criminal courts and tribunals specifically indicate that the accused 
has the right to be present. Additionally, many courts and tribunals require clear evidence 
that the accused chose to be absent before trial can take place in their absence; the ability 
to choose being a hallmark of a right.  Despite the apparent uniformity amongst these 
various foundational documents, different courts have interpreted that right in different 
ways. Some courts, including the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the 
International Criminal Court have also found that in addition to having a right to be 
present, the accused also has a duty to be present at trial.  
2.2  THE DUTY TO BE PRESENT AT TRIAL 
 Although it is generally agreed that the accused has a right to be present at trial, 
some international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals have also found a 
corresponding duty to be present at trial.  No international or internationalised criminal 
court or tribunal recognising a duty to be present has done so in isolation; it has always 
been acknowledged together with the accused’s right to be present.  The idea that the 
accused’s presence at trial is both a right and a duty found initial support in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. In Poitrimol v France, the 
European Court of Human Rights found that the presence of the accused at trial gives 
meaning to two important aspects of criminal procedure.  First, it guarantees the 
accused’s right to a hearing, and second, it serves the evidentiary function of allowing the 
court to weigh the accused’s testimony against that of the victims and witnesses.51  The 
European Court observed that to achieve the second goal the legislature of the country in 
question “must accordingly be able to discourage unjustified absences” and suggests that 
the accused can be punished for his or her failure to appear.52   
 The Poitrimol decision does not explicitly impose a duty on the accused to be 
present but it does make clear that domestic legislatures have the authority to implement 
measures discouraging the accused from refusing to appear at trial. 53  Permitting 
governments to sanction an accused person for failing to appear at trial implies that the 
accused has some obligation to appear.  A right, by its very nature, may be freely 
exercised by the right holder. Therefore, the imposition of a penalty on the accused for 
failing to appear demonstrates the existence of a duty because it infringes on the free 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Poitrimol v France (1994) 18 EHRR 130, 23 November 1993 at para 35.  
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
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exercise of the right. Although the European Court of Human Rights does not specify 
what sanctions are appropriate, it did later find that denying the accused the right to 
counsel if he or she does not appear is not a permissible sanction.54 
 The Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on the Operation of European 
Conventions in the Penal Field (“Committee of Experts”) also explicitly identified the 
accused’s duty to be present at trial in conjunction with recognising the right to be 
present.  In a memorandum published in 1998 titled ‘Judgments in Absentia’, the 
Committee stated that the duty to be present at trial arises out of the requirement imposed 
on the defendant that he or she “give a personal account to the court”, which it described 
as a requirement of justice.55 The Committee of Experts did not offer any further 
comment on the duty to be present other then to acknowledge that linking the duty with 
an obligation to forgo one’s liberty for the duration of trial may not comport with Article 
5 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  It also did not attempt to explain how 
the right to be present and the duty to be present interact with one another. 
  Several international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals have also 
found that the accused has a duty to be present at trial. In The Prosecutor v Barayagwiza, 
the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found that in 
order for the accused to make a fully knowledgeable waiver of the right to be present, he 
or she must be informed of certain facts including “his/her right to be present at trial” and 
to “be informed that his or her presence is required at trial.”56  This holding indicates that 
there is a dual purpose underlying presence at trial.  However, it also mischaracterises the 
function of presence before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Neither the 
Tribunal’s Statute, nor its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, refer to a duty or 
requirement on the part of the accused to be present at trial.  In fact, the use of the word 
entitlement in Article 20(4)(d) indicates that presence at trial is a right and not a duty. In 
the context of international human rights law, the terms ‘right’ and ‘entitlement’ are 
synonymous and to be entitled to something means one has a right to it.57 Further, the 
French version of Article 20(4) uses the word droit, which can be translated as either 
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right or entitlement.58 This is a clear instance of the Appeals Chamber taking a position 
that is not based on the relevant law and importing it into its findings.  
 In reaching the conclusion that the accused’s presence at trial constitutes both a 
right and a duty, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Appeals Chamber 
relied on the Views expressed by the United Nations Human Rights Committee in 
Mbenge v Zaire.59  The Appeals Chamber asserted that Mbenge stood for the proposition 
that waiver of the right to be present is permitted provided, “in the interest of the sound 
administration of justice, that the accused has been informed beforehand of the 
proceedings against him, as well as of the date and place of the trial, and that he has been 
notified that his attendance is required.”60  In fact, the Mbenge Views do not expressly 
contain the attendance requirement asserted by the Appeals Chamber of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.  Instead, the Mbenge Views state that “[j]udgement in 
absentia requires that, notwithstanding the absence of the accused, all due notification has 
been made to inform him of the date and place of his trial and to request his 
attendance.”61  The substitution of the phrase “to request his attendance” with the phrase 
“notified that his attendance is required” substantively changes the nature of presence at 
trial from a right that can be freely exercised by the accused, to a duty required of the 
accused.  Therefore, not only did the Appeals Chamber read a requirement into the 
Statute and the Rules of Procedure that does not exist, it did so on the basis of a faulty 
interpretation of the relied upon jurisprudence.  The Appeals Chamber’s holding may 
accurately reflect its position as to the issue of presence at trial, however, one should be 
cautious as to the amount of weight one gives to this aspect of the Barayagwiza opinion. 
 Trial Chamber V(A) and Trial Chamber V(B) of the International Criminal Court 
also found that the accused has a duty to be present at trial in addition to a right to be 
present.62  Both Chambers stressed that the accused’s presence at trial should be regarded 
as, and is a reflection of, the accused’s duty to be present.63  In Ruto and Sang, Trial 
Chamber V(A) announced that Article 63(1) does not express a right to be present 	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59 Mbenge supra note 18. 
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because that right is already found in Article 67 and to construe both articles as setting 
out the same right would mean that Article 63 is redundant. 64 Instead, it was persuaded 
by the Prosecution’s argument that Article 63 contains a duty to be present and connected 
the obligations implicit in that duty to the need for judicial control over the proceedings.65  
To further bolster its position, the Chamber also announced that Article 63(1) of the 
Statute provides a statutory basis for it “to make impositions on the time and whereabouts 
of the accused for the purposes of trial” and that it also authorised the imposition of 
“sanctions and forfeitures” on the accused if he or she failed to comply with the duty to 
be present.66 The Kenyatta Court also determined that the accused has a duty to be 
present, although it did not clearly identify the basis for its conclusion.  However, the 
language of the decision seems to imply that it is based, at least to some extent, on a 
concern that if the defendant were not obliged to appear at trial, the ‘quest for justice’ 
would be thwarted.67  
 The Ruto and Sang Court also found support for its position in Article 58 of the 
Statute which it claims stands for the proposition that “the accused’s appearance at trial is 
an obligation, which can be enforced by means of arrest, if not voluntarily undertaken.”68 
Article 58(1)(b)(i) permits the Pre-Trial Chamber to issue an arrest warrant where there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that the arrest of the suspect is necessary to ensure his 
or her appearance at trial.69  The Trial Chamber’s reliance on this section of the Statute to 
support the imposition of a duty to appear on the defendant may be inappropriate, as 
doing so requires an interpretation of the article that goes beyond the language of the text.  
Article 58 is designed to endow the Court with a tool to satisfy its own interest in 
conducting trial in the presence of the accused. It does not, however, oblige the accused 
to be present. A duty obligates an individual to act, or not act, in a particular way so that 
he or she is in compliance with that duty.  Article 58(1)(B)(i), by contrast, does not 
impose anything upon the accused. To the extent the article imposes an obligation at all, 
it is on the Court, as the Article describes actions that can be taken by the Court and not 
the accused.   
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 On appeal by the prosecution, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal 
Court declined to directly address the status of presence at trial as a right and a duty.  It 
did disagree with the Trial Chamber’s finding that Article 63(1) would be made 
redundant if it was expressing a right already contained in Article 67(1)(d).70 Instead, the 
Appeals Chamber found that Article 63(1) was meant to reinforce the right to be present 
and “preclude any interpretation of Article 67(1)(d) of the Statute that would allow for a 
finding that the accused had implicitly waived his or her right to be present by 
absconding or failing to appear for trial.”71  The Appeals Chamber’s explicit recognition 
that Article 63(1) reinforces the accused’s right to be present at trial, without mentioning 
a corresponding duty to be present at trial, makes it reasonable to surmise that the 
Chamber does not believe that the Statute contains a duty to be present. However, its 
failure to specifically exclude the existence of a duty suggests that it is not prepared to 
rule out the idea entirely; particularly where, as here, it was able to reach its conclusion 
without having to rule on the existence of a duty.  This divergence of opinion between the 
Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber leaves open the question of whether the 
International Criminal Court’s Statute expresses a duty to be present along with the right 
to be present.    
 Commentators are also beginning to recognise the duty to attend trial contained in 
Article 63 of the Rome Statute.  In the most recent edition of his commentary on the 
International Criminal Court’s Statute, William Schabas states  “Article 63 appears to 
treat presence at trial as a duty”, an observation missing from the previous edition.72  Kai 
Ambos also recently asserted, “Article 63 itself does not speak of a ‘right’ but the use of 
the term ‘shall’ (in para. 1) rather suggests a general presence requirement coming close 
to a duty.”73  This commentary, taken together with the case law, shows increased 
recognition of the idea that the accused has both a right and a duty to be present at trial. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Prosecutor v Ruto et al. (Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the 
Decision of Trial Chamber V(A) of 18 June 2013 entitled “Decision on Mr Ruto's 
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October 2013) para 54. 
71 Ibid. 
72 William A Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome 
Statute (2nd ed, OUP 2016) 1035; c.f. William A Schabas, The International Criminal 
Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (OUP 2010) 807. 
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2.3 THE CONTRADICTION CREATED BY THE EXISTENCE OF BOTH 
 A RIGHT AND A DUTY TO BE PRESENT 
 Viewing the accused’s presence at trial as both a right and a duty creates an 
apparent contradiction.  By definition, a right can be freely exercised by the accused, 
whereas the accused is required to perform a duty.  Where a right and a duty overlap, the 
duty is necessarily dominant because it is compulsory.  Put differently, if an accused has 
a right to decide whether or not he wishes to appear at trial, as well as a duty requiring his 
or her appearance, the right is extinguished, as it is optional, in favour of the duty, which 
is obligatory.  If there is a duty to be present at trial, it could be argued that there is no 
right to be present.  Clearly, that conclusion is not sustainable because the Statute of 
every international and internationalised criminal court and tribunal asserts that such a 
right exists.  Therefore, the right to be present and the duty to be present must encompass 
different interests.   
 Reference to the text of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is 
instructive when determining what the right to be present entails.  The International 
Covenant grants the accused the minimum guarantee to be tried in his presence.74 
Describing the right to be present as a minimum guarantee implies that at a bare 
minimum the accused must have the opportunity to attend trial if he or she wishes. This 
interpretation of the right to be present was advanced by a Trial Chamber of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v Delalić et al. 
(“Čelebići Camp case”), when the presiding judge, Adolphus Godwin Karibi-Whyte 
stated of an absent defendant “[i]f he wants to be here, he has a right to be here. There is 
no doubt about it.”75  As a result, the right to be present is essentially the right not to be 
unilaterally excluded from trial.76  The existence of the right prevents courts from 
proceeding in the absence of the accused unless the accused waives his or her right to be 
present and the court accepts that waiver.77   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 International Covenant supra note 17 at art 14(3)(d). 
75 Prosecutor v Delalić, et al. (Trial Transcript) IT-96-21, T Ch (4 November 1997) 8973, 
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76 Alejandro Chehtman, The Philosophical Foundations of Extraterritorial Punishment 
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 This construction of the right is also supported by the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights. In Jelcovas v Lithuania, the Court found that “a person charged 
with a criminal offence should, as a general principle based on the notion of a fair trial, 
be entitled to be present at the first-instance hearing.”78  Although the Jelcovas holding 
does not explicitly interpret the right to be present at trial as securing the accused’s 
presence if he or she wishes to be present, that inference can be drawn if Jelcovas is read 
together with Stoichkov v Bulgaria.  There, the European Court of Human Rights found 
that the State has a duty “to guarantee the right of the criminal defendant to be present in 
the courtroom” and also held that it is one of the “essential requirements of Article 6”.79 
That the State would be required to guarantee the right of the accused, that is, not prevent 
the accused from being present, indicates that the accused’s right to be present should be 
understood as requiring trial to take place in his or her presence if he or she wishes to 
attend.  
 In international criminal law, the right to be present at trial is not an absolute right 
as evidenced by the fact that under certain circumstances it can be waived by the 
accused.80  The European Court of Human Rights has found that trials conducted in the 
absence of the accused comply with the right to be present when the accused has either 
explicitly or implicitly waived the right to be present.81 That the accused can choose to 
waive his or her presence at trial indicates that it is a right and not a duty as the accused 
has control over the decision of whether or not to exercise the right.82 This is reflected in 
the rules at the International Criminal Court.  In 2013, the International Criminal Court 
changed its Rules of Procedure and Evidence to permit portions of the trial to continue in 
the absence of the accused. Rules 134 bis, 134 ter and 134 quater all emphasise the 
importance of the accused waiving his or her right to be physically present in the court 
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before trial can take place in his or her absence.83  Rule 134 bis permits the defendant to 
request that he or she be permitted to appear at “part or parts” of his or her trial via video 
technology.84 Rule 134 ter and Rule 134 quater require that any absence on the part of 
the accused be accompanied by an explicit waiver of his or her right to be present at 
trial.85  By placing the power in the hands of the accused to explicitly waive his or her 
presence at trial, the Assembly of State Parties recognised that trial can only take place 
without the accused being present when the accused has specifically authorised that 
absence.    
 These new rules conflict with the Ruto Trial Chamber’s finding that Article 63(1) 
establishes a duty to be present at trial.  The purposes supporting a finding that an 
accused has a duty to be present, recognition of his or her active role as a participant in 
proceedings and protecting the interests of justice, are undermined if the accused can 
voluntarily absent him or herself from trial. By making trial contingent on the accused’s 
appearance or waiver of appearance, the condition under which trial takes place is 
entirely within the control of the accused and is a strong indication that presence at trial is 
a right. It also reinforces the idea that the right to be present is defined by the right not to 
be excluded from trial.  It logically follows that if the accused must agree to trial taking 
place in his or her absence then the accused cannot be prevented from attending trial if he 
or she wishes to attend. If there is no consent, i.e. no waiver, trial cannot lawfully occur.  
Therefore, the right to be present must be defined as the right not to be excluded.   
 The accused’s ability to decide whether trial can be conducted in his or her 
absence through the exercise of a waiver may be a strong indicator that the accused has a 
right to be present at trial but it is not conclusive.  Waiver can also indicate a duty to be 
present depending on how that waiver is established.  The Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
opened itself up to criticism by permitting trials in the absence of the accused based on a 
waiver presumed through the non-appearance of the accused following notice by 
publication.86  The Special Tribunal concluded that notice could be assumed due to the 
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fact that the efforts undertaken in Lebanon to publicise the Tribunal’s first indictment 
made it “inconceivable that [the four accused] could be unaware that they had been 
indicted”.87  The Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Trial Chamber took this supposition one 
step further in the Merhi case and found that “[t]he fact that [Mr. Merhi] has failed to 
respond to the charges either in person or through a lawyer leads to the conclusion that he 
has elected not to attend the hearing and has therefore waived his right to be present.”88   
  Assuming waiver based on less than conclusive evidence raises questions as to 
whether the accused’s absence is the result of an active choice not to attend trial.  
Because there is no clear indication that the accused’s absence is the result of a choice not 
to be present, trials in absentia conducted under these circumstances can best be 
described as the result of the accused’s failure to comply with the duty to be present. 
Waiver implied through silence or inaction indicates a duty to appear couched as a failure 
to exercise the right to appear.  However, failing to exercise a right is different from 
declining to exercise a right.  When an accused waives his or her right to be present, 
either explicitly or implicitly, it must be unequivocal and it is seen as an informed 
decision not to exercise the right to be present.  Failure to exercise a right through silence 
or inaction does not carry with it the same indicia that it was the product of an informed 
decision.  It suggests an obligation because it reverses how the right is understood.  
Rather than approaching trial in the absence of the accused as the result of an accused’s 
decision not to attend, it views trial in absentia as the natural result of a failure to act.  In 
this way, trial in absentia is seen as a legitimate exercise of a court’s powers.89 
 When trial in absentia is utilised, it is often justified on the grounds that the 
accused’s wilful absence from trial constitutes “bad faith conduct” by the accused and 
that such actions should not be allowed to delay or frustrate the smooth progress of trial.90 
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From that perspective, the overriding interest in justice belongs to the public and the goal 
of criminal prosecution is to arrive at the truth.91  It perceives the defendant’s absence as 
“halting the course of justice” which must be allowed to proceed so the social peace 
disturbed by the criminal offence can be restored.92  This approach understands justice as 
something that is only available to the victims of atrocity crimes because the accused can 
only thwart justice and not be protected by it.93  The failure of the accused to appear at 
trial is understood as a disruption to the course of justice and by not appearing the 
accused forfeits his or her right to participate in trial.94 This position directly conflicts 
with the general understanding that trial should only proceed following the accused’s 
unequivocal waiver of his or her right to be present. Viewing trial in absentia as the 
natural result of a failure to act deprives the accused of the ability to exercise his or her 
waiver of the right to be present.   
 The proper administration of justice is often cited as one of the key reasons why 
courts should require the accused’s attendance during trial and be allowed to proceed in 
his or her absence as punishment for his or her failure to attend.  If the right to be present 
prevents the court from conducting proceedings without first affording the accused the 
opportunity to attend if he or she so pleases, then the duty to be present requires the 
presence of the accused at trial in recognition of his or her active role as a participant in 
proceedings and “the wider significance of the presence of the accused for the 
administration of justice.”95 Presence at trial as a duty is seen as a choice to respect the 
“institutions of justice” above the rights of the accused.96  A key determination is whether 
holding trial in the absence of the accused is in the interests of justice.   
 The fear that the interests of justice might be subverted is the main driving force 
behind much of the commentary supporting a finding that the accused’s presence at trial 
is a duty. This argument is rooted in the Human Rights Committee’s Views in Mbenge v 
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Zaire. There the Committee stated that in absentia proceedings “are in some 
circumstances… permissible in the interest of the proper administration of justice.”97 The 
Human Rights Committee only identified one circumstance, where the accused is 
informed of the proceedings against him or her but declines to attend, in which the 
interest of the proper administration of justice is implicated.98  However, its use of the 
word ‘circumstance’ in its plural form indicates that there are other, unenumerated 
situations, in which the proper administration of justice permits courts and tribunals to 
proceed in the absence of the accused. It has been left to the individual courts and 
tribunals to conclude when those circumstances arise.  
 A determination as to what is meant by “the proper administration of justice” is 
necessarily a theoretical inquiry as it has no firm meaning and an understanding of the 
issue depends on an individual’s perception of what constitutes justice.99 On one side is 
the assertion that in absentia trials may be conducted under any circumstances so long as 
doing so would be within the “proper administration of justice.”100 From that perspective, 
justice is understood as righting a wrong committed by the accused and the accused is 
viewed as being “brought” to justice for the crimes he or she is alleged to have 
committed.101  The rationale behind this position is that the course of justice must 
proceed even if the accused refuses to participate in the proceedings.102 This view does 
not countenance the notion that failing to provide the accused with all of the rights to 
which he or she is entitled could also lead to injustice. The injustice being addressed is 
the one the accused is alleged to have committed and does not pertain to any injustice that 
might be committed against the accused.  Rather, presence at trial is plainly understood as 
a duty rather than a right because justice can only be achieved if the accused is present in 
court and available for punishment.  
 The Special Court for Sierra Leone subscribed to the latter position.  In The 
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Chamber observed that criminal law does not allow an absent or disruptive accused “to 
impede the administration of justice or frustrate the ends of justice.”103  This ruling was in 
response to Defendant Augustine Gbao’s refusal to attend any further hearings because 
he did not recognise the legitimacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.104  To halt trial 
under these circumstances would have been “tantamount to judicial abdication of the 
principle of legality and a capitulation to a frustration of the ends of justice without 
justification.”105  By ascribing its position to criminal law generally, it suggests that the 
Trial Chamber viewed this notion as being a general principle of law. The Court echoed 
this sentiment in The Prosecutor v Samuel Hinga Norman et al. when it found that it is 
not “in the interests of justice to allow the Accused’s deliberate absence from the 
courtroom to interrupt the trial” and that any deliberate absence “will certainly undermine 
the integrity of the trial and will not be in the interests of justice.”106   
 Others have taken the contrary position and asserted that ‘the interests of justice’ 
includes respecting the accused’s right to a fair trial.107  This belief encompasses a 
concern that conducting trials in absentia as punishment for failing to appear at trial will 
result in delegitimizing international tribunals, as doing so will call into question any 
verdicts entered against the accused in those circumstances. 108   Antonio Cassese 
recognised that the accused’s failure to appear at trial could prevent trials from occurring 
and “make a mockery of international justice”, but he also believed that the “paucity and 
inconsistency of international rules” regarding trial in absentia demonstrated that it was 
in the interests of justice not to construe presence at trial as a duty.109    
  In Prosecutor v Blăskić, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia found that generally speaking conducting a trial in 
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tried in his or her presence.110  However, the Appeals Chamber did find that it could 
conduct in absentia proceedings in matters involving the secondary jurisdiction of the 
tribunal, like contempt proceedings, because those matters involved “obstructing the 
administration of justice.”111  The logical interpretation of this holding is that in absentia 
trials are justified when it is alleged that the accused obstructed the administration of 
justice.  Because the Tribunal found that in absentia trials were not permissible when 
prosecuting crimes under the primary jurisdiction of the court, it follows that the Tribunal 
does not believe that the absence of the accused from trial when accused of primary 
jurisdiction crimes constitutes an obstruction of the administration of justice.  
 There is no clear agreement as to whether the interests of justice are impaired if 
the accused is not present during trial. In the face of such a disagreement, it is difficult to 
impose a duty on the accused to be present since the evidence does not wholly support 
the imposition of that duty.  Therefore, any duty imposed on the accused to appear at trial 
cannot be derived out of a concern that his or her absence will undermine the interests of 
justice, because it is unclear whether the available evidence supports such a conclusion.     
2.4 CONCLUSION 
 It is indisputable that the accused has a generally recognized right to be present at 
trial.  However, the recent jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court in the Ruto 
and Sang case indicates that the accused may also have a duty to appear at trial.  This 
initially suggests a contradiction in the law, however, the right and the duty to be present 
actually relate to different interests and are therefore not in conflict.  The accused’s right 
to be present is better understood as the right not to be excluded from trial if the accused 
wishes to attend.  This does not prevent trial from taking place in the absence of the 
accused as the accused may waive his or her right to be present.  
 The duty to be present recognizes the accused’s active role in trial proceedings 
and the important place that role occupies in the proper administration of justice. If the 
accused fails to appear, the court may conduct trial in absentia in acknowledgment of the 
accused’s responsibilities and as punishment for failing to appear. 112   However, 
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conducting trial in the absence of the accused as a punishment for his or her failure to 
appear directly conflicts with the fundamental responsibility of a criminal court to carry 
out its duties “with due regard to the rights of the accused.”113  If criminal courts are 
required to function with due regard for the rights of the accused, those same courts 
cannot inflict punishment on the accused if they disagree with the manner in which the 
accused chooses to exercise his or her rights. 
 As a result, although courts have found that the presence of the accused at trial is 
both a right and a duty, courts should be wary of allowing the right to be consumed by 
the duty.  When weighing the decision to proceed in the absence of the accused, the court 
should heed Mirjan Damaška’s concern that de-emphasising the importance of defence 
rights in favour of other interests might result in those rights becoming undervalued and 
lead to the conviction of innocent defendants.114  While the interests of the public are 
important, they must give way if they create a danger of convicting innocent defendants. 
Placing the efficient operation of the justice system ahead of defence rights is a slippery 
slope because an argument can be made that the system would function most effectively 
if the accused had no rights at all.  Once the rights of the accused are compromised to a 
small extent it becomes easier and easier to further limit those rights in the pursuit of 
other interests.  Rights should not be restricted or impaired in such a way as to 
compromise the basic purpose of that right.115  If one accepts that the accused has a duty 
to be present under international criminal law, one must also accept that it cannot be 
applied so as to invalidate any of the rights of the accused. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF DIFFERENT LEGAL  
SYSTEMS IN FORMULATING THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT  
AT TRIAL IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW  
 
 The question of why the accused should be present at trial has generally been 
approached from two different perspectives.  The first looks at presence at trial from the 
standpoint of the accused.  This defence-oriented perspective asserts that the accused 
should be present at trial so that he or she might understand the case against him or her 
and be afforded the opportunity to answer the charges. The second perspective is less 
concerned with fairness to the accused and more interested in the part the accused plays 
in trial. It values the accused’s presence as recognition of his or her active role as a 
participant and “the wider significance of the presence of the accused for the 
administration of justice.”1   These two different approaches to why the accused should 
be present are often attributed to the type of criminal law system followed by the court in 
question.  
 There are two dominant criminal procedure systems, the inquisitorial system (also 
called ‘the civil law system”, “the Romano-Germanic System” or the “continental 
system”) and the accusatorial system (also known as “the common law system,” “the 
adversarial system,” or “the Anglo/American system”). The inquisitorial system is 
oriented towards protecting “the interests of society”, achieving an objective 
understanding of the truth and applying legal principles based on written law.2 The 
adversarial system “is bent on enhancing the rights of the accused” and “ensuring respect 
for the fundamentals of “due process””.3 The two systems are also distinguished by the 
form of proceedings, with the inquisitorial system taking the shape of an official inquiry 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Prosecutor v Ruto et al. (Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the 
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October 2013) para 49. 
2 Kai Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law: Volume III: International 
Criminal Procedure (OUP 2016) 2; Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (OUP 
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and the accusatorial system progressing as a contest between competing parties.4 A 
further distinction involves how evidence is introduced at trial in each system.  In the 
inquisitorial system the judge has access to all of the available evidence and is generally 
charged with determining the probity of the evidence.5 By contrast, the parties in the 
adversarial system control what admissible evidence will be introduced during trial and 
some evidence is automatically excluded from consideration due to concerns about its 
reliability.6      
 This consideration of the accusatorial and inquisitorial systems should not be 
viewed as a value judgment whereby these systems are being elevated over other legal 
systems. These two systems are examined due to their relevance to the debate about how 
the right to be present should be applied by international and internationalised criminal 
courts and tribunals. However, efforts are now being made to define international 
criminal procedure on its own terms and as a reflection of policy determinations designed 
to meet the needs of international criminal justice.7 Commentators have begun to reject 
the importance of the inquisitorial and accusatorial distinction in the international 
criminal law context, and a move is afoot to do away with them altogether as they are 
viewed as largely a distinction without a difference.8 It is thought that these different 
legal systems share so many characteristics that the distinctions that once distinguished 
the inquisitorial and accusatorial systems have become blurred and that there is no longer 
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101. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Jens David Ohlin, ‘A Meta-Theory of International Criminal Procedure: Vindicating the 
Rule of Law’ (2009) 14 UCLA J Intl L & For Aff 77, 81; Frédéric Mégret, ‘Beyond 
“Fairness”: Understanding the Determinants of International Criminal Procedure’ (2009) 
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a Crime’, in Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome 
Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results (Kluwer Law International 1999) 256; William A. 
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any true expression of either system.9  What system a particular rule comes from before 
being incorporated into the procedure of a court or tribunal is thought to be less important 
than whether its incorporation “is consistent with international standards of fairness.”10   
3.1 INQUISITORIAL AND ACCUSATORIAL APPROACHES TO THE 
 RIGHT TO BE PRESENT 
 Within the context of presence at trial, domestic courts using the inquisitorial 
system often permit trials in absentia on the basis that justice should not be “thwarted” by 
an accused who refuses to appear for or participate in trial.11 This does not suggest that 
the accused is not entitled to appear at trial in the inquisitorial system. Rather, an accused 
who fails to appear for trial or is disruptive during trial is viewed as having waived that 
right.  Conversely, countries that adhere to the accusatorial system, and its focus on due 
process and the rights of the accused, generally do not permit trials in absentia, although 
there are exceptions.12  This is because the accusatorial system necessarily requires the 
interplay between the parties with each side, prosecution and defence, having a role to 
play in how trial is conducted.13  
 Many civil law countries permit trials in absentia, but the decision to do so should 
not necessarily be connected with the inquisitorial system.14 Germany, a country that 
follows the inquisitorial system, generally does not allow trials in absentia.15  At the same 
time, Italy, which adopted adversarial procedures in 1989, allows trial to take place in the 
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14 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd Ed, OUP 2008) 389. 
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absence of the accused.16  Although trials in absentia are most commonly associated with 
the inquisitorial system, it can be argued that the most genuine manifestation of that 
system rejects such trials.  It is often said that the core goal of the inquisitorial system is 
to determine the objective, material or real truth.17  However, Germany recognises that 
the accused is a necessary participant in the search for the truth. If one thinks of the truth 
as a puzzle, with each bit of evidence constituting a piece, some of those pieces are in the 
sole possession of the accused.  His or her absence, and resulting inability to add those 
pieces, prevents the puzzle of truth from being completed.  The German and Spanish 
legal systems are aware of this and do not countenance trials in which the whole truth can 
never be ascertained because the accused is not present.  Therefore, the German and 
Spanish systems may be the most inquisitorial in their approach to the presence of the 
accused, as those systems have the greatest commitment to finding the objective truth.   
 Another inquisitorial approach is found in he French criminal justice system. The 
French system also recognises the important function played by the accused in the trial 
process and the questioning of the accused is considered a central element of the trial as 
the accused is expected to contribute to the process of learning the truth.18  Despite the 
important role the accused plays in trial, the French system is willing occasionally willing 
to dispense with the important role played by the accused and proceed in his or her 
absence for two reasons. First, the court gathers both inculpatory and exculpatory 
evidence during the investigatory process and considers all of the evidence when 
reaching its verdict regardless of whether the accused is present.19  Second, it is thought 
that the public’s interest in adjudicating crimes is more important than the accused’s right 
to be present at trial, particularly when the accused has notice of the trial and chooses to 
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(Hart Publishing 2005) 21. 
19 Cassese supra note 2 at 371-372. 
	   34 
voluntarily absent himself or herself.20   
 The different methods of addressing the accused’s presence at trial pursued by the 
German and French legal systems demonstrate that trial in absentia is not a necessary 
component of the inquisitorial system. Rather than connecting a domestic criminal justice 
system’s willingness to conduct trials in absentia to it being an inquisitorial system, a 
more likely answer can be found in the historical development of criminal procedure in 
Germany and France. A consideration of these two particular countries is key because of 
the global influence of their legal systems. The German predilection in favour of 
conducting trial in the presence of the accused can be traced to an early German criminal 
procedure code, the Sachsenspiegel.  Believed to have first appeared in 1235, the 
Sachsenspiegel detailed a synthesis between traditional legal practices with new 
approaches to criminal procedure.21 The procedure contained therein was accusatorial in 
nature, as opposed to Germany’s modern inquisitorial system, and it did not permit trial 
to take place in the accused’s absence.22  Instead, an absent accused was declared an 
outlaw resulting in the forfeiture of his legal rights and protections.23   
 Inquisitorial procedures began to develop in Germany during the subsequent two 
centuries and were uniformly codified in the sixteenth century in the Constitutio 
Criminalis Carolina. 24  The provisions of the Constitutio Criminalis Carolina were 
largely concerned with regulating the use of torture as a means of inducing an accused 
person to confess, and operated with the clear expectation that the accused would be 
present to endure the torturous inquest.25 The Constitutio Criminalis Carolina remained 
in force until the unification of Germany in 1871 and the enactment of the 
Strafgesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich (Criminal Code for the German Reich) 
(“RStGB”).26  The RStGB, still in force today, albeit in a somewhat modified form, 
reflects the general rule in German law that trial be conducted in the presence of the 
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21 Maria Dobozy, (trans), ‘Saxon Mirror: A Sachsenspiegel of the Fourteenth Century’ 
(The University of Pennsylvania Press 1999) 22. 
22 Sachsenspiegel, Book One, Clause 38, as reprinted in Dobozy supra note 21 at 80. 
23 Sachsenspiegel, Book One, Clause 67, as reprinted in Dobozy supra note 21 at 89.  
24 John Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance: England, Germany, France 
(Harvard UP 1974) 155. 
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accused.27  This historical perspective demonstrates that German law’s preference in 
favour of conducting trial in the presence of the accused developed over centuries and is 
not necessarily a product of the inquisitorial system. 
 Although the French legal system has a long history of allowing trial to occur 
without the accused being present, trials in absentia have not always been permitted 
under French Law. The earliest French legal codes still in existence, the Etablissements 
de Saint Louis and la Coutume de Normandie, detail customary law as it existed in 
different parts of France in the 12th and 13th centuries.28 Neither document describes any 
procedure for conducting trials in absentia; instead, an absent accused was banished from 
the relevant community and deprived of many of his legal rights if he failed to appear 
following an official summons.29  This changed in the 16th century with the introduction 
of L’Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterêts.  L’Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterêts was not an 
official legal code but an expression of the changes its author wished to see made in the 
existing code.30  In particular, it did away with the long-standing banishment procedure in 
favour of conducting trials in the absence of the accused.31  The use of trials in absentia 
was further developed in the 17th century when l’Ordonnance Criminelle became the first 
criminal procedure code to set out a comprehensive procedure for trying the accused in 
absentia.32 That procedure was retained by Napoleon when he introduced the Code 
d’Instruction Criminelle in 1808.33  The Code d’Instruction Criminelle was disseminated 
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Community (Butterworths 1993) 159-60; Christoph J.M. Safferling, Towards an 
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note 32 at 23; Esmein supra note 26 at 74. 
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June 2017.  
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throughout the world and influenced the development of criminal procedure in those 
countries making up the French empire, as well as Belgium, Luxembourg, Poland, 
Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, Japan, Ottoman Turkey and parts of South America, 
Italy, Egypt, Switzerland, Canada and Germany.34  The Code d’Instruction Criminelle 
remained in force until 1958 when the current French criminal procedure code came into 
force.35 Despite the fact France has had a number of different criminal procedure codes, a 
clear line can be drawn through them evidencing a historical commitment to conducting 
trials in absentia without demonstrating any real correlation to its use of an inquisitorial 
system. 
 By comparison, the English and Welsh legal system, which is considered the 
foundational accusatorial legal system, is increasingly embracing trials in absentia.  
Historically, the notion of trial taking place in the absence of the accused was rejected as 
being incompatible with the British common law.  In the eighteenth century, William 
Blackstone made clear that trial could not commence for a felony if the accused was not 
present and that remained the general rule into the twentieth century when the traditional 
legal position on the right to be present began to erode.36  
 The general prohibition against proceeding in the absence of an accused charged 
with a felony began to change in 1933 when, in Lawrence v The King, the Privy Council 
found that the rule requiring the presence of the accused was “inviolable” except possibly 
when the conduct of the accused makes holding the trial impossible and then it might 
take place in his or her absence.37 The permissibility of proceeding in the accused’s 
absence continued to expand in 1972 when the Court of Appeal extended the holding of 
R. v Abrahams, an Australian case pertaining exclusively to misdemeanour crimes, by 
finding that it also applied to felonies.38 In doing so, the Court of Appeal reiterated the 	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general position that the accused has the right to be present at trial; however, it made the 
right contingent on the accused not abusing it for the purpose of obstructing the 
proceedings.39 It also found that by absconding, an accused waives his or her right to be 
present, and the Court can properly proceed in the absence of the accused.40  The Court 
left open to the discretion of the trial court the possibility of continuing trial in the 
accused’s absence in other circumstances, while cautioning that the court’s discretion 
should be used with “great reluctance” and its exercise should be based on the “the due 
administration of justice”.41 
 The 21st century saw further changes to British law in relation to the right to be 
present at trial.  In 2002, the trial court decision in R v Anthony William Jones repeated 
the conclusion that the right to be present could be waived through the deliberate absence 
of the accused and that the judge had the discretion to proceed with an in absentia trial.42  
The Jones court also set out a list of considerations for the court to take into account 
when deciding whether to proceed in the accused’s absence; which were then slightly 
modified by the later ruling in the House of Lords to uphold the decision of the Court of 
Appeal.43  In R v O’Hare, it was found that waiver of the right to be present could be 
implied if it were demonstrated that “the accused knew of, or was indifferent to, the 
consequences of being tried” in his or her absence.44  English and Welsh courts have also 
proceeded in the absence of an unrepresented accused upon a finding by the court that the 
accused’s refusal to leave his cell for trial and to properly instruct his counsel acted as a 
waiver of his right to be present and his right to representation.45  These decisions signal 
a clear departure from the traditional accusatorial principle that trial should take place in 
the presence of the accused.   
 As indicated by the changing practices in England, there appears to be growing 
support in different domestic legal systems for conducting some or all of trial in the 	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accused’s absence.46 At the same time, more countries have also been shifting away from 
the inquisitorial system and towards adopting more accusatorial practices.47 That trial is 
being conducted in the accused’s absence in more countries, while simultaneously more 
national jurisdictions are adopting adversarial criminal procedures, further demonstrates 
that trial in absentia is not an idea limited to the inquisitorial system.  It also highlights 
the blurring between traditional ideas about different legal systems and reinforces the 
growing conclusion that the debate about the accusatorial and inquisitorial systems is 
nothing more than a false dichotomy.  
3.2 THE IMPACT INQUISITORIAL AND ACCUSATORIAL 
 APPROACHES HAVE HAD ON THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT IN 
 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 Distinguishing between accusatorial and inquisitorial systems is also of 
diminishing relevance in the context of international criminal law.  None of the 
international or internationalised criminal courts or tribunals is completely inquisitorial or 
accusatorial in style, but rather blend elements of both systems in their Statutes, Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence and their practice.   International criminal procedure is best 
viewed as an attempt to develop a procedure “that is uniquely suited to the reality and the 
values of the tribunals’ international nature”.48 While it is important to understand the 
distinguishing components of each system, one should not become too focused on what 
differentiates the two systems.  Ultimately, no statutory or procedural rule is imported 
unchanged from a national jurisdiction into the Statute or Rules of an international 
criminal tribunal.49 Each rule must be designed “to promote the object and purpose of a 
fair and expeditious trial in the international setting of the Tribunal.”50 Rules are likely to 
undergo modifications based on the “contextual and teleological requirements” of the 	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particular Tribunal, notwithstanding which system the rule was drawn from.51 As a Trial 
Chamber at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia made clear in 
Prosecutor v Delalić et al. “[a] Rule may have a common law or civilian law origin but 
the final product may be an amalgam of both common law or civilian elements, so as to 
render it sui generis.”52  
 Salvatore Zappalà questions whether the accusatorial system is even relevant in 
international criminal law.  Zappalà argues that modern international criminal law norms 
adequately protect the rights of the accused through the imposition of a duty on judges 
and prosecutors “to assist the accused in the preparation of his or her defence.”53  
Zappalà’s position is undermined by the fact that, in practice, defendants at the 
international criminal courts and tribunals do not always receive the requisite assistance 
from the prosecution.  The Lubanga trial at the International Criminal Court had to be 
stayed on two different occasions by the Trial Chamber because of the Prosecution’s 
refusal to disclose evidence to the defence.54  The International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia was forced to delay the progress of the Mladić trial after it was 
discovered that the Prosecution failed to produce millions of pages of documents in what 
the court described as “the prosecution’s significant disclosure errors.”55  These “errors” 
reinforce the importance of protecting the fair trial rights of the accused at international 
and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals.  The accused must be afforded the 
necessary safeguards to protect his or her fair rights regardless of the criminal law 
tradition with which those protections may be associated. 
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 3.2.1 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER   
  YUGOSLAVIA 	  
  Despite the diminishing importance in distinguishing between the two systems, a 
perceived tension between inquisitorial and accusatorial procedures informed the drafting 
of the Statutes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ad hoc Tribunals.56  This 
tension was no more evident than in the debate concerning whether the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia should permit trials in absentia.  Prior to 
submitting the draft statute to the Security Council for its approval, the Secretary General 
of the United Nations solicited suggestions from different states regarding the formation 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.57 The right to be 
present at trial, and whether to hold trials in absentia, were amongst the most debated 
issues addressed in the proposals received.   
  The French government proposed using trials in absentia in a way that would be 
consistent with the inquisitorial system as described in the French Code de procédure 
pénale.58 The French proposal barred the absent accused from being represented by 
council and from questioning witnesses.59  The French did suggest that any judgment 
reached in the absence of the accused would be annulled if the accused came under the 
control of the Tribunal and that trials in absentia should be utilised only as a last resort.60  
France appears to have been motivated by a concern that the work of the Tribunal would 
have been paralysed in the absence of trials in absentia.61  The French opinion on this 
issue is informed by the inquisitorial system’s emphasis on the interests of society over 
the interests of the accused. 
  Other nations supported the French position, although there is little clear evidence 	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that the support was the result of adherence to a particular system of criminal law.  The 
Russian government proposed that the accused’s right to be present at trial be respected, 
but it also allowed for the possibility of trying an accused in his or her absence.62  
Although that position did not find support at the time, it is actually quite similar to the 
policy later adopted by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. The Italian government 
suggested that default judgments should be excluded “unless specifically accepted”, a 
somewhat unusual suggestion, particularly as over the following decade, the Italian 
government would repeatedly find itself in trouble with the European Court of Human 
Rights for failing to properly notify the accused before conducting trials in their 
absence.63   
  In contrast, the United States was firmly against conducting trial in the absence of 
the accused.  The United States government took the position that the Tribunal “must be 
fair and be seen to be fair” and that part of achieving that goal was “the participation of 
defendants in their own defense.”64  The United States also proposed including an Article 
forbidding the commencement of trial in the absence of the accused.65  This position is 
clearly based on the accusatorial system as practised in the United States with its 
emphasis on due process and the rights of the accused. Interestingly, the government of 
the Netherlands also opposed permitting trials in absentia at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, despite the fact that the Netherlands allows in 
absentia trials in its national courts.  The Netherlands based its opposition on two 
grounds: first, any in absentia conviction would be “questionable from a legal point of 
view” because the absent accused would also be unrepresented; and second, because of 
the perceived difficulty of notifying a person convicted in absentia of their conviction in 
time to allow the appeals process to be completed during the limited time period during 	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which the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia would be open.66 By 
contrast, the Netherlands supported the inclusion of trial in absentia in the International 
Criminal Court’s Statute in part because the Rome Statute ensured the accused’s right to 
counsel and, as a permanent court, it avoided the danger of the court ceasing operations 
before any potential appeals might be heard.  The Netherlands’ willingness to change its 
position about the permissibility of trials in absentia suggests that it was acting in what it 
believed was the best interests of the court or tribunal being established, and not through 
some ideological notion of how to best implement the inquisitorial system at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
 The resultant Statute takes a fairly clear position about whether the accused has a 
right to be present at trial.  Using the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
as a model, the accused’s presence at trial is described as one of the minimum guarantees 
of a fair trial.  Although the Statute stops short of describing presence at trial as a right, 
the report prepared by the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to the 
Security Council’s resolution establishing the Tribunal leaves little doubt that the accused 
has the right to be present at trial and that trials in absentia should not be permitted at the 
ICTY.67  In paragraph 101 of his report, the Secretary-General reiterated the position of 
the United States and stated, “[a] trial should not commence until the accused is 
physically present before the International Tribunal.”68  The Secretary-General went on to 
declare, “[t]here is a widespread perception that trials in absentia should not be provided 
for in the statute as this would not be consistent with article 14 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which provides that the accused shall be entitled 
to be tried in his presence.”69 
 Despite this seemingly unequivocal statement by the Secretary-General, the 
debate continued about whether the ICTY could conduct trials in absentia.  Proponents of 
trials in absentia viewed the Tribunal’s failure to adopt the procedure as a triumph of the 
accusatorial system over the inquisitorial system, and argued that the Tribunal would be 
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unable to meet its political goals without conducting in absentia trials.70  Two lines of 
argument are used to attack the Secretary-General’s position; the first is semantic and the 
second is legal.  In line with the first argument, Paola Gaeta indicates that the phrase 
“[t]here is a widespread perception”, contained in the original English version of the 
report, appears as “[d]’aucuns estiment que” in the French version which, when translated 
into English, means “some hold the view that”.71  In Gaeta’s view, the more equivocal 
phrase contained in the French text may indicate that the possibility of holding trials in 
absentia was a topic about which there was disagreement, as opposed to the phrase found 
in the English version of the report which more definitively rules out trials in absentia.72  
While it is true a discrepancy exists between the meaning of the phrases “[t]here is a 
widespread perception” and “[d]’aucuns estiment que”, that inconsistency is minimised 
when placed in the context of the entire paragraph.   In particular, the French version of 
the report also states that trials in absentia are inconsistent with Article 14 of the 
International Covenant.73 Whether some people or most people think trial in absentia 
should not be included in the Statute is of no real import when indicating that such a 
provision would violate the International Covenant.  Additionally, there is no legal basis 
for the suggestion that the French version of the report should somehow negate the 
meaning of the English version.  That is particularly true where, as here, the report was 
written in English and the French version is a translation.74  It is counterintuitive to 
disavow the meaning of the language used in the original document in favour of a 
different meaning extrapolated from a translation.   
 A second semantic argument concerns the Secretary-General’s use of the term 
“[a] trial should not commence until the accused is physically present” in his report, 
rather than the more decisive, “shall not commence until the accused is physically 
present”.  It is thought by some that the use of the former statement suggests a lack of 
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decisiveness about the issue.75  However, if the Secretary-General’s Report is placed in 
the appropriate context, that of a series of recommendations on the form of the draft 
statute and commentary thereto, then the oblique language used in the commentary is 
appropriate for its purpose.76  The Secretary-General was attempting to make suggestions 
about how the Tribunal should proceed, not direct the Tribunal as to how it must operate. 
 The legal argument used to refute the Secretary-General’s conclusion that trial in 
absentia should not be permitted at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia relates to the Secretary-General’s assertion that to do so would be 
inconsistent with Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
Scholars have argued that the Secretary-General was incorrect when he asserted that trials 
in absentia do not comply with Article 14 of the International Covenant.77 Support for 
this position runs the spectrum.  Herman Schwartz alleges that the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia does permit trials in absentia because international 
criminal law permits the accused to waive his or her right to be present.78 Ruth 
Wedgwood suggests that the Secretary-General may have intentionally relied on a 
misinterpretation of Article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant in an effort to be less 
controversial.79  Alain Pellet insists that it would be absurd to interpret Article 14(3)(d) as 
imposing a ban on conducting trial in the accused’s absence as such an interpretation 
would run counter to “les exigences d'une justice equitable” and threaten to paralyze the 
proper functioning of the Tribunal.80  While there is some validity to the general 
proposition that the Secretary-General’s reliance on Article 14 to prohibit trials in 
absentia was misplaced, the opinions of these commentators takes the argument too far.  
The Human Rights Committee interpretation of Article 14(3)(d) is more nuanced than the 
Secretary-General’s report might suggest as it identifies exceptions to the right to be 
present at trial rather than supporting the seemingly inviolable rule announced by the 
Secretary-General.81  However, there is little basis to support the conclusion that the 
Secretary-General intentionally misstated or misinterpreted the International Covenant.  	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 In an effort to reconcile the Secretary-General’s statement with the jurisprudence 
of the Human Rights Committee, some commentators have justified the decision not to 
hold trials in absentia as a political one.  Various political pros and cons of holding trials 
in absentia have been advanced. Those advocating in favour of trials in the absence of the 
accused claimed that it would likely be difficult for the Tribunal to gain custody over the 
accused, particularly due to the expected failure of the States involved to extradite 
identified suspects.82 In absentia proceedings would provide the possibility of a public 
condemnation of the accused, even when he or she is not physically within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 83  Others were concerned that if the Tribunal had no 
procedure condemning an absent accused, the Tribunal would be in danger of becoming 
‘une bureaucratie inefficace’.84 Opponents of in absentia proceedings were concerned 
that if the accused was not present during trial, the trials could be perceived as ‘show 
trials’ and the verdicts dismissed as little more than a biased condemnation.85  This view 
connotes a concern that trials in absentia would open up the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to criticisms similar to those directed at the 
Nuremberg trials.86  The fear was that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia would be nothing more than a “paper tiger” issuing “hollow judgments” and 
wasting limited resources on trying defendants that would never be punished.87 
 The debate over whether the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia should conduct trials in absentia did not end with the conversation 
surrounding the Statute.88 When the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence were 
being discussed prior to their adoption in February 1994, Antonio Cassese, the Tribunal’s 
first president, submitted a memorandum to the judges in which he challenged the 
Secretary-General’s assertion that trials held in the accused’s absence are not consistent 
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with the right to be present and advocated for a rule permitting trial by default.89  The 
notion of adopting a rule permitting trials by default was met with resistance and 
ultimately was not adopted as many of the judges had reservations about conducting trial 
under those circumstances.90 Cassese later confirmed that “the overriding need to ensure 
that justice is not only done, but is seen to be done” led to the conclusion by the judges 
that trial in absentia should not be incorporated into the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence.91 Judge Gabrielle Kirk 
McDonald proposed an alternative procedure under which a hearing could be conducted 
to preserve and make public the evidence against an absent accused.92  In Judge 
McDonald’s formulation the accused would be entitled to representation by counsel 
during the proceeding.93  
 Instead of allowing trial by default of trial in absentia, the Tribunal introduced 
Rule 61 as a compromise between the different sides in favour or against conducting the 
entirety of trial outside of the accused’s presence.94 Rule 61 describes a procedure that 
amalgamates the proposals set forth by Professor Cassese and Judge McDonald into a 
single process. Rule 61 permits the Tribunal’s Trial Chambers to conduct hearings in the 
absence of the accused during which evidence is presented and, at the conclusion of the 
proceeding, the Chamber reaches a determination about the culpability of the accused.95  
These proceedings have been described as resembling trials in absentia, “a substitute to 
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the process in absentia” and most notably by former Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen, as 
“a mock trial.”96 Rule 61 has also been described as a compromise “between common 
law countries who disfavoured the use of trial in absentia and civil law countries who felt 
that without it, the Tribunal would not be able to function properly.”97  Rule 61 
proceedings largely proved to be an unsatisfactory solution and quickly fell out of use.98 
Louise Arbour, former chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, considered Rule 61 proceedings detrimental to the work of the 
prosecution, and felt that its benefits did not outweigh its detriments.99   
 The Appeals Chamber largely resolved the conflict surrounding the 
appropriateness of proceeding outside of the presence of the accused in its decision in 
Prosecutor v Blaškić. Speaking in the context of whether the Tribunal was authorized to 
hold in absentia contempt proceedings against an individual that failed to comply with a 
subpoena, the Appeals Chamber addressed the appropriateness of holding in absentia 
trials generally.100 The Appeals Chamber found that: 
[G]enerally speaking, it would not be appropriate to hold in absentia 
proceedings against persons falling under the primary jurisdiction of the 
International Tribunal (i.e., persons accused of crimes provided for in 
Articles 2-5 of the Statute). Indeed, even when the accused has clearly 
waived his right to be tried in his presence (Article 21, paragraph 4 (d), of 
the Statute), it would prove extremely difficult or even impossible for an 
international criminal court to determine the innocence or guilt of that 
accused.101  
 
Although the Blaškić case did not directly involve the defendant’s right to be present at 
trial, the Appeals Chamber’s opinion that the Statute did not permit trials in absentia has 
been afforded due respect.  This is particularly evident from the fact that several 
significant suspects avoided coming under the jurisdiction of the court and no effort was 	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made to try them in their absence.  
 Despite the rather clear preference in favour of trial in the presence of the 
accused, the Tribunal would eventually come to accept that some proceedings could take 
place in the accused’s absence.  Rule 80 of the Tribunal’s Rules generally authorises the 
exclusion of any individual from the courtroom in order to maintain the dignity and 
decorum of the proceedings and specifically allows the Trial Chamber to order the 
removal of the accused if he or she has been consistently disruptive and has been warned 
that he or she may be removed.102  If the accused is removed under Rule 80, the trial may 
continue in his or her absence.103  The Appeals Chamber would later find that disruptions 
to trial consistent with Rule 80(b) were not confined to the defendant’s outbursts; it also 
described absence due to illness as a disruption to trial, albeit a non-intentional one.104  A 
later Appeals Chamber decision would find that the right to be present at trial is not 
absolute; that it can be waived or forfeited as evidenced by the fact that a disruptive 
accused could be removed from the courtroom.105  However, the right to be present, as a 
fundamental right, can only be restricted in service of a sufficiently important objective, 
and the restriction can be no greater than that which is necessary to achieve that 
objective.106  
 The Secretary-General’s Report and the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia’s subsequent decision in Blaškić led many to conclude that the 
accused must be tried in his or her presence at the Tribunal.107  However, the Tribunal’s 
actual practise has been much more nuanced.  The early debate over whether trial in 
absentia should be incorporated into the Tribunal’s rules, and the resulting compromise 	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position establishing the Rule 61 proceedings that could take place outside of the 
accused’s presence, demonstrates that the issue was far from settled.  The subsequent 
practice to continue trials in the absence of a disruptive or unwell accused indicates that 
the Tribunal has been much more flexible in interpreting the Statute’s dictate that the 
accused be tried in his or her presence.  While it is certainly true that the Statute and the 
Tribunal’s jurisprudence would not allow for the entirety of trial to take place in the 
absence of the accused, it is also apparent that substantial portions of trial have occurred 
outside of the accused’s presence.   
 3.2.2 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 	  
 The idea of a permanent international criminal court is an old one.  In 1920, 
Baron Descamps, the president of the Committee of Jurists, suggested the establishment 
of a ‘High Court of International Justice’ to adjudicate crimes against public order and 
the law of nations.108  Baron Descamps’ declaration was followed two years later by an 
International Law Association resolution advocating in favour of the creation of an 
International Criminal Court.109  Two years later the International Law Association 
promulgated a draft Statute for the proposed court.110  Interest in the Court was revived in 
1948, when Article 6 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide authorised trial against individuals accused of genocide “in such 
international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction.”111 This led to the International Law 
Commission drafting a model statute for an international criminal court before the idea 
was again abandoned in the 1950’s.  
 Interest in an international criminal court was resurrected in the late 1980’s by 
Arthur Napoleon Raymond Robinson, then the Prime Minister of Trinidad and 
Tobago.112 Concerned by the financial pressure being placed on small nations to combat 
international narco-terrorism, Mr Robinson formed a coalition of Latin American and 
Caribbean countries and requested a U.N. General Assembly agenda item “addressing the 	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creation of an international criminal court with jurisdiction over international drug 
offenses.”113  The General Assembly responded to the Trinidadian initiative by requesting 
that the International Law Commission renew its earlier work on a Statute for an 
international criminal court.114  While the negotiating parties quickly agreed that the 
default position of the court should be to conduct trial in the presence of the accused, the 
issue of trial in absentia came to be considered one of the most controversial topics 
during the negotiation process of the Statute. 115 
 Some debate exists as to whether the divergence in practice between the 
inquisitorial and accusatorial systems played a role in the development of the 
International Criminal Court’s position on the presence of the accused.  Salvatore 
Zappalà describes the issue of whether trials in absentia should be permitted as one of the 
“key divisions” between inquisitorial and accusatorial nations, and that the debate 
between the two sides on the issue was reopened during the negotiations of the Rome 
Statute.116   Håkan Friman took a less strident stance by asserting that although the 
conversation over trials in absentia during the negotiation of the Rome Statute did not 
exactly split down inquisitorial versus accusatorial lines, the type of system followed 
domestically did often inform the position of the negotiating states.117  William Schabas 
rejects Zappalà and Friman’s positions as a false distinction and asserts that the issue of 
presence at trial is really an issue of different practices rather than one about the 
fundamental values underlying national criminal law practices.118 Despite his refutation 
of the traditional understanding of the clash between the accusatorial and inquisitorial 
systems, Schabas does recognise that the debate about presence at trial during the Rome 
Conference invoked some of the traditional disagreements between the accusatorial and 
inquisitorial traditions.119      
 The drafting history of the International Criminal Court’s Statute does not clearly 
demonstrate an inquisitorial or accusatorial bias with regard to the right to be present 
although there are some identifiable instances in which concerns were raised arising out 	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of that dichotomy.  In particular, the early negotiations do not suggest a debate drawn 
along inquisitorial versus accusatorial lines. The introduction in 1993 of the International 
Law Commission’s Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court (“1993 Draft 
Statute”) immediately sparked debate over whether trial in absentia should be permitted, 
but that debate appears to have been informed by the practice in each commenting state 
and not whether it employed an inquisitorial or accusatorial system.120  
 Article 44 of the 1993 Draft Statute sets out the suggested rights to be afforded to 
the accused, including the right to be present at trial.121  The Article’s Commentary 
demonstrates significant disagreement amongst the Committee’s members with regard to 
the appropriateness of trials in absentia.  Some took the position that trials in absentia 
should be banned outright, while other members took a more nuanced view.122  It was 
proposed that distinctions about the reason for the accused’s absence should be drawn 
and three different types of absence were discussed, including: (1) where the accused has 
been indicted but is unaware of the proceedings; (2) the accused has been notified but 
refuses to appear; and (3) the accused has been arrested but escapes before the start of 
trial.123 The members also debated whether trial should be allowed to commence under 
these different scenarios, although it was generally agreed that trial should not take place 
in the first situation and that retrial be allowed if a trial in absentia were conducted.124   
 Following the presentation of the 1993 Draft Statute, the United Nations invited 
the states to present their written positions as to the advisability of conducting trials in 
absentia.125 These written statements indicate that States’ positions were not strictly 
dictated on the basis of the inquisitorial/accusatorial divide.  Some countries, including 
Germany, Australia, New Zealand, Malta, the United States, Switzerland (as a non-
member State) and Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia and Montenegro), made it clear that 	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they were opposed to trial taking place in the absence of the accused.126  This list contains 
a mix of inquisitorial and accusatorial countries, two of which, Yugoslavia and 
Switzerland, were inquisitorial countries that permitted some form of trial in absentia in 
their own domestic legal system.127 This departure from a State’s own national practice 
was not confined to countries opposing in absentia trials.  In contrast, some countries, 
like Austria, that narrowly limit trials in absentia in their national courts, felt it was 
appropriate to hold in absentia trials in certain situations so long as the accused was 
afforded the right to a new trial if he or she were to later come under the custody of the 
proposed court.128 Still other countries, particularly Cuba, Hungary, Kuwait, Sri Lanka 
and the United Kingdom advocated in favour of implementing a system that closely 
resembled its own. 129  Finally, some countries, notably Mexico, Iceland, Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden and Slovenia, refused to take a firm position on the issue and instead 
counselled further deliberation while also taking explicit notice of the importance of 
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 130 This diversity of 
positions indicates that opinion on the matter was wide-ranging but it does not suggest 
that the disagreement could be strictly reduced to a dispute between inquisitorial and 
accusatorial states.  
 The debate over trials in absentia continued during the meetings of the 
International Law Commission in May 1994. At that time, the debate about trial in 
absentia began to crystalize along inquisitorial and accusatorial lines, although there was 
no uniformity of agreement based on those distinctions. The French and Algerian 
participants, both representing inquisitorial countries, asserted that Article 14 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not forbid conducting trial in 
the accused’s absence and expressed their support for trials in absentia held under limited 	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circumstances.131 They were joined in their support of trials in absentia by Australia and 
Guatemala, both countries viewed as employing accusatorial criminal procedures 
(Guatemala had recently adopted an accusatorial system). 132  That opinion was 
contradicted by Uganda, Germany, and the United States, nations that generally 
disapprove of trial in absentia, each of whom believed that such trials would undermine 
the legitimacy of the court. 133 The latter two states also expressed opposition because in 
their view trials in absentia would lack any practical effect.134 China and India also 
opposed trials in absentia out of a concern that such trials are “contrary to the concept of 
respect for the rights of the accused.”135  
  In its 1994 Draft Statute (“1994 Draft Statute”), the International Law 
Commission introduced Article 37 entitled ‘Trial in the Presence of the Accused’.136 
Article 37 started with the proposition that “[a]s a general rule, the accused should be 
present during trial.”137 The draft statute then went on to describe instances in which trial 
could be conducted in the absence of the accused.  Article 37(2) permitted in absentia 
trials if the accused was in custody, or had been released pending trial, and considered it 
undesirable to conduct trial in the presence of the accused for reasons of security, when 
the accused was in ill-health; if the accused was continuing to disrupt trial; or the accused 
had escaped from lawful custody or broken bail.138 Under this model, before trial could 
be held in the absence of the accused the court was required to take reasonable steps to 
inform the accused of the charge and ensure that the accused was legally represented at 
trial.139 Next, the Draft Statute authorized the formation of an ‘Indictment Chamber’ 
tasked to record evidence, consider whether a prima facie case had been established 
against the accused and issue arrest warrants against those accused against whom such a 
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case had been established.140 If the accused was subsequently tried following the decision 
of the ‘Indictment Chamber’, the evidence presented before that chamber would be 
admissible at trial.141 
 The International Law Commission explained the reasoning behind the provisions 
of Article 37 in the commentaries to the Statute.  The Commission started with the 
proposition that “the presence of the accused is “of vital importance”” in recognition of 
Article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and to ensure 
the establishment of the facts and the ability to enforce any sentence passed by the 
court.142  However, the International Law Commission also identified the appeal of a 
developing a procedure similar to the Rule 61 Proceedings contained in the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence of the ad hoc Tribunals.143 The Commission’s advocacy on 
behalf of this sort of procedure could be interpreted as an attempt to reach a compromise 
on the issue of trial in absentia.144 
 On 9 December 1994, the United Nations General Assembly established an ad 
hoc committee to review the 1994 Draft Statute.145  The ad hoc committee reviewed the 
Statute and developed some conclusions regarding the right to be present at trial.  The 
rule that the accused should be present at trial was “widely endorsed” although there was 
disagreement as to the extent of any exceptions to the rule. 146  Some delegations 
questioned whether there should be any exceptions to the right to be present at all, and 
specific concerns where expressed over the exceptions relating to ill-health and 
security.147 Other delegations viewed paragraph 2 of the 1994 Draft Statute, which sets 
out the situations in which a person may be tried in their absence, as overly broad while 
others felt it struck the right balance between the importance of the right to be present and 
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the need to allow trial to take place if the conditions of the exceptions were met.148 
Finally, the committee discussed the need for the paragraph concerning the “Indictment 
Chamber”, the proper function of the “Indictment Chamber” and whether paragraph four 
should be deleted in its entirety and replaced with a separate article establishing a 
permanent indictment chamber.149   
 In 1995, the United Nations General Assembly established the Preparatory 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (“1996 Preparatory 
Committee”), which convened in 1996 to continue the discussion about the 1994 Draft 
Statute and to prepare a consolidated statute as a next step towards holding a conference 
of plenipotentiaries.150 The Preparatory Committee introduced significant changes to the 
1994 Draft Statute including deleting the paragraphs concerning the “Indictment 
Chamber” (although that procedure would reappear as the Pre-Trial Chamber as 
described in Article 56-58 and 60-61 of the Rome Statute).151 The 1996 Preparatory 
Committee also combined paragraphs two and three of the 1994 Draft Statute and listed 
five exceptions to the right to be present including: for reasons of security or ill-health; 
the continued disruption of the trial by the accused; following an escape or breaking of 
bail by the accused; the refusal of a detained accused to appear at trial; and the accused’s 
failure to appear where all reasonable steps have been taken to inform him or her of the 
charges.152 The 1996 Preparatory Committee also proposed an alternative whereby the 
accused was required to turn himself in at least one day before the start of trial.153 and 
failure to do so, absent an exemption granted by the Trial Chamber, would result in the 
issuance of an arrest warrant for the accused, and failure to appear for the commencement 
of trial would result in the trial being conducted in the accused’s absence.154  
 The 1996 Preparatory Committee experienced lengthy debates regarding the right 
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to be present at trial.155  These debates were, in part, the result of a French concern that 
practitioners from common law countries were dominating the conversation and that a 
danger existed that in the absence of action a common law system would be implemented 
at the court.156  Therefore, the French introduced its own Draft Statute in an effort to 
ensure that its civil law system was properly respected.157  Some states blamed the French 
for delaying the negotiations but this intervention is thought to have been crucial to 
stimulating discussion about the adversarial and inquisitorial systems and led to the 
hybridized procedure now in place at the ICC.158 
 During the negotiations, France and the Netherlands both proposed expanding the 
possibility of conducting trials in absentia.159 It is interesting to note that the Dutch 
supported trials in absentia at the International Criminal Court as they opposed the 
practice at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Their apparent 
change of heart likely resulted from the Rome Statute’s guarantees that an absent accused 
would receive representation and would have access to an automatic retrial if he or she 
ever came under the jurisdiction of the Court. France, Canada, Austria and South Africa 
all showed support for the Article 37(4) indictment chambers as proposed in the 1994 
Draft Statute. 160   China, Austria and South Africa also expressed concerns over 
conducting trial in the absence of the accused due to the illness of the accused and China 
suggested that trial should be postponed when an accused becomes ill.161  The Japanese 
submitted a Working Paper recommending limiting trials in absentia to only those 
situations in which a defendant in custody refuses to attend trial on a particular day.162   
 The Preparatory Committee (“1997 Preparatory Committee”) met again in 1997 
and continued the discussion about the right to be present at trial.  The 1997 Preparatory 
Committee introduced four new options regarding the right to be present each using the 
1994 ILC Draft Statute as a starting point.  Option one forbade the Court from holding 
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trials in the absence of the accused.163 Option two started with the proposition that the 
accused should be present at trial but set forth several exceptions whereby trial could take 
place in the absence of the accused including: where the accused has escaped from lawful 
custody or broken bail; or where the defendant continued to disrupt the trial.164  The third 
option also started with the general presumption that the defendant had the right to be 
present at trial but expanded on the instances in which trial could take place in his or her 
absence to include: when the accused requests to be absent from trial for reasons of ill-
health; when the accused fails to appear on the day of the hearing; when the accused 
disrupts trial; and when a detained defendant refuses to appear at trial.165 This option does 
not include proceeding with trial if the defendant has escaped from custody.166 The fourth 
option also specifically identifies the accused’s right to be present at trial but would 
permit trial to proceed in his or her absence when the Trial Chamber determines that the 
accused’s absence is deliberate.167  The significant differences between these options 
demonstrates how little consensus there was between the States when addressing the 
issue of the right to be present at trial.    
 Although there were subsequent meetings in which the right to be present at trial 
were discussed, there were no real substantive changes to the draft article until the Rome 
Conference.  What did change over the course of the two subsequent drafts was the 
numbering of the Article.  What had been labelled as Article 37 became Article 56 in the 
Zutphen Draft, prepared during an inter-sessional meeting held in Zutphen, Netherlands 
between 19 January and 30 January 1998.168 The final meeting of the Preparatory 
Committee was held in April 1998, at which time the Article had again been renumbered 
as Article 63, but no substantive changes were made. 
 The delegates arrived at the Rome Conference without any agreement as to how 
the presence at trial of the accused would be treated in the Statute.  Presence at trial 	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1997’ (1997) U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.8/Rev.1 as reported in Bassiouni, M. Cherif, 
The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court: An Article-By-Article 
Evolution of the Statute, vol 2 (Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2005) 453-55 (hereinafter 
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remained one of the most contentious issues to be resolved during the Rome Conference, 
as it had been throughout the preparatory stages of the drafting process.169 Common 
ground remained amongst the delegates as to certain aspects of the right to be present.  It 
was generally agreed that the default position of the court was for the accused to be 
present at trial, that some measure needed to be introduced to prevent the accused from 
disrupting trial and that a procedure to preserve evidence was needed.170  What was 
lacking was an accommodation between those delegations that firmly opposed holding 
trials in absentia, and those that believed such trials should be permitted.171 Numerous 
states took the floor during the conference to declare their preference for one approach or 
another without any consensus being reached.172  Because of the lack of agreement the 
issue was referred to a working group for resolution before being included in the larger 
statute.173  
 Three new proposals addressing the presence of the accused at trial were 
introduced during the Rome Conference by nations that had previously been silent on this 
issue.  On 25 June 1998, a group of Muslim nations made up of Egypt, Iraq, Libya, 
Oman, Qatar, Sudan and the Syria submitted a proposal that allowed for trial in absentia 
if the accused had been notified of the date of trial and the accused refused to attend, or 
was prevented from attending the proceedings; the accused escaped from custody or; if 
the Trial Chamber wished to proceed in the face of force majeure preventing the accused 
from attending.174 Although this proposal was not adopted, it bears marked similarities to 
the trial in absentia provision adopted by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.  On the same 
day, Malawi also submitted a proposal under which the accused could be tried in his or 
her absence following a determination by the Trial Chamber that the accused’s absence 
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was deliberate.175  Malawi’s proposal also permitted the Trial Chamber to request that the 
Pre-Trial Chamber reconvene to record evidence against the absent accused that would be 
admissible in a future trial.176 This latter proposal is similar to a procedure later adopted 
at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as Rule 71 bis. The stated purpose of 
both rules is to preserve the evidence against an absent accused that might be used at a 
future trial should the accused ever come under the control of the court.177 Colombia also 
submitted a proposal designed to authorize the Court to proceed in the absence of the 
accused if, after all necessary steps are taken to secure the appearance of the accused, he 
or she still does not attend trial.178  Both the Malawian and Colombian provisions are 
similar to the system each country utilizes domestically when confronted with an absent 
accused, although Malawi’s proposal is not quite as expansive as its domestic practice.179   
 In an effort to simplify the proposals thus far introduced, the Committee on 
Procedural Matters introduced two different working papers during the conference.  Both 
working papers contained the provisions found in the finished Statute, that the accused 
“shall be present during trial” and that the Court could order the removal of a 
continuously disruptive accused from the courtroom.180  The 4 July Working Paper also 
contained two additional clauses under consideration for addition to the Statute.  The first 
optional clause permitted the court to proceed in the accused’s absence if the accused, 
having been present at the beginning of trial, fled after trial started.181  This practice is 
permitted by most domestic courts, including those like the United States that are 	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177 Ibid; see also International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Newsletter (October 2009) 
1 <http://www.unmict.unictr.org/sites/unictr.org/ 
files/news/newsletter/oct09.pdf> accessed 30 June 2017. 
178 ‘Proposal of Colombia submitted on 25 June 1998 regarding Article 63’, United 
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Vol 3 (United Nations, 2002) UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.17, 304. 
179 Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code, Malawi (1 February 1968) art 203 and art 
248; Code of Criminal Procedure, Republic of Colombia (31 August 2004) art 127. 
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particularly unreceptive to holding trials without the accused being present.  By only 
starting trial in the presence of the accused, the trial court guarantees that the accused is 
aware of the proceedings against him or her, eliminating any concern that the accused did 
not receive notice of the trial. The second option was more audacious and proposed to 
allow trial to be conducted in the accused’s absence if: the accused requested to be absent 
due to his or her ill-health; the accused failed to appear in court on the day of the hearing; 
or an incarcerated accused refused to appear and made it particularly difficult for the 
court to force his or her appearance.182  The second option also described the procedure to 
be followed in any of the above instances where the accused had not been notified of the 
start of trial, thus countenancing the idea of true trials in absentia.183   
 The 9 July Working Paper demonstrated some movement on the right to be 
present.  Gone were the provisions permitting trial to begin without the accused having 
notice of he proceedings.184  Gone too were the sections allowing the accused to waive 
his or her appearance due to ill-health or when an incarcerated accused refused to appear 
for trial.185  The only questions left to consider were whether trial could continue after a 
once present accused had fled or when the accused had been notified about trial but 
simply failed to appear.186 In the end, these proposals were not incorporated into the 
Rome Statute.  It became clear as negotiations continued that there was no compromise to 
be reached regarding trials conducted in the accused’s absence.187  In order to avoid 
placing this issue before the entire Conference for a resolution, it was decided that 
confirmation of charges hearings would be introduced at the pre-trial stage that mimicked 
Rule 61 proceedings and could take place in the absence of the accused, and that trial in 
absentia would be entirely removed from Article 63.188 The Court’s Appeals Chamber 
later explained that not only does Article 63 not permit trials in absentia, but that the 
article was included in the Statute, in part, to inhibit a finding that an accused had 
implicitly waived his or her right to be present by absconding or failing to appear for 
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trial.189 
 The conclusion of the Rome Conference, and the introduction of the Court’s 
Statute, did not entirely put to rest all discord between the accusatorial and inquisitorial 
factions.  In The Prosecutor v Kenyatta, Trial Chamber V(B) attributed the “failure to 
reach an agreement on trials in absentia” at the Rome Conference to “a misapprehension 
of the law in significant respects on the part of the common law delegates.”190  In 
particular, the Chamber found that those delegates were “under the erroneous impression 
that such trials were not permissible in common law jurisdictions or in international law, 
when in fact the opposite is true.”191  This suggestion typifies much of the ill will that has 
developed on both sides of the trial in absentia debate.  Not only does it presuppose that 
the highly qualified professionals advocating against trials in absentia at the Rome 
Conference did not understand how international law treated the issue, it also suggests 
that they did not even understand how the issue was dealt with in their own domestic 
jurisdictions.  It also ignores the fact that just four years before the Rome Conference the 
Secretary General of the United Nations stated that trials in absentia were not compatible 
with Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.192 A more 
constructive approach would be to attempt to understand why certain countries opposed 
the use of trials in absentia at the Court rather than attribute their opposition to ignorance.   
 3.2.3 THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON 	  
   The nature of the underlying system of law also became relevant following the 
introduction of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.   The report released by 
the United Nations’ Secretary-General in conjunction with the introduction of the Statute 
specifically indicated that proceedings before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon contain 
both inquisitorial and adversarial elements.193  Although the Secretary-General identified 
the procedure followed by the Special Tribunal as being “essentially adversarial”, he also 	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makes clear that the decision to conduct trials in absentia is informed by the inquisitorial 
tradition.194 It has also been suggested that Article 22 was the subject of great controversy 
and was only inserted in the Statute at the insistence of the Lebanese government.195  
 The importance of the inquisitorial system at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is 
reinforced through Article 28 of the Statute, which permits the Special Tribunal’s judges 
to consider the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure when adopting the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence for the Special Tribunal.196 The Lebanese legal system is part of 
the inquisitorial tradition and, as a result, specifically permits trials to take place in the 
absence of the accused.  Through its Statute and Rules, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
embodies a number of different traditions and represents a true hybrid between the 
inquisitorial and accusatorial systems while also incorporating a strong domestic law 
influence.197  The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, more than any other court or tribunal, 
demonstrates the blurred boundaries between the inquisitorial and accusatorial systems 
and constitutes the best argument in favour of ignoring these distinctions entirely.  
Instead, the focus should be on devising sensible and practical procedures that will work 
within the context of the particular legal system regardless of the legal system those 
procedures may be most closely identified with. How the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s 
unique approach to the right to be present at trial operates in practice will be explored in 
depth in subsequent chapters. 
 3.2.4 OTHER COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 	  
 The negotiating and drafting histories of the Statutes of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone are not instructive about the 
accused’s right to be present at trial when analysed in light of the inquisitorial versus 
accusatorial dichotomy. Both Statutes draw their provisions on the right to be present 
almost verbatim from the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 	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Yugoslavia and there does not appear to have been any substantive debate surrounding 
whether trial should proceed in the accused’s absence.  Both the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone would eventually confront 
the limits of the accused’s right to be present, particularly as it relates to an incarcerated 
accused that refuses to appear for trial.  However, as those decisions were not reached 
through reference to either the inquisitorial or accusatorial approaches to this issue they 
are discussed in subsequent chapters. 
 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia also did not try to 
interpret the presence of the accused at trial from either an inquisitorial or accusatorial 
perspective. However, the Extraordinary Chambers’ strong presumption in favour of 
proceeding in the accused’s presence is thought to result from the active role the accused 
is expected to play in the proceedings.198 This active role for the accused resembles the 
one played by criminal defendants in the German inquisitorial system although the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia do not explicitly draw this 
comparison.  The incorporation of inquisitorial procedure into the practice of the 
Extraordinary Chambers is not surprising in light of Article 33 of the Law on the 
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.  Article 33 
requires that the Extraordinary Chambers adhere to “existing procedures in force”, i.e. 
Cambodian criminal procedure.199  Cambodian law is made up of an amalgam of 
different practices, including inquisitorial and accusatorial principles.200  Therefore, the 
lack of debate over employing procedures ascribed to one system or the other should 
come as no surprise as the use of that procedure is already settled in domestic law.  
3.3 CONCLUSION 
 State support or opposition for trials in absentia at international and 
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internationalised criminal courts and tribunals is often attributed to whether the criminal 
procedure of the state in question is rooted in the inquisitorial or accusatorial tradition.  In 
fact, this is too broad a distinction. Most nations are interested in implementing a system 
that is most similar to their own, not because of the tradition that underlies it, but out of a 
belief that criminal procedure as practiced in their home country in the best approach to 
criminal procedure in general. There is logic to that conclusion. Presumably, a country 
would change its domestic criminal procedure if its existing system did not meet its 
criminal justice needs.  What that attitude fails to take into account is that while a 
particular country’s procedure might be best for that country, it is not necessarily the best 
procedure for an international or internationalized court.  
 The importance of the accused’s presence at trial differs depending on whether 
trial is being conducted in international or domestic courts.  The statutes of international 
and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals entitle the accused to the minimum 
guarantee that trial will take place in his or her presence.  That entitlement can only be 
derogated from with explicit statutory authorisation or through the accused’s unequivocal 
waiver of their right to be present.  This objective justification differs from the subjective 
reasons relied on by domestic legal systems when determining the importance of the 
accused’s presence at trial.  The domestic reasons include: so the accused can understand 
the case against them; to give the accused an opportunity to answer the charges and; in 
recognition of the role the accused plays in discovering the complete truth about the 
incident in question.  Those motives are then considered in light of society’s interest in 
adjudicating crime, and whether that interest outweighs the accused’s interest in being 
present. Because of the divergence between international and domestic practice, the 
procedure used at international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals must 
be suited to the court or tribunal’s particular needs, regardless of the system from which it 
derived.   
 The negotiations about the right to be present provisions in the Rome Statute and 
the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia involved a 
real struggle between those nations attempting to develop the most appropriate procedure 
for the court or tribunal being formed, and those nations primarily interested in installing 
their own national practices into international law. In the end, no compromise could be 
reached and, as a result, both Statutes ended up with basic clauses recognizing the 
importance of the right to be present without any real limitations on it.  Although the 
Statutes of both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the 
	   65 
International Criminal Court do not permit trial to continue in the accused’s absence, 
other than in the narrow circumstance involving a disruptive accused, both have also 
adopted policies permitting trial to continue outside of the accused’s presence in limited 
situations. Those situations are dependent on the accused waiving, either explicitly or 
tacitly, his or her right to be present.  In that way, the practices of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court do not 
differ too greatly from the approach to presence at trial pursued by the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon, despite the fact that the Statute of the latter does specifically allow for trials 
in absentia. The real difference, and the major point of contention, is not that the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon permits trials in absentia, but rather, the procedure used by the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon when reaching a finding that the accused waived his or her 
right to trial.  It is clear that the old inquisitorial/accusatorial driven debate about trials in 
absentia has largely run its course, and the conversation has moved on to ensure that any 
permitted absences do not violate the accused’s right to be present.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE  
RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT TRIAL AND THE UNDERLYING  
GOALS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS 
 
 In 2004, former United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan formally set out 
the objectives to be met when establishing international criminal tribunals.  Those stated 
goals are:  
Bringing to justice those responsible for serious violations of human rights 
and humanitarian law, putting an end to such violations and preventing 
their recurrence, securing justice and dignity for victims, establishing a 
record of past events, promoting national reconciliation, re-establishing the 
rule of law and contributing to the restoration of peace.1   
 
The aims set out by the Secretary-General were, for the most part, not new, but reflected 
the ambitions already identified in the foundational documents of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, the International Criminal Court and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.  The 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon would identify similar, albeit slightly different goals when 
its Statute was introduced three years later.    
 When the United Nations’ Security Council established the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia it made clear that it wished to achieve three goals: 
first, to stop the violations of international humanitarian law being committed in the 
former Yugoslavia, including mass killings and ethnic cleansing; second, to “bring to 
justice” individuals perpetrating those crimes; and third, to restore and maintain peace in 
the region.2 The Security Council set out similar, albeit somewhat differently worded, 
objectives when establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
highlighting the importance of ending the commission of international crimes, bringing 
the perpetrators to justice and contributing to national reconciliation and the restoration 
and maintenance of peace.3  The major difference between the identified goals of the two 
ad hoc tribunals is that the resolution establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda specifically identified the importance of promoting national reconciliation. 
Despite this textual difference between the Statutes, Antonio Cassese, the first president 	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of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, later explained that the 
realization of national reconciliation is implicit in the goals of the Yugoslavia Tribunal.4   
 In addition to achieving similar goals to the ad hoc Tribunals, the International 
Criminal Court’s Statute attempts to protect the victim-oriented interests identified by 
Secretary-General Annan. The Preamble to the International Criminal Court’s Statute 
refers to the fact that millions of people have been the victims of crimes that “deeply 
shock the conscience of humanity” and then reinforces the important role the Court plays 
in punishing the perpetrators of those crimes.5  By including reference to victims in the 
Preamble, the drafters of the Statute intended to emphasise the prominent place of 
victims’ interests in the International Criminal Court’s system.  The Court’s interest in 
securing justice and dignity for victims is further reinforced in Article 54(2), which 
compels the prosecutor to consider the interests and personal circumstances of the victims 
and witnesses when investigating and prosecuting crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction, 
and Article 68(1), which obligates the Court to take measures to protect “the safety, 
physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses.”6    
 The Security Council set out somewhat different goals in its resolution 
authorising the formation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. In addition to expressing 
the specific desire to bring to justice those responsible for assassinating former Lebanese 
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, which the Security Council classified as a threat to 
international peace and security, it also stressed that the Tribunal would assist Lebanon 
“in the search for the truth” about the incident.7 By identifying the search for truth as part 
of the function of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the Security Council implicitly 
suggested that a court is an adequate forum for determining the truth about a given 
situation.   
 The Secretary-General’s Report and the foundational documents of the different 
international criminal courts and tribunals emphasise the importance of a multitude of 
different purposes.  They include: 1) punishing those offenders found to be accountable; 
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2) providing the victims of international crimes with dignity and justice; 3) establishing 
the truth about a situation and developing the historical record; 4) promoting 
reconciliation and lasting peace; 5) re-establishing and enhancing the commitment to the 
rule of law and; supplying the victims with reparations for the wrongs they have suffered. 
There is no hierarchy amongst these different goals and various commentators assign 
greater or lesser importance to them based on the point he or she is trying to prove. 
Mirjan Damaška warns that an over ambitious or inappropriate selection of goals will 
lead to “uncertainty about their relative importance” resulting in disorientation, 
disillusionment and unfulfilled expectations.8  These Statutes demonstrate that there are a 
number of trial goals linked to holding the perpetrators of atrocity crimes accountable for 
their actions.  
4.1 ACCOUNTABILITY 
 Once confined to the narrow legal focus of trying individuals for their alleged 
crimes, accountability has become the more expansive and is now seen as both an end 
result of trial as well as a means for facilitating a myriad of other trial goals.9 
Accountability efforts have been credited with furthering: reconciliation, deterrence, 
recognition of victimisation, reparations, truth, peace, representative democracy, 
lustration and the cessation of on-going conflict.10 Additionally, these goals can be 
achieved outside of the traditional boundaries of the courtroom.  Accountability processes 
in international criminal law now include: truth and reconciliation commissions, 
memorialisation of victims and “other guarantees of non-repetition.”11 
 Despite the proliferation of functions assigned to accountability, and the 
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increasing number of ways in which accountability can be realised, it is thought that legal 
accountability, that is, the aims arising out of prosecution and conviction, must remain 
the most prominent form of accountability.12 Legal accountability, in the context of 
international criminal law, involves holding individuals responsible for violations of any 
crimes proscribed by the applicable statute.13  Legal accountability is seen as the natural 
counterpoint to impunity and the absence of legal accountability is thought to be 
immoral, damaging to victims’ interests, in violation of international legal norms and will 
lead to the recurrence of atrocity crimes.14  In theory, prosecution for all acts of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and acts of torture is essential to ensure that none of 
these crimes will be committed with impunity, although none of the international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals have either the interest or the capacity to 
achieve that goal.15 
 An important question underlying whether international criminal courts and 
tribunals should conduct trials in absentia is whether accountability can be achieved in 
the absence of the accused. International trials are time consuming and expensive and 
should not be held simply for the sake of holding a trial. For in absentia trials to have any 
real legitimacy in the context of international criminal law they must produce some 
benefit, and preferably one that outweighs the diminution of the accused’s fair trial rights 
that necessarily accompanies a trial in absentia. It appears that some of the commonly 
cited reasons for holding international criminal trials cannot be fulfilled in the absence of 
the accused.  In particular, an absent accused often cannot be punished because he or she 
is not under the control of the trial court and it is debatable whether an absent accused is 
truly being held accountable for his or her actions.  Punishment of the accused is seen as 
a benefit of trial as it is an actual representation of the accused’s condemnation and it 
rights the imbalance created by the commission of the crime. 
 An important question is whether punishment is necessary to achieve 
accountability or if it can be realised only after a determination about the accused’s guilt. 
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If punishment is necessary then trials in absentia are unlikely to accomplish the goals of 
international criminal trials because an absent accused cannot be punished.   Whether 
punishment is necessary to achieve accountability is largely dependent on how the 
different courts and tribunals prioritise the interests of the distinctive groups international 
criminal law is intended to serve.  Both the victims of the crimes being prosecuted and 
the larger international human rights community, which includes the United Nations and 
its constituent parts, international, internationalised and regional courts and tribunals and 
academics and other commentators, have an interest in how international criminal law is 
applied.  While these interests often intersect, the two groups diverge on the subject of 
the necessity of punishment.16  Most victims, when interviewed, emphasize the important 
role punishment plays in the realization of their own sense that justice has been done.  
Conversely, the international community often wants to achieve other goals that in some 
cases can be realized through a declaration of guilt and do not necessarily require the 
punishment of the accused.      
 Richard Goldstone suggests that victims should be “entitled to full justice, namely 
trial of the perpetrator and, if found guilty, adequate punishment.”17 However, some 
scholars reject the notion that punishment is necessary to meet the needs of the victims. 
William Schabas writes that the victims’ interest in justice “may be better satisfied by 
society’s condemnation of anti-social behaviour than by the actual punishment of 
offenders” and that in international criminal law the declaration of the accused’s guilt is 
“far more important” than the actual punishment of the perpetrators.18 In his view, the 
victims of international crimes desire the identification and stigmatisation of the 
perpetrator and a pronouncement by society that the offender’s behaviour was wrong and 
anti-social.19  This is contrary to the opinion of several other commentators who believe 
that punishment is an essential component of delivering justice to the victims.20 In 
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particular, Jeremy Rabkin explains that punishment is necessary because it acts as 
recognition that the victims have suffered a wrong and that society is committed to 
righting that wrong.21   
 The international community has a complicated role vis-à-vis crime victims.  
Some argue that it is necessary to recognise their victimisation and treat victims as 
individual subjects of justice by acknowledging the equal worth of all people as human 
beings.22 Jean Hampton developed this idea, using Kantian philosophy as a starting point, 
when finding that all human beings are of equal value and therefore, are entitled to equal 
respect. 23 Certain types of crimes, including crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
genocide and the crime of aggression, act to diminish or invalidate the value of 
individuals rendering them no longer equal.24 The existence of this imbalance imposes an 
affirmative duty on society to repudiate the victimisation and reaffirm the victim’s equal 
value in society.25 Failure to comply with that duty results in society’s complicity in its 
commission.26 The duty can be fulfilled by expressing solidarity with the victims as 
evidenced through efforts to investigate and repudiate the actions of the alleged 
perpetrators.27  All of these aspects of recognition can be achieved through punishment, 
but it is only effective when that punishment can be imposed.28 By doing so impunity is 
defeated and justice is achieved.29  Conversely, in absentia guilty verdicts may prevent 
proper recognition of the victims, as the inability to punish the absent defendant results in 
his or her acts being insufficiently repudiated.   
 The international community also has its own distinct interests in holding 
international criminal trials apart from the interests of the victims. This is exemplified by 
Kofi Annan’s statement at the opening of the Rome Conference, when he urged the 	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delegates to develop a Statute where “the overriding interest must be that of the victims, 
and of the international community as a whole.”30  Listing these two groups separately 
acts as recognition that they each have distinct interests. While victims are largely 
concerned with the immediate redress of the wrongs committed against them, the 
international community often hopes that international criminal trials will produce more 
long-term benefits. The deterrence of future atrocity crimes, the public vindication of 
human rights norms and the promotion of long-term and stable peace are all goals that 
have been identified as being particularly important to society as a whole.31 The purpose 
of indicating that different groups stress different goals is not meant to suggest that one 
group wants to realise its goals at the expense of the goals important to another group. 
Instead, it acts as recognition that victims and society may prioritise these goals 
differently.   
 The challenge in all of this is that the victims are not the only participants in the 
criminal process expecting justice. Courts and tribunals must strive to find a balance 
between the needs of the victims and the rights of the accused.  It is generally agreed that 
the accused should only be convicted if his or her trial meets certain basic fair trial 
standards. Most observers agree that a conviction obtained without meeting the standards 
of fair trial constitute an injustice.32  Those standards have a significant impact on the 
trial process and can result in the acquittal of an individual that may be factually guilty. 
These procedural rules subordinate the strict truth telling function of trial in order to 
guarantee procedural fairness, which creates a conflict of interest between the accused 
and the victims. 33  That conflict of interest often makes victims dissatisfied with the 
outcome of international criminal trials arising out of a perception that the criminal 
justice system disproportionately focuses on the defendant and fails to adequately 
account for the needs of the victims.34  
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 Both retribution and deterrence are identified as important goals in the Preamble 
to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.  The Preamble recognises that 
millions of people have been the “victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock 
the conscience of humanity” and that the crimes considered most serious by the 
international community must be punished.35  Subsequently, the Preamble also asserts the 
need to end the impunity of the perpetrators of those serious crimes contributing to their 
prevention.36  There is no order amongst the goals set out in the Preamble and, therefore, 
punishing serious crimes is of equal importance to preventing their future commission.   
 4.1.1  RETRIBUTION 	  
 In its most basic form, retribution as a theory of punishment advocates punishing 
the accused in proportion to the wrong he or she has committed.37 Some have rejected 
retribution as a legitimate basis for punishment at international and internationalised 
criminal courts and tribunals as it is plainly impossible for a person convicted of mass 
atrocity crimes to serve a punishment commensurate with the harm he or she has done.38  
This problem is further exacerbated in international criminal law by the fact that the death 
penalty has been specifically forbidden as a permissible sentence following conviction.  
The unavailability of the death penalty has led to a sense of dissatisfaction amongst some 
victims of atrocity crimes.39   	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 Many international and internationalised courts and tribunals identify providing 
the victims of atrocity crimes with justice as their most important function, but none of 
them substantively address what justice for the victims means in this context. Scholars 
have attempted to fill that gap by asserting that victims experience justice when provided 
with the right to an effective remedy designed to eliminate the effect of the harm caused 
by the commission of the crime.40  A crucial component of the right to a remedy is the 
prosecution and punishment of perpetrators.41  As the Trial Chamber of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia explained, one purpose of punishment is to 
‘reflect…the calls for justice from the persons who have been victims of suffered because 
of the crimes’.42 
 Trials in absentia ending in conviction can contribute to the victims’ sense of 
dissatisfaction with the proceeding as such trials lack any real possibility of punishment 
and therefore result in an imperfect remedy.43 The failure to provide victims with an 
adequate remedy can lead to a sense that the trial did not deliver justice to the victims. 
Victims of atrocity crimes consistently indicate that the perpetrators of the crimes 
committed against them should be tried and punished for their actions as retribution for 
the crimes committed.44  A 2015 study conducted in Kenya, Uganda, Côte d’Ivoire and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo found that victim participants want the accused to be 
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convicted and punished for their alleged crimes.45 Individuals affected by atrocity crimes 
in the Central African Republic overwhelmingly felt that the perpetrators of atrocity 
crimes should be held accountable, and advocated in favour of a variety of punishments 
ranging from the very general ‘punishment’, to imprisonment, summary execution, and 
the rather oblique statement that the perpetrators of atrocity crimes “should confront 
justice.”46 A survey conducted in 2002 of a randomly selected group of Rwandans found 
that 96.8% of respondents believed it was important to try those responsible for 
committing crimes during the genocide, and 92.3% felt that the purpose of trials was “to 
punish those who have done wrong”, although for some punishment was a secondary 
consideration to reparations in the form of compensation and forgiveness.47  In a 2004 
study conducted in Iraq, the majority of those interviewed advocated in favour of 
summary justice in the form of execution or torture without trial.48  This suggests that in 
Iraq, punishment was even more important than a finding of guilt. Taken together, these 
surveys present a compelling argument that the victims of atrocity crimes are particularly 
interested in seeing the perpetrators of those crimes punished for their actions. 
 In some instances punishment alone is not enough to satisfy the victims. Those 
victims interested in punishing the perpetrator as retribution for his or her crimes are 
often unhappy with the type of punishment or the length of sentences imposed following 
conviction.49  This was reflected in a survey of victim participants in the Duch trial at the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.  There, one of the overriding goals 	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of the victim participants was to see that Duch was adequately punished, a goal that likely 
went unmet as many of the punishments recommended by those victim participants 
exceeded the scope of what the Chambers could lawfully order.50  Similar findings 
emerged in a study conducted of victims of the war in Yugoslavia, which also concluded 
that lenient sentencing, constituting any sentence other than the death penalty or life 
imprisonment, would disappoint victims seeking retribution through punishment.51     
 Trials in absentia create an additional problem when pursuing retribution as the 
basis for punishment because in many instances an absent accused will never come under 
the control of the court or serve the sentence imposed following a guilty verdict. Victims 
that may already feel dissatisfied with the punishment will likely only feel more 
aggrieved if the perpetrator is not present to serve his or her sentence. Further, failure to 
punish responsible criminal perpetrators is seen as having a negative effect on the 
reconciliation process.52 Therefore, retributive justice, represented by the punishment of 
the accused, will go unfulfilled when the accused is tried in absentia.  This is a particular 
concern as many victims have indicated the important role punishment of the perpetrator 
plays in their own ability to feel as if justice has been done. 
 That many victims link their own ability to feel that justice has been served to 
whether the perpetrator of the crimes against them has been punished does not mean that 
victims have the right to dictate the type or severity of punishment. The international 
legal community has accepted that some forms of punishment must be forbidden 
regardless of the sense of justice imposition of those sentences might deliver to the 
victims of atrocity crimes.  The legal prohibition against the use of torture is the most 
prominent of these limitations.  The prohibition against torture is considered a jus cogens 
norm that cannot be derogated from, leaving no doubt that torture is an unacceptable 
form of punishment in international criminal law.53 Further, it is forbidden in a number of 
different international conventions, including the International Covenant on Civil and 
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Political Rights, the Convention Against Torture and the Geneva Conventions. 54 
However, the fact that torture is considered an illegitimate form of punishment has not 
stopped victims of atrocity crimes from suggesting that those individuals convicted of 
committing crimes against them should be subjected to torture as punishment for their 
actions. A significant number of the people interviewed in Iraq following the end of 
Saddam’s Hussein’s regime indicated that he and other former leaders should be 
summarily executed or tortured as punishment for their actions.55 A Kurdish woman 
living in Sulaimaniyah said of Hussein, ‘bring him to us – we want to torture him’; a 
victim from Baghdad declared, ‘I wish for him the same as what they used to do to the 
criminals: torture them in the public square and then hang them’; and a Shi’a woman 
from Baghdad stated, ‘I have thought of a punishment for Saddam, which is to put him in 
a cage...and every person that Saddam hurt can punish him as he sees fit’.56  These 
victims clearly identify torture as an appropriate, even a necessary punishment, however, 
the general prohibition on torture dictates that the victims advocating in favour of this 
form of punishment will be disappointed. By outlawing torture, the world community 
accepts that the barbarity of torture outweighs the sense of justice one might derive from 
seeing it used as well as the contribution to reconciliation and peace such a sense of 
justice might also produce.  
 Goldstone pointed out that ‘full justice’ for the victims means seeing the accused 
sentenced to an adequate punishment following a conviction, not any punishment desired 
by the victims.  The same idea holds when trying an accused in absentia. The victims 
may be dissatisfied by a procedure during which the accused does not appear and that 
will likely not result in the accused being punished following a conviction, but it is 
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certainly better than no trial at all. As Schabas asserts, there is justice in condemning the 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes that outweighs that experienced through imposing 
punishment.  The victims can dispute whether they have received the justice they want, 
but must accept that some justice is better than none at all.    
 4.1.2 COMMUNICATIVE VALUE OF TRIAL  	  
 Commentators have proposed two purposes for international trials that focus on 
the communicative value that trial can have for the general public. These trials purposes, 
expressivism and deterrence, use criminal trials as a way to publicize different types of 
criminality, and encourage individuals not to commit those crimes.  Some of the 
objectives of both expressivism and deterrence may be fulfilled through the prosecution 
and conviction of the accused absent punishment, meaning that it may be possible to 
achieve these goals without the participation of the accused.  As a result, trials conducted 
in absentia may be sufficient to meet these goals. 
 Expressivism is a fairly new justification for international criminal trials although 
it has its roots in more traditional legal theory.57  At its root, expressivism encourages 
punishing the perpetrators of atrocity crime to strengthen the general public’s faith in the 
rule of law.58  However, the effects of expressivism are not only realised through 
punishment as there can be expressive value in indictments and trials not accompanied by 
conviction and punishment.59 Some expressivists even find value in the existence of an 
unenforced law to the extent that individuals comply with it out of fear of its 
enforcement.60  Because expressivism perceives value in aspects of the criminal process 
that do not involve punishment, it is possible that the goals of expressivism can be 
achieved in the accused’s absence.  Expressivism is better designed to achieve the long-
term goals sought by society as a whole and does little to meet the immediate needs of he 
victims. 
 The international community has also identified deterrence as a communicative 
reason for conducting international criminal trials.  In the Čelebići Camp Case, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s Trial Chamber identified 
deterrence as “probably the most important factor in the assessment of appropriate 	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sentences for violations of international humanitarian law.”61 Deterrence is traditionally 
understood as a justification for punishment and it can be broken down into two types: 
specific deterrence and general deterrence. Specific deterrence acts to disincline the 
person charged or on trial from committing future crimes due to the anticipated severity 
of punishment resulting from a guilty verdict.62  General deterrence presumes that by 
making certain actions illegal, and by punishing the commission of those actions, it will 
discourage others that might want to commit similar crimes.63 The effectiveness of both 
types of deterrence in international criminal law is the subject of significant debate. 
 Specific deterrence has no real effect in the context of an absent accused because 
the accused is not present to experience the deterrent effect of the punishment.  It has 
been suggested that specific deterrence does not necessitate punishment because the 
public stigmatisation and reputational injury that accompanies any suggestion of an 
individual’s involvement in atrocity crimes would sufficiently disincline anyone from 
committing such crimes.64 It is argued that individuals in national leadership positions are 
interested in establishing sustained political viability, which is best achieved when his or 
her regime is internationally accepted.65 A fear of losing that acceptance will cause 
leaders to abstain from activities that could result in prosecution, or the threat of 
prosecution, by the international community.66 Because the deterrent effect is produced 
by threatening the reputation of the accused, rather than through condemnation or 
punishment, it necessarily follows that it can be achieved in the absence of the accused.  
 The trouble with this argument is that it operates on the assumption that 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes engage in a rational weighing of consequences before 
committing criminal acts.  There is little evidence to support such an assumption and, to 
the extent they do partake in such a consideration, it is more likely to focus on the 
probability of apprehension, prosecution and the possible severity of punishment, than on 
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international disapprobation.67 The circumstances under which atrocity crimes occur also 
have a tendency to undermine the effectiveness of specific deterrence on possible 
perpetrators of international crimes. The choices one might make under normal 
circumstances become inverted in countries riven by ethnic or military conflict as 
decisions are made with the intent of gratifying the divisive or violent tendencies that 
have become the norm in that particular society.68  This problem can become exacerbated 
in countries that have fallen into a state of war, as the institutions of justice often 
disappear or lose effectiveness, allowing the uninterrupted commission of atrocity 
crimes.69 Under such circumstances, behaviour normally considered aberrant is thought 
to be acceptable, and in some cases, desirable. 70  Decisions made in this sort of 
environment are motivated by a need to conform to the wishes of the people within the 
state rather than out of concern for pressures coming from outside of the state.  Therefore, 
international suspicion and accusations will likely have little specific deterrent effect on 
those that might commit international crimes.  Any potential deterrent will grow even 
smaller when the suspicion and accusations are not reinforced with trial and punishment, 
as there is no tangible threat the accused will suffer any sort of repercussions for their 
actions. 
 General deterrence is commonly cited as an important goal served by 
international criminal law.  It is thought that punishing the perpetrators of atrocity crimes 
will “dissuade for ever, others who may be tempted in the future to perpetrate such 
atrocities by showing them that the international community shall not tolerate the serious 
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights.”71 This is thought to be 
achieved through a two step process: first, by transforming popular perceptions of 
acceptable behaviour; and second, through promoting the gradual internalization of those 
values leading to “habitual conformity” with the law.”72 However, inconsistency in the 
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arrest and prosecution of those individuals accused of international crimes undermines 
the argument in favour of general deterrence.73 One of the problems that plagues 
international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals is the inability to exert 
control over all of those people subject to its jurisdiction.  This is the result of two 
significant shortcomings.  First, international and internationalised criminal justice 
mechanisms lack their own police forces making them dependent on domestic police to 
arrest indicted suspects.  As a result, they are not able to gain custody over most of the 
people they would like to try.  Second, the sort of atrocity crimes tried at international 
and internationalised courts and tribunals are often committed by hundreds, if not 
thousands, of perpetrators.  International and internationalised criminal courts and 
tribunals lack the capacity to try all, or even most, of the people subject to their 
jurisdiction. 74 If there is little chance that the accused will be arrested and tried for the 
crimes alleged it is unlikely that such a tenuous threat will serve as any real deterrent.  
 Further militating against an over-reliance on general deterrence as a sufficient 
justification for international criminal trials is the conflicting evidence as to whether 
international criminal trials achieve the goal of general deterrence. On the positive side, 
the evidence suggests that the Lubanga trial at the International Criminal Court has had 
some deterrent effect. Interviews conducted in the Ituri Province of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo following Lubanga’s conviction found a decrease in the use of child 
soldiers which was attributed to the trial creating a more widespread understanding that 
the recruitment and use of children in combat is illegal.75  Lubanga’s conviction also had 
some impact in the Central African Republic where a rebel commander demobilised his 
child soldiers upon learning from the trial that it is a crime to use child soldiers in 
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combat. 76 More generally, a study of domestic and international human rights 
prosecutions in over 100 countries discovered that prosecutions may have some deterrent 
effect, both in the country affected by human rights violations and also in neighbouring 
countries. 77  The study also concluded that the deterrent value of accountability 
mechanisms was derived from both the threat of punishment and normative pressures 
indicating that punishment only plays a part in producing a deterrent effect.78 By contrast, 
it is often pointed out that the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia did not prevent the Srebrenica genocide or numerous war crimes 
committed by ethnic Serbs against the Kosovars.79  However, it has been suggested that 
the Srebrenica genocide and the crimes committed in Kosovo occurred before the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was fully operational and 
therefore, it could not have been expected to have developed a functional general 
deterrent capacity.80  The anecdotal nature of this evidence makes it difficult to draw any 
definitive conclusions about the deterrent effect of trial.  Further, the accused was present 
at trial in those instances in which some deterrent effect was found, raising questions as 
to whether the same effect might be derived in the accused’s absence. 
 The difficulty with relying on expressivism and deterrence as justifications for 
trials in absentia is that both ideas are oriented towards communicating to, and changing 
the behaviour of, the general public rather than addressing the needs of the trial 
participants.  This acts as a substantial departure from the traditional model where the 
causes and effects of trial are mainly felt by those directly involved.  Shifting the focus 
from the participants creates a danger that their important interests will be marginalized 
in an effort to maximize the educative function of trial.  This is less of a concern for the 
accused, as providing due process is a particular focus of expressivists, but it can have the 
tendency of reducing the attention paid to victims’ interests as the focus is on the more 
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long-term benefits of trial.81    
 Another reason expressivism and deterrence should be used cautiously when 
justifying trials in absentia is the inherent connection both ideas draw between 
punishment and communicating the wrongfulness of the accused’s actions.82  Although 
indictment and conviction may be communicative in and of themselves, those messages 
are only received when accompanied by a legitimate threat of punishment.83 Even studies 
that suggest societal pressures play a role in creating a deterrent effect acknowledge that 
those pressures are only effective when combined with a perceived higher cost of 
committing atrocity crimes represented by punishment.84 Therefore, the efficacy of the 
communicative purposes of trial is intrinsically linked to punishment as the former cannot 
be achieved without the latter.  The inability to punish an accused tried in absentia would 
therefore leave the purposes of both expressivism and deterrence unfulfilled making them 
both weak justifications for trying an absent accused.  The usefulness of expressivism and 
deterrence becomes even more tenuous when the victims’ interests are taken into account 
as neither theory pays much attention to their needs.  
4.2 ESTABLISHING THE TRUTH  
 Establishing the truth about the situation under consideration is one of the most 
commonly identified purposes of international criminal trials.  Madeleine Albright 
described truth as “the cornerstone of the rule of law” and different international criminal 
courts and tribunals have consistently identified the important role truth-finding plays in 
their missions.85  The truth established by a court or tribunal is believed to serve multiple 
purposes including: identifying an objective record of events; undermining denials about 
the existence of human rights violations; supplying therapeutic benefits to the accused; 
and the traditional legal function of creating a factual basis upon which the fact-finder 
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can determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.86  
 The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights indicated in 2006 that 
victims have a “right to truth” entitling them to learn: “the full and complete truth” about 
relevant events and the circumstances in which they occurred; the identities of the 
participants; and the reasons for the occurrence of the events.87 Establishing this sort of 
“full and complete truth” is largely impossible when the accused is not present during the 
trial. There is certain information known only to the accused that cannot be introduced 
without his or her participation in trial. If trial is conducted without the accused’s 
involvement, he or she cannot share that information with the court and the puzzle of 
truth is left incomplete and, in turn, the goal of establishing the full and complete truth 
remains unfulfilled.  
 International and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals rarely establish, 
or attempt to establish, the full and complete truth, irrespective of the accused’s presence 
during trial. One of the common criticisms about the Nuremberg Tribunal is that it failed 
to acknowledge Allied crimes committed during World War II.88 Similar concerns were 
expressed about the Tokyo Tribunal’s refusal to adjudicate alleged Allied crimes and the 
decision not to prosecute Emperor Hirohito for his actions during the war.89 This problem 
has carried over to modern international and internationalised criminal courts and 
tribunals.  The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda abandoned attempts to 
properly investigate and prosecute crimes committed by members of the Tutsi ethnic 
group following tremendous pressure from the Rwandan government.90  Survivors of 
Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime in Iraq were disappointed that foreign actors, including 
the United Nations, the United States and other Arab countries, were not called to 
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account for their perceived support of, or lack of intervention in, the human rights 
violations that were committed against them.91 Many Serbians not only believe that the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is biased against ethnic Serbs, 
but also that NATO should have been held accountable for their actions during the war in 
the former Yugoslavia.92  Interviewees in Bosnia and Herzegovina believe that the Dutch 
government shares equal responsibility with the Serbs for the Srebrenica genocide.93  
These failures to investigate or prosecute alleged crimes committed by parties other than 
those being tried, indicate a tacit acceptance that no attempt would be made to establish 
the full and complete truth about these situations. 
 The willingness of international and internationalised criminal courts and 
tribunals to allow the accused to plead guilty also demonstrates an inclination to proceed 
without establishing the full and complete truth about the situation under examination.  In 
Prosecutor v Momir Nikolić, Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia voiced concern that a guilty plea failed to provide a full and 
complete record of the facts.94 The Trial Chamber expressed further apprehension about 
plea agreements reached under Rule 62 ter, which permit the accused to enter a guilty 
plea only as to certain agreed upon facts.95 The Trial Chamber felt that under these 
circumstances “[n]either the public, nor the judges themselves come closer to know the 
truth beyond what is accepted in the plea agreement” potentially creating “an unfortunate 
gap in the public and historical record of the concrete case”.96 The International Criminal 
Court’s Statute attempts to address this concern by allowing for the presentation of 
evidence following a guilty plea, including witness testimony, “in the interests of justice” 
and “in particular, the interests of the victims”.97  Whether this flexibility to allow the 
introduction of additional evidence following a guilty plea will contribute to a fuller 
factual record remains to be seen as evidence was only presented for two days in the 
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single instance in which this procedure was used.98 
 There are also areas of the truth about which criminal courts are ill equipped to 
inquire.  Incidents occur during conflicts that are part of the full and complete truth but 
are unlikely to be the subject of court proceedings. In some situations, atrocity crime 
victims have accused members of other ethnic groups of being responsible for failing to 
act while crimes were being committed, failing to warn people of other ethnicities of 
impending violence and failing to provide information about where the bodies of missing 
people are buried.99 As an example, ethnic Croats living in Vukovar, Croatia felt betrayed 
during the war by their Serbian friends and neighbours who did not actively participate in 
the violence, but who also did nothing to prevent it or to help those being victimized.100  
Conversely, ethnic Serbs from Vukovar see no reason for remorse or apology because 
they did not personally commit acts of violence against the Croats.101  While there is a 
clear need for both groups to openly discuss the situation in an effort to reach some sort 
of common truth, this is also not the sort of truth that can be determined by a court. First, 
there is no real mechanism in international criminal law to hold people accountable in 
these sorts of situations.  Second, it is the sort of situation that demands an open 
communal dialogue about the issues dividing the community, not a determination of guilt 
or innocence.102  In fact, a legal determination would likely further inflame the situation, 
as it would have the tendency to apportion blame rather than foster understanding.   
 Overall, the international community has been willing to accept that the 
furtherance of the trial purposes it considers most important, particularly accountability 
and deterrence, can be fulfilled by a less than complete version of the truth. 
Accountability and deterrence can be achieved through the establishment of a limited 
record that identifies alleged perpetrators and contains evidence sufficient to determine 
the guilt or innocence of the accused.  Some commentators have argued that victims of 
atrocity crimes also do not require a full accounting of the truth because they only really 	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have an interest in why the incident occurred and who is responsible.103 This argument 
implies that a less robust investigation into the entire truth about the situation under 
consideration is permissible, as the only facts needed are those necessary to apportion 
responsibility.  
 The trouble with this position is that it does not take into account the sort of 
information victims of atrocity crimes have specifically identified as being indispensable 
to aid in their own psychological healing.  Individuals affected by atrocity crimes make 
clear that a more complete form of truth is essential if their communities are going to 
heal. Ninety-three per cent of Cambodians interviewed in 2011 believed “[i]t is necessary 
to find the truth about what happened during the Khmer Rouge regime.”104  Ninety-four 
per cent of Rwandans indicated that one purpose of trial “is to reveal the truth about what 
happened in 1994” and over eighty per cent of respondents felt that learning the truth 
about atrocity crimes was necessary for reconciliation and healing.105 Eighty-nine per 
cent of citizens in both the Central African Republic and Northern Uganda specified that 
it was important to find out the truth about the atrocity crimes committed in their 
respective countries.106 In the Central African Republic, survey respondents agreed that 
finding out the truth was important, “because the truth must be known”, “to understand 
why the conflict and violence happened” and “to know who is responsible.”107 The 
citizens of Northern Uganda also valued knowing the truth and gave specific reasons for 
ascertaining the truth including, “so the people will not forget”, “so that history will be 
known”, and “identifying those responsible”. 108   Most victims in Iraq preferred 
expressive reasons for establishing the truth, including “show[ing] the world the truth of 	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what happened in Iraq” and “ensuring that future generations know what happened and 
what mistakes were made.”109 
 These surveys, while in no way definitive, do demonstrate that victims and others 
affected by atrocity crimes are interested in establishing the truth for a wide variety of 
reasons, many of which demand a full and complete account of the truth.  Reasons like 
knowing the truth or the history of the situation, showing the world the truth and teaching 
future generations require a broad investigation into the truth and are not limited to 
demonstrating why the crimes were committed or who committed them. This interest in a 
more complete truth indicates that the victims want a broader discussion of what 
happened than what is required to satisfy the wider community. This problem is 
exemplified by the victims’ strong desire to learn the location of the remains of murdered 
loved ones so that the living might gain a sense of closure by knowing their loved ones 
are dead and that they received a proper burial.110 The sheer number of the dead in 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, coupled with the often clandestine way in which 
bodies were disposed, made it impossible for the ad hoc Tribunals to conduct sufficient 
forensic investigations.111 Therefore, the courts and tribunals made the decision not to 
fully investigate an aspect of the truth despite its seemingly vital importance to the 
victims.   
 The problem of locating mass graves takes on additional importance when 
considered in the context of trials in absentia.  The perpetrators of atrocity crimes are 
often the only source of information about the burial places of the deceased. Therefore, 
when the accused are tried in their absence, evidence about mass graves will necessarily 
not be revealed.  In this way, trials in absentia prevent the victims from learning the full 
truth about the situation and specific information they consider vital to restoring their 
sense of justice and psychological wellbeing.  
 This discrepancy between the needs of the victims and those of the international 
community has implications on whether trials in absentia can fulfil the goals of 
international criminal trials. The partial truth accepted by the international community 	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will likely also accommodate a truth to which the accused has made no contribution. That 
is because the international community’s primary trial goals can be met without the 
accused’s active involvement in trial. The achievement of their goals largely depend on 
the symbolism of trial, that someone is being called to account for their actions and 
condemned for their crimes. That symbolism can be realised so long as the requisite 
burden of proof is met, regardless of the source of the evidence needed to meet that 
burden.  The more complete truth demanded by the victims is less likely to be satisfied in 
the accused’s absence. Additionally, there is some evidence to suggest that the truth-
telling process is only effective for victims when it is accompanied by an apology from 
the perpetrators of the crimes against them.112  An absent accused is much less likely to 
apologize for his or her alleged crimes thus depriving the victims of an important 
component of the truth-telling process.  Therefore, the truth telling process, as currently 
constituted, meets the needs of the international community as a whole but falls short of 
what the victims demand to enable them to experience a sense of justice.   
4.3 RECONCILIATION 
 In declaring 2009 the “International Year of Reconciliation”, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations recognised that reconciliation is necessary “for the 
establishment of firm and lasting peace” in conflict and post-conflict settings.113 Despite 
its importance, reconciliation is a problematic goal in international criminal law as there 
is no agreement as to what must occur for reconciliation to be accomplished.   As Harvey 
Weinstein posits: 
Is it peace, the end of violence; is it contented individuals and families; is 
it communities where it is safe to walk the streets, to shop, to go to the 
mosque or church or synagogue, where women do not fear rape and where 
men and women feel no pressure to take up arms; is it economic 
opportunity, education for the children and dignity in old age?114 
 
 Weinstein concedes that safety and security are critical components of 
reconciliation, but he also questions the meanings of those terms within the context of a 
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post-conflict society.115 Others have focused on the attitudes of the people on different 
sides of the conflict, and particularly on whether there is tolerance and acceptance of 
people from different communities and whether they are “getting along”.116 Still others 
described reconciliation as “the repair and restoration of relationships” by “discovering 
ways and means to build trust so that the parties might be able to live cooperatively with 
one another.”117 What these attempted definitions illustrate is that reconciliation can be 
approached from a number of different directions making it difficult to identify one 
single, over-arching definition. 
 The situation in the former Yugoslavia raises serious doubts as to whether 
international criminal prosecutions can produce reconciliation.118 Qualitative research 
conducted by Janine Clark suggests that more than a decade of prosecutions had not 
resulted in reconciliation. Clark’s research in Bosnia and Herzegovina found that 
“[e]xtremely high levels” of mistrust remained amongst members of the different 
factions, that there was little or no contact between divergent ethnic groups, what contact 
did exist was largely confined to business transactions and that different parties had 
markedly dissimilar understandings about how and why certain underlying acts took 
place during the war.119 These findings led her to conclude that the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s judicial process had not led to the reconciliation it 
was established to promote.120   
 Clark’s conclusion undermines the optimism expressed by Antonio Cassese at the 
time of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s establishment. 
Cassese believed that fair trials conducted by an independent and impartial tribunal 
would promote reconciliation, and be conducive to the establishment of “healthy and 
cooperative relations”, thus contributing to the peaceful resolution of the conflict.121  In 	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Cassese’s view, fair trials, and the resulting convictions of those found to be responsible, 
would alleviate unresolved hatred and resentment diminishing the likelihood of renewed 
violence and the commission of new crimes.122  Cassese failed to recognise that fair trials 
conducted by an objective tribunal cannot, by themselves, lead to reconciliation. Perhaps 
more important than the trials actually being fair is that they are seen as being fair by 
members of the affected communities. 
 Clark attributes the lack of reconciliation between the parties to the perception, 
particularly amongst Serbs and Croats, that the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia is biased against them.123 That perception is fuelled by the belief 
amongst Serbs that they were disproportionately the subjects of indictments by the 
Tribunal and that Serbs were receiving excessively harsh sentences when compared to 
other ethnic groups.124 It is true that of 161 indictments issued by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 109 were issued against ethnic Serbs, and 
that Serbs received slightly longer prison sentences than those of other ethnic 
backgrounds.125 While the raw numbers could be interpreted as demonstrating an anti-
Serbian bias, it has been argued that they are actually indicative of greater Serbian 
responsibility for crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia.126  The latter interpretation 
suggests that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s activities 
are consistent with the judicial goal of bringing to justice those responsible for 
committing mass killings and ethnic cleansing as set out by the Security Council, it just 
so happens that ethnic Serbs were disproportionately responsible for committing those 
crimes.  Whatever the reality, as long as groups perceive a bias in how international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals prosecute the accused, the court’s judicial 
activities will prevent a conflicted region from achieving the political goal of 
reconciliation. 
 The problem of how the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia is perceived within the nations that once made up the former Yugoslavia is 	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exacerbated by the Tribunal’s failure to create an objectively understood history about the 
war.127  It is widely thought that establishing the objective truth about a conflict facilitates 
successful reconciliation by identifying indisputable facts that cannot be manipulated or 
denied.128 Instead, the history established through testimony at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has largely been rejected in the different nations of 
the former Yugoslavia and domestic narratives about the war have been developed.129  
Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have all developed divergent, national 
historical accounts so fundamentally at odds with one another as to be irreconcilable.130 
Additionally, different ethnic groups within each nation have also developed unique 
understandings of the truth about what happened during the war that at times conflict 
with the overarching national history.131 This problem is further complicated by the fact 
that each individual affected by the war believes his or her own particular truth about 
why and how the conflict happened.132  This has resulted in a multitude of different 
histories, many of which conflict with one another on a very basic level.  The Tribunal’s 
failure to develop a single, objective narrative about the war has raised questions amongst 
different factions about the Tribunal’s legitimacy and whether the accused are receiving a 
fair trial, particularly when it makes decisions that do not accord with a particular group’s 
understanding of events.   
 Realistically, it may not be possible for an international criminal court or tribunal 
to develop a truly objective history sufficient to facilitate reconciliation.  For there to be 
true reconciliation everyone must accept that although individual accounts may differ, 
each person’s story is equally valid. Consensus of opinion is not required, what is 
necessary is for the different factions to find a way to live with the fact that there is no 
consensus.133 However, it is very difficult for a person to fully accept the validity of a 	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narrative he or she feels is incompatible with his or her own version of events.  Any 
history developed by an international or internationalised criminal court or tribunal must 
be accepted as legitimate before it can help facilitate the reconciliation process. Rather 
than insisting on an objective truth, it may be necessary for courts and tribunals to focus 
on developing an acceptable truth if they truly aspire to promote reconciliation amongst 
belligerent groups. Unfortunately, such an approach is at odds with the accused’s fair trial 
rights. 
 The accused’s right to a fair trial cannot accommodate a compromised truth 
telling process designed to encourage reconciliation.  A fair trial requires factual accuracy 
and if relevant facts are omitted or distorted so as to create a truth acceptable to all sides 
of a conflict the entire proceeding will be considered inequitable. Further, it is not clear if 
reconciliation is possible in the absence of punishment.  Interviews conducted with 
Bosnian survivors of the war in the former Yugoslavia linked the possibility of 
reconciliation to the need for the punishment of the perpetrators of atrocity crimes.134 
Some of the interviewees tied reconciliation to forgiveness, indicating that they would be 
more likely to forgive someone that was being punished for his or her crimes.135 The 
interviewees also generally rejected the idea of a truth commission as being sufficient to 
promote reconciliation because truth commissions lack the authority punish the 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes.136  These findings suggest that the victims need to see the 
perpetrators of the crimes against them punished before they can properly begin to 
reconcile with other ethnic groups. That is not possible if the accused is not present 
during trial suggesting that trials in absentia fail to further the goal of reconciliation. 
4.4 PEACE 
 Achieving peace is also a commonly cited goal of international criminal trials.  
Peace is a frequently used word that defies easy definition.137  Johann Galtung posited 
that the modern concept of peace should be understood as being of two different types, 
negative peace and positive peace.138  He defined ‘negative peace’ as “the absence of 	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organized collective violence”, and positive peace as “all other good things in the world 
community, particularly cooperation and integration between human groups.”139  Charles 
Webel elaborated on Galtung’s theory and introduced the ideas of a “Strong, or Durable, 
Peace” and a “Weak, or Fragile Peace.”140 Strong, or durable, peace exists when there is 
“relatively robust justice, equity, and liberty, and relatively little violence and misery at 
the social level”.141 Conversely, peace is described as weak or fragile if there is an 
absence of war, but also “pervasive injustice, inequity and personal discord and 
dissatisfaction.”142  
 The United Nations’ use of the modifier ‘lasting’ in describing the type of peace 
achievable through truth indicates that the United Nations hopes to achieve positive peace 
or strong, or durable peace, when establishing international and internationalised criminal 
courts and tribunals.143  This interpretation is further supported when one considers the 
interaction between reconciliation and lasting peace. If one purpose of reconciliation is to 
build cooperative and integrated relationships between different groups, it logically 
follows that such reconciliation will result in a peace defined along the same terms. This 
relationship between reconciliation and peace suggests that the problems precluding 
reconciliation would also inhibit peace.  Although the arrest and prosecution of 
individuals actively disturbing peace in a particular region will help produce the absence 
of violence, i.e. negative peace, it is less likely to bring about the sort of positive or 
lasting peace sought by the United Nations.144  All arrest and prosecution does is remove 
agitators from the equation; it does not address the root causes of the conflict. 
 Holding trials in absentia of those same individuals would likely serve no purpose 
at all.  It would not remove them from the positions that allow them to provoke violence. 
Therefore, in absentia trials would not help to promote negative peace. In fact, trials in 
absentia would probably encourage the perpetrators of atrocity crimes to be more 	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provocative as they would likely feel as they have nothing left to lose after being 
accused.145  Trials in absentia would also have no discernable effect on positive peace.  
The potential effect trials can have on creating a positive peace is tied to the deterrent 
effect trials are thought to produce.146  However, as discussed above, the deterrent effect 
of trial is largely reinforced by the credible threat of punishment.147  As trials in absentia 
fail to carry with them a credible threat of punishment they are unlikely to fulfil the goal 
of promoting peace. 
4.5 RULE OF LAW  
 International criminal trials are also conducted in the belief that doing so helps to 
strengthen the rule of law both domestically and internationally.  Ban Ki-Moon 
emphasised the importance of the rule of law by placing it at “the heart” of the work done 
by the United Nations due to its intrinsic link to peace and justice.148  The rule of law is 
thought to legitimate the internal sovereignty of the State and its right to make, adjudicate 
and enforce laws within its own territory, while also ensuring the separation of powers, 
limiting the use of power by the State and guaranteeing fairness in how the laws are 
applied.149  Central to this concept is the requirement that all persons and entities within 
the State, both public and private, are “bound by and entitled to” the same benefits and 
detriments of the law, regardless of their position.150 The rule of law serves three 
purposes: to protect people from arbitrary abuses of power; to allow people to make 
decisions with knowledge of the legal consequences of their actions; and to protect 
people from arbitrary exercised of power by public authorities.151  
 A strong rule of law is thought to lead to peace and reconciliation but can only 
exist if the people have trust that their legal institutions will deliver prompt and fair 
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dispute resolution. 152  Trials conducted under the rule of law by international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals compel the governments of affected States 
to comply with rule of law norms and even dictators are persuaded that atrocity crimes 
are morally repugnant.153 They also raise public awareness amongst the citizens of those 
nations that human rights laws were violated thus increasing the legitimacy of those 
laws.154  Trials are seen as an expression of the moral authority for all humanity and 
compliance with the basic legal standards expressed therein is part of being a member of 
the international community.155  If taken to the logical extreme, international criminal 
trials can lead to habitual lawfulness and the belief that committing atrocity crimes is not 
a logical alternative to peaceful, multi-ethnic co-existence.156  
 It is important to note that international criminal law, on its own, cannot establish 
or re-establish the rule of law following the commission of atrocity crimes. Instead, it 
takes multiple actors to strengthen the standing of the rule of law. International criminal 
law is responsible for reinforcing two different aspects of the rule of law.  First, it is 
designed to establish or re-establish the rule of law in a state following a period of 
violence during which atrocity crimes were committed.157 Second, international criminal 
trials are meant to be expressive, both in an effort to encourage the growth of the rule of 
law in regions afflicted by conflict, but also to demonstrate the legitimacy of the trial 
itself in an effort to facilitate acceptance of the outcome.158  It has been posited that both 
of these purposes can be achieved in the accused’s absence, although judgment has been 
reserved as to whether vindicating the rule of law can justify an infringement of the 
accused’s right to be present at trial.159   
 The evidence does not appear to support the more optimistic projections about the 
effects international criminal trials have on rebuilding or enhancing the rule of law.  A 
study done in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia on the impact that international 
tribunals have on the rule of law found that the ad hoc Tribunals suffer from a lack of 
legitimacy within the affected States and, as a result, neither has had the desired effect on 	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developing the rule of law domestically. 160 A study into the impact the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone had on the rule of law in Sierra Leone and Liberia produced more mixed 
findings.  A majority of the people in both countries felt that there had been an overall 
improvement in the Rule of Law since the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, and more than 80% of the people surveyed attributed that improvement to the 
work of the Special Court. 161   However, the researchers found that despite the 
interviewees’ perception, the Special Court for Sierra Leone had instigated few changes 
to domestic legislation in either country and had minimal impact on law enforcement or 
the judiciary.162  
 It also does not appear that the International Criminal Court has had any real 
success in instilling victim participants with a sense that the domestic rule of law has 
been enhanced. Studies done in Uganda and Kenya found that despite International 
Criminal Court involvement in those countries there was still widespread distrust for 
domestic legal institutions due to perceptions about political interference and 
corruption.163 In fact, interviewees in both countries believe that the more likely outcome 
is that the domestic governments will have a corrupting effect on the International 
Criminal Court resulting in an overall diminishment of the rule of law internationally.164  
 These findings lead to the conclusion that many victim participants view their 
nation’s lack of adherence to the rule of law as being so entrenched that it is more likely 
that local political entities will corrupt international justice institutions than that those 
international institutions will positively affect domestic respect for the rule of law. Even 
in Sierra Leone and Liberia, where interviewees expressed some positivity about how the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone has enhanced the rule of law, researchers have been 
unable to identify any significant reforms to domestic justice institutions. There is 
insufficient evidence to support a finding that international criminal trials have a 
substantive influence on the domestic rule of law in states formerly affected by conflict.  
As a result, trials in absentia should not be justified on rule of law grounds because the 
potential infringement on the accused’s participation in trial outweighs the uncertain 	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benefit such a trial might have on strengthening the rule of law.  
4.6 REPARATIONS 
 Reparations represent one area in which the victims’ interests can be satisfied 
without the participation of the accused. Victims have made abundantly clear that one 
expected outcome of trial is that they will be provided with reparations in recognition of 
their victimisation.  In 2005, the United Nations General Assembly recognized a right to 
reparations for victims of gross violations of international human rights law or 
international humanitarian law.165 Reparations are meant to be proportional to the harm 
done and fall into five categories: Restitution, Compensation, Rehabilitation, Satisfaction 
and Guarantees of Non-Repetition. 166  National governments are responsible for 
reparations for crimes that can be attributed to the state and individuals are responsible 
for paying reparations when found liable by a competent court.167 
 Prior to 2005, victims of atrocity crimes being tried in international criminal 
courts and tribunals only had a right to reparations to the extent that the particular court 
or tribunal responsible for adjudicating the accused perpetrator of the crimes against them 
provided for reparations. The Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals and the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone only authorise reparations in the form of restitution of property and 
proceeds obtained by the accused through his or her criminal conduct.168  None of these 
three institutions are authorised to order any of the other four types of reparations 
identified by the United Nations General Assembly. 169   The law establishing the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia does not provide for any form of 
restitution for victims.  Instead, it requires the forfeiture to the State of any illegally 
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obtained money or property.170  The Extraordinary Chamber’s Internal Rules do allow for 
the award of reparations, but limit them in scope to “collective and moral” reparations 
and explicitly exclude monetary awards.171  The Statute of the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon does not directly provide the victims with a right to reparations.  Instead, it sets 
out the procedure it will follow to assist victims receiving reparations from courts of 
national jurisdictions.172  In contrast, Article 75 of the International Criminal Court’s 
Statute permits victims to seek reparations in the form of restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation in the event of the conviction of the accused.173  
 People affected by atrocity crimes have consistently asserted that they believe that 
the victims of such crimes should receive reparations.  A majority of victim participants 
in Uganda and Kenya indicated that the prospect of receiving reparations was there 
primary motivation for becoming victim participants in cases at the International 
Criminal Court.174 Their counterparts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Côte 
d’Ivoire were more likely to rank reparations amongst their motivations for participating 
rather than as their primary motivation, but respondents from both countries generally 
expected reparations following trial.175 In 2010, 97% of interviewees in the Central 
African Republic, not all of whom identified themselves as victims, felt that reparations 
for the victims are important.176  Most Iraqis responding to a 2004 survey indicated that 
reparations in the form of rehabilitation and compensation were necessary for Iraq to 
move on from the crimes committed during Saddam Hussein’s regime.   
 The ability of the victims to receive reparations from international criminal courts 
and tribunals is not affected when trial is conducted in absentia.  Although orders to pay 
reparations constitute part of the sanctions against an individual following his or her 
conviction, the reparations do not have to be paid by the convicted perpetrator.  When the 
United Nations General Assembly recognized the right to reparations it also adopted the 
principle that States should implement national programmes to pay reparations to victims 	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or to provide them with other assistance should those liable for harming the victims prove 
unwilling or unable to do so.177  The International Criminal Court also has a mechanism 
permitting the Trial Chambers to order that the Court’s Trust Fund pay the reparations 
awarded to the victims.178 These rules mean that the award of reparations is unrelated to 
the presence of the accused because there are other entities that will be responsible for 
paying the necessary reparations to the victims.  
 The accused’s presence at trial is largely irrelevant to victims primarily motivated 
by receiving reparations.  In fact, it could be argued that it is in the best interests of those 
victims driven by receiving reparations to proceed in absentia if the alternative would be 
the postponement of trial and an accompanying delay in the award of reparations. The 
existence of mechanisms that do not require the accused to participate in trial to ensure 
that the victims will receive the ordered reparations renders the accused’s presence 
immaterial.     
4.7 CONCLUSION 
 International human rights practitioners have gone beyond the strictly legal 
reasons for holding a trial and identified numerous other purposes to justify conducting 
international criminal trials.  These additional reasons for trial are largely designed to 
vindicate the rights of two groups, the victims of atrocity crimes and the international 
community. These two groups are generally interested in achieving the same things, 
including reconciliation between opposition groups following an armed conflict, the 
development and maintenance of a sustainable peace and the punishment of perpetrators 
of atrocity crimes.  Despite this general agreement when identifying the appropriate goals 
of trial, the victims and society as a whole often disagree about how best to prioritise 
those different goals.  Victims are mostly interested in the immediate redress of the 
wrongs committed against them while society as a whole emphasises the long-term 
benefits that international criminal trials can provide.  Redress for the victims most often 
takes three forms: being made to feel as if justice has been done, often through the 
punishment of the perpetrator of the crimes against them; by developing a full and 
complete historical record; and through financial reparations awarded in recognition of 
the suffering they endured.  The first two of these goals generally require the accused to 
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be present.  The international community prioritises different goals including: deterring 
the future commission of atrocity crimes; promoting long-term peace and the rule of law 
through out the world; and promoting a moral shift under which potential rights abusers 
will consider the commission of atrocity crimes repugnant.  While many of these goals 
are best accomplished through the punishment of the accused, in some situations they are 
also thought to be effective in the absence of punishment.  These distinctions are relevant 
because whether punishment is necessary to meet the goals of trial has a significant 
bearing on whether trying an accused in his or her absence is advisable.  If a particular 
goal cannot be met without punishing the accused than it cannot properly be used to 
justify holding a trial in absentia as an absent accused cannot be punished.  
 Also important is how a particular court or tribunal ranks the interests of these 
different groups. The International Criminal Court explicitly mentions victims in the 
Preamble of its Statute, and its extensive provisions detailing the rights of the victims 
make clear that their interests are a primary focus for the court. Because the International 
Criminal Court emphasises the victims’ interests, and most of the victims’ high priority 
goals are generally only effective when the accused is punished, there is little point in 
trying an accused in absentia at the International Criminal Court if it intends to fulfil its 
responsibility to the victims.  Conversely, when the ad hoc Tribunals were formed, the 
Security Council identified trial goals more closely aligned with the interests of the 
international community. This suggests that trials at those tribunals could accomplish 
their overarching goals in the absence of the accused.  Therefore, it is necessary for 
courts and tribunals to clearly understand what goals they hope to achieve, and whether 
those goals can be achieved in the absence of the accused, before proceeding with a trial 
in absentia.  
	   102 
CHAPTER 5: THE RIGHT TO BE  
PRESENT AT TRIAL AND TRIAL IN ABSENTIA 
 
 By the mid-2000’s it was generally thought that trial in absentia was a dead letter 
in the context of international criminal law. The Rome Statute’s apparent requirement 
that the accused be present at trial was interpreted as an indication that the international 
legal community had rejected trials in absentia.1 Trials in absentia had been described as 
‘anachronistic’, ‘unfair’ and ‘in opposition to international law standards’.2  However, the 
introduction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute in 2007, and its more 
permissive approach to trial taking place in the absence of the accused, signalled a radical 
shift in thinking about the role of trials in absentia in international criminal law. For the 
first time since the Nuremberg Trials, the statute of an international or internationalised 
criminal court or tribunal authorised the use of trial in absentia. An issue that many 
thought had been resolved in international criminal law was imbued with new life.  
 The phrase in absentia translates from Latin to “in the absence of” and carries the 
same legal meaning.3  Despite this clear literal definition, the term trial in absentia has 
been used to describe many different factual scenarios involving an accused’s absence 
from trial and as a result has no set meaning in international criminal law.4  It is used 
broadly to describe any situation in which trial occurs outside of the accused’s presence 
and more narrowly to describe a trial occurring in its entirety without the accused being 
present but where the accused is aware that trial is taking place in his or her absence.  
When used broadly, some commentators separate trial in absentia into two categories, 
partial in absentia and total in absentia, in an effort to describe the different legal rules 
that apply to each situation.5  Total in absentia refers to a trial which entirely takes place 	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in the absence of the accused while partial in absentia exists when the accused is present 
for some parts of the trial and absent for others.6 However, this approach is too limiting 
and fails to adequately account for the difference types of total and partial absences from 
trial.   
 To provide as much specificity as possible, absences from trial have been divided 
into four parts, each of which will be addressed in its own chapter.  The four types of 
absences are: 1) trial in absentia; 2) trial by default; 3) absences that occur after the 
commencement of trial; and 4) situations where the accused is physically present in the 
courtroom but unable to understand and participate in the trial.  This chapter examines 
trials in absentia, which are trials that occur in the absence of the accused where the 
accused has adequate notice that the trial is taking place and has waived his or her right to 
be present. In this context, notice exists when the accused learns of the charges against 
him or her and the date and location of trial sufficiently in advance of its start to ensure 
that he or she has an adequate amount of time to prepare his or her defence to those 
charges.7 Some also take the position that adequate notice should also include an 
indication of the consequences that can arise if the accused does not appear for trial.8  
Waiver of the right to be present occurs when the accused has adequate notice of the 
charges and the date and location of trial and declines to exercise his or her right by 
failing to appear for trial.9 Trial in absentia is thought to be permissible and compatible 
with the right to be present when the accused is given the opportunity to exercise his or 
her right to be present through adequate notice and declines to do so following an 
effective waiver. 10  Therefore, the existence of notice and waiver are fundamental 	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Principle into the Dutch Criminal Justice System’ (2001) 32 VUW L Rev 715, 722; 
Schabas, William A. and Veronique Caruana, ‘Article 63: Trial in the Presence of the 
Accused’, in Otto Triffterer and Kai Ambos, The Rome Statute of the International 
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considerations when determining whether a trial can properly held in absentia. 
5.1 THE REASONS FOR AND AGAINST TRIALS IN ABSENTIA IN 
 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 Trials in absentia conducted by international and internationalised criminal courts 
and tribunals are often justified on the basis of the Human Rights Committee’s Views in 
Mbenge v Zaire. In its Views, the Committee stated that in absentia proceedings “are in 
some circumstances… permissible in the interest of the proper administration of 
justice.”11 The Human Rights Committee did not elaborate about what circumstances 
might allow a court or tribunal to proceed in the accused’s absence, but they appear to 
encompass those situations in which the public interest in holding trial outweighs 
society’s competing interest in respecting the fair trial rights of the accused.12 The public 
interest in holding trials assumes this dominant position when the potential delay caused 
by the accused’s absence could result in: the loss of evidence; the expiration of applicable 
statutes of limitations; a burden on other trial participants, particularly with respect to the 
speedy trial rights of co-defendants; or a lengthy delay to the start of trial.13 Trials held 
under these circumstances are meant to promote public confidence in criminal trials and 
preventing the accused from subverting the course of international law and justice.14  
 The danger of conducting trials in absentia is that they can act to de-emphasise 
the importance of defence rights, which can result in those rights becoming undervalued 
and lead to the conviction of innocent defendants.15 Further, convictions resulting from 
trials in absentia may create the perception that the outcome is indicative of the accused 
being disciplined for his or her contumacy, and not because of the evidence presented by 	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12  Prosecutor v Milošević (Decision on Admissibility of Prosecution Investigator’s 
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the prosecution. This concern is exacerbated when trials in absentia are conducted in 
international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals because of the attention 
paid to these trials and the seriousness and gravity of the crimes alleged.16 Trials in 
absentia also often do not serve the penological interests of justice when the defendant 
remains at large following the conclusion of trial.17  It can be viewed as a wasted effort to 
go through the lengthy process of convicting someone in absentia when there is no real 
likelihood that the defendant will be punished for his or her actions. Additionally, 
convictions in absentia may create the impression that the international community will 
be satisfied with punishing atrocities through declarations of guilt rather than prison 
sentences and reparations.18  To avoid these outcomes, it is generally agreed that trial in 
absentia should be considered the exception and not the rule, even in those jurisdictions 
that permit the practice.19  
5.2 ATTITUDES TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL TRIALS IN ABSENTIA 
 BEFORE THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL 
 Although the Nuremberg Tribunal marked the first instance in which individuals 
were tried before an international criminal tribunal, it was not the first time that the 
international community expressed interest in conducting trials of an international 
character. The British government signalled its willingness to hold in absentia trials 
during the deliberations of the Commission on Responsibilities following World War I.  
The Commission on Responsibilities was established by the preliminary Paris Peace 
Conference to consider the issue of responsibility relating to the war and, as an ancillary 
issue, to discuss the formation and applicable procedure of the tribunal later discussed in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Wayne Jordash and Tim Parker, ‘Trials in Absentia at the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon: Incompatibility with International Human Rights Law’ (2010) 8 JICJ 487, 500-
501. 
17 Ibid; see also Zakerhossein and de Brouwer supra note 5 at 183; Stefan Trechsel, 
Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (OUP 2005) 253. 
18 Niccolò Figa-Talamanca, ‘Trials in Absentia and International Criminal Court’, in 
Flavia Lattanzi (ed), The International Criminal Court: Comments on the Draft Statute 
(Editoriale Scientifica 1998) 216. 
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Participation in the Criminal Process’ (2005) 38 Comp & Intl L J S Afr 285, 286; Håkan 
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Results (Kluwer Law International 1999) 255.  
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Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles.20 On 8 February 1919, the British government 
submitted a memorandum regarding its position on the various issues being considered 
by the Commission, including its suggestion that the proposed tribunal be able to try the 
accused in his or her absence so long as the accused received advance notice of the trial.21  
This is particularly notable as it is one of the earliest instances in the international context 
in which a distinction is drawn between a trial in absentia and a trial by default.  
Emphasising the importance of notice, and the information contained in that notice, will 
prove pivotal for the development of the right to be present at trial. 
 The British memorandum does not state why trials in absentia should be 
permitted at the proposed tribunal, but the memorandum does speak about the need for 
“prompt action” and “the urgent demand for stern justice”. 22  From that one can 
extrapolate that the British believed that trials should take place quickly and should not 
be subject to the delays caused by an accused that failed to appear.  The position of the 
British government is particularly notable because at the time the English and Welsh 
Common Law prided itself on the proposition that trials should not take place in the 
absence of the accused.23   
 The Treaty of Versailles, the official peace agreement with Germany following 
World War I, contains several provisions concerning criminal sanctions resulting from 
actions taken during the war.  Article 227 of the treaty announced criminal charges 
against Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, charging him with “a supreme offence against 
international morality and the sanctity of treaties” and a special tribunal was to be 
constituted in which to try him.24  Despite this, the special tribunal was never established, 
and Kaiser Wilhelm was never tried for his ‘supreme offence’, in large part because the 
Netherlands, where he fled following the war, would not extradite him for trial. The 
Dutch refused on the grounds that it had no duty under either the Versailles Treaty, 
international law or domestic law to extradite the Kaiser, and that to comply with the 
request would run counter to the Netherlands traditional position as a nation of refuge 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission and the Development of the Laws of War (His Majesty’s Stationery Office 
1948) 32. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid at 33. 
23 William Blackstone, Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book IV, 
Chapter 24 < http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk4ch24.asp> 1 July 
2017; Lawrence v The King [1933] AC 699, 708.   
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“for the vanquished in international conflicts”.25     
 Although no international trials were held following World War I, Belgium, 
France and Turkey all conducted domestic trials against individuals accused of 
committing crimes during the war, and some of those were held in absentia.26 It is safe to 
assume that the trials that took place in Belgium and France were conducted under the 
criminal procedure rules of those countries that specifically authorized trials in absentia. 
In Turkey, the Constantinople War Crime Trials started with great promise but significant 
procedural concerns, accompanied by the on-going political upheaval in Turkey, led to 
these trials being declared a “farce” and a “failure”.27  Despite this, the trials did succeed 
in returning in absentia convictions against a number of significant members of the 
Ottoman leadership during the war, including Mehmet Talaat, Ismail Enver and Ahmed 
Djemal.28  
 The fact that in absentia trials took place for crimes committed during the war 
should not lead to the conclusion that the international community accepted trials in 
absentia.  Rather, the post-World War I trials in absentia are more appropriately viewed 
as exercises of domestic criminal procedure, or, in the case of Turkey, as an effort to shift 
blame away from the State and onto certain individuals, and to ingratiate the failing 
Ottoman government with Western Europe.29  The decision not to try Kaiser Wilhelm II 
in absentia is stronger evidence that the international community at large did not accept 
trials in absentia, but it too should be viewed more as a politically motivated decision. 
While one could interpret the decision not to prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm II as a decision to 
respect his fair trial rights, it is more likely that the choice not to pursue a trial outside of 
his presence was based on the lack of political will to try a former head of state for his 
actions taken during his period of leadership for a crime that did not exist while he was in 	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January 1920) (courtesy of Professor William A. Schabas); Paul Marquardt, ‘Law 
Without Borders, The Constitutionality of an International Criminal Court’ (1995) 33 
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27 Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes 
Tribunals (Princeton UP 2002) 106, 129-30. 
28 Guenter Lewy, The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide 
(The University of Utah Press 2005) 76. 
29 Bass supra note 27 at 118. 
	   108 
power.30 
5.3 TRIAL IN ABSENTIA AT THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL 
 International criminal law generally, and the right to be present at trial 
specifically, again rose to prominence following the Second World War.  Tribunals were 
established in Nuremberg, Germany and Tokyo, Japan to try those German and Japanese 
officials accused of committing crimes during the war. The decision to pursue trials 
following World War II has been attributed to the phenomenal brutality of the war and 
the need to heal the wounds of the world.31 The trial held at Nuremberg by the 
International Military Tribunal resulted in the first international trial in absentia, and first 
international conviction in absentia. 
 Following the unconditional surrender of the Germans to the Allies on 7 May 
1945, the Allied powers assumed supreme authority over Germany on 5 June 1945.32  
The Allied powers met in London to discuss the creation of the International Military 
Tribunal (“Nuremberg Tribunal”) and to draft its charter.33  On 8 August 1945, the 
International Military Tribunal’s Charter was signed and introduced to govern the 
conduct of the Nuremberg Tribunal.34 Certain fair trial rights possessed by the accused 
were set out in the Charter, including the right to conduct a defence, the right to counsel, 
the right to introduce evidence and the right to examine witnesses.35  The right to be 
present at trial was not included amongst those fair trial rights. In fact, Article 12 of the 
Charter specifically authorized conducting proceedings against an absent accused if that 
accused “has not been found” or if the Tribunal “for any reason, finds it necessary, in the 
interests of justice, to conduct the hearing in his absence.”36 No compelling reason has 
been offered as to why the Allied powers authorised the use of trials in absentia at the 
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Nuremberg Tribunal.37  
 The Allies’ decision to allow trials in the absence of the accused at the Nuremberg 
Tribunal was immediately put to the test in the form of Martin Bormann. Bormann 
became head of the Nazi Party Chancellery on 12 May 1941 following Rudolf Hess’ 
escape to Britain, and in 1943 was named Secretary to the Fuhrer.38 Bormann’s authority 
over domestic matters was thought to rival that of Heinrich Himmler and Hermann 
Goring and it is believed that by the end of the war Bormann exerted “great influence” 
over Hitler. 39  Bormann was directly involved in the systematic slaughter of Jewish 
people, crimes committed against prisoners of war and operating the forced labour 
programme.40 In his memoir, Telford Taylor, who served as assistant prosecutor to 
Robert Jackson at the Nuremberg Tribunal, described Bormann as “a bad man” and 
recalled the statement of Hans Fritzsche, another Nazi tried at Nuremberg (although he 
was acquitted), who said of Bormann: 
 The vanished defendant had no friends.  Neither in court nor in private 
talks did I ever hear a single friendly word spoken of this man whose good 
will had once been so avidly sought…Now as he was tried in absentia it 
was shown that this stocky dark-haired man with the face of a peasant had 
always been regarded as a tyrant; his subordinates, even down to the 
typists, had been full of resentment against him, and he had been on bad 
terms with his family and closest relations.41 
 
Martin Bormann’s whereabouts following Germany’s unconditional surrender were 
unknown, as was whether he was alive or dead (it was later learned that he was dead).42 
The Allied powers disagreed about whether Bormann should be included in the 
indictment due to his absence. The United States and the United Kingdom were not 
particularly interested in trying an absent accused, but the French and the Soviets both 	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wanted to move ahead with indicting Bormann because he was considered “extremely 
important” and because he might prove to be alive.43  In the end, both the French and 
Soviet negotiators insisted on Bormann’s inclusion in the indictment and used the 
procedure set out in Article 14 of the Tribunal’s Charter to overcome the objections of 
the British and the Americans.44  
 Two significant issues arose out of the Tribunal’s decision to try Bormann in his 
absence.  The first problem was that Bormann’s lawyer, Friedrich Bergold, had no client 
to instruct him about the evidence, the role of particular witnesses in the crimes alleged or 
to direct him towards any existing exculpatory evidence. Telford Taylor described 
Bergold’s difficulties as follows, “never has a lawyer had a more thankless task.  He had 
no client in the flesh, and no one wanted to help him.”45  With regard to documentary 
evidence “Bergold had fewer than a dozen documents for which the best one could say 
was that Bormann had written some letters that did not incriminate him.”46 Bergold 
highlighted the problem during his closing argument when he pointed out that his ability 
to defend Bormann was compromised because he did not have a client to consult about 
the identity of witnesses or the location of exculpatory evidence.47  In total, it took 
Bergold “little more than an hour” to present Bormann’s case in defence of the charges.48  
 The second issue arising out of the decision to try Bormann in his absence was 
that other defendants used Bormann’s absence as an opportunity to shift responsibility for 
their own misdeeds on to Bormann. Bergold asserted that: 
The charges which many co-defendants have made against him, perhaps 
for very special reasons and obviously in order to further their own 
defense and exonerate themselves, cannot for reasons of fairness be taken 
as the basis of a judicial decision.  The prosecution has already stated quite 
frequently through its representatives that the defendants would endeavour 
to throw the main blame upon dead or absent men for the acts which are 
subject to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.  Some of my colleagues have 
followed these tactics of the defendants in their defense speeches.  Perhaps 
it was right to do all of this.  I cannot judge the matter. Besides, I have no 
authority to form such a judgment.49 	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As Bergold suggested in his statement, the prosecution shared his concern that the 
defendants present for the trial were marginalising their own guilt and disproportionately 
blaming people that were absent. During his closing argument, Robert Jackson pointed 
out that all of the defendants had shifted blame to those Nazi officials, including 
Bormann, not present at the trial.  While Jackson avoided directly accusing the 
defendants of lying, he did make clear his incredulity at this fact, stating “[i]t is a 
temptation to ponder the wondrous workings of a fate which has left only the guilty dead 
and only the innocent alive. It is almost too remarkable.”50   
 Later commentary supports Bergold’s unease that the present defendants were 
absolving themselves of blame while blaming others known to be absent or dead. Bradley 
Smith wrote of Bormann that “most of the other accused found him an ideal figure on 
whom to deposit all the responsibility they could brush off themselves” and that “[b]y the 
end of the trial, the prosecution and the various defendants had produced such a towering 
picture of Bormann’s malevolent influence and power that his image threatened to 
overshadow that of Hitler himself.”51 Kim Christian Priemel asserts that Bormann’s 
absence meant he could not give evidence against the other accused, leading to 
responsibility being “dumped at his doorstep” by the other defendants.52  Michael 
Bazyler described the shifting of blame to those Nazi officials not present at trial, 
including Bormann, as “a common defense tactic”.53 
 The decision to try Bormann in absentia is often justified on the grounds that the 
documentary evidence against Bormann was overwhelming. After recognising that 
Bergold “labored under difficulties” when trying to refute the documentary evidence, the 
Tribunal found in its decision that, “[i]n the face of these documents which bear 
Bormann’s signature it is difficult to see how he could do so even were the defendant 
present.”54 Others have reached a similar conclusion and stated, “[i]t is more than 
doubtful that Bormann’s presence in court would have altered the judgment, for the 	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documents were unanswerable.”55  While this may be true, it is also beside the point.  
Even if the evidence against an accused is overwhelming, and even if the court ultimately 
came to the ‘right’ decision, it does not justify abrogating the accused’s right to be 
present. As Bergold put it in his closing argument “nobody knows what the defendant 
Bormann could of said in answer to these men if he had been present.”56   
 This goes to the very crux of the danger of trying an accused in his or her absence. 
The prosecution’s case will always appear persuasive if the defence is unable to 
adequately test it.57 When the defendant is not present the prosecution has free rein to 
characterise the evidence in any way it chooses, to question witnesses about 
incriminating facts while ignoring exculpatory evidence and to generally create a case 
that upon first glance appears unimpeachable.  It is only through cross-examination and 
the introduction of contrary evidence that the trier of fact is able to adequately assess the 
guilt or innocence of the accused.  Reaching an accurate verdict is made even more 
difficult where co-defendants use the absence of others as an opportunity to shift the 
blame onto those missing parties. The Tribunal’s decision was, in part, based on 
inaccurate and inadequately tested evidence and as a consequence the court’s verdict as it 
relates to Bormann can be called into question.  
 The court’s decision to try Bormann in his absence constituted an injustice against 
the victims of the Nazis’ crimes.  Justice is not achieved simply by apportioning guilt; 
guilt must be ascribed to the proper parties in appropriate proportions for justice to be 
done.  Here, participants and subsequent observers had the impression that Bormann’s 
co-defendants transferred at least some of their own culpability onto him so as to relieve 
themselves of guilt.  Therefore, acts or omissions ascribed to Bormann at trial may not 
have been his responsibility at all. This demonstrates a failure of justice as in some 
instances the actual guilty party may not have been held responsible for his crimes.  None 
of this is to say that Bormann was not guilty; he was most certainly responsible for the 
commission of horrendous acts during the Second World War.  However, equally guilty 
people used his absence as an opportunity to avoid full responsibility for their own 
crimes. As Robert Jackson made clear during his concluding remarks: 
 nor do I deny that all these dead and missing men shared the guilt…But 
their guilt cannot exculpate the defendants…It was these dead men whose 	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56 Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol 19 supra note 47 at 117. 
57 Starygin and Selth supra note 1 at 173. 
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these living chose to be their partners in this great conspiratorial 
brotherhood, and the crimes that they did together they must pay for one 
by one.58 
5.4 TRIALS IN ABSENTIA IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 SINCE NUREMBERG 
 When reaching its decision to try Bormann in absentia, the Nuremberg Tribunal 
only considered whether the notice requirement contained in Article 12 of the Charter 
had been complied with, and did not address whether Bormann’s failure to appear 
constituted a waiver of his right to be present at trial.59  This is not surprising as the right 
to be present had not yet been recognised in international criminal law.  Because no right 
to be present existed when the decision was made to try Bormann in his absence, there 
was no need to determine whether he had waived that right.  This has changed since 
Nuremberg following the introduction of the accused’s right to be present in a variety of 
human rights conventions and the Statutes of the different international and 
internationalised courts and tribunals.  Presence at trial is now seen as both a right and a 
general principle of international procedure, however it is not absolute.60 The legal 
recognition of the accused’s right to be present has made the issue of waiver of that right 
a prominent feature of litigation involving the presence of the accused at trial. The 
legality of proceeding against an absent accused now turns on whether the accused 
effectively waived his or her right to be present. 61  
 5.4.1 THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 	  
 To establish the effective waiver of any fair trial right, including the right to be 
present, three conditions must be met.62 These conditions were originally set out by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, 
Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 - 1 October 1946, vol 18 (1947) 428.  
59 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, 
Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 - 1 October 1946, vol 2 (1947) 25-27. 
60 Safferling, International Criminal Procedure supra note 2 at 400; see also Prosecutor 
v Zigiranyirazo (Decision on Interlocutory Appeal) ICTR-2001-73-AR73, A Ch (30 
October 2006) para 14. 
61 Safferling, International Criminal Procedure supra note 2 at 400. 
62 Colozza v Italy (1985) 7 EHRR 516, 12 February 1985, para 28; Sibgatullin v Russia 
App No 32165/02 (ECtHR, 14 September 2009) para 46; Sejdovic v Italy (2006) 42 
EHRR 17, 1 March 2006, para 86; Demebukov v Bulgaria (2010) 50 EHRR 41, 28 
February 2008, para 47; Poitrimol v France (1994) 18 EHRR 130, 23 November 1993, 
para 31; Prosecutor v Ruto and Sang (Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against 
the decision of Trial Chamber V(a) of 18 June 2013 entitled “Decision on Mr Ruto's 
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European Court of Human Rights and later recognised by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Court.63 To meet those conditions 
one must show that the waiver is: (1) unequivocal; (2) does not run counter to any 
important public interest; and (3) is attended by minimum safeguards commensurate with 
its importance.64   The European Court of Human Rights has also indicated that there are 
certain rights that can only be waived if the waiver was knowing and intelligent. 65 Thus 
far only the right to counsel has been specifically acknowledged as requiring that 
additional protection, but the Court’s reference to the right to counsel as one of the 
“fundamental rights among those which constitute the notion of a fair trial” suggests that 
the waiver of other, similar rights might also need to meet this heightened criteria.66 This 
may be particularly true of the right to be present as it has been described as the right that 
permits “an effective use of all the rights in article 6 of the Convention”.67 As such, it 
would appear to fit into that category of rights necessary to ensure that the accused’s trial 
is fair. 
 The European Court of Human Rights has provided three examples of actions 
sufficiently unequivocal to meet the first criterion.  They are: (1) where the accused states 
publicly or in writing that he or she does not intend to participate; (2) where the accused 
has become aware of the proceedings from unofficial sources and intentionally evades an 
attempted arrest; or (3) where the evidence unequivocally shows that the accused was 
aware of the charges and still did not appear.68  All three of these examples demonstrate 
the importance of notifying the accused about the proceedings.  The European Court of 
Human Rights has confirmed the important role notice plays in holding that “to inform 
someone of a prosecution brought against him is a legal act of such importance that it 
must be carried out in accordance with procedural and substantive requirements capable 
of guaranteeing the effective exercise of the accused’s rights; vague and informal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial”) ICC-01/09-01/11, A Ch (25 
October 2013) para 51; Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze v The Prosecutor 
(Judgement) ICTR-99-52-A, A Ch (28 November 2007) para 108. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Şaman v Turkey App No 35292/05 (ECtHR, 5 April 2011) paras 32-33; Pishchalnickov 
v Russia App No 7025/04 (ECtHR, 24 September 2009) paras 77-78; Dvorski v Croatia 
(2016) 63 EHRR 7, 20 October 2015, paras 100-101.  
66 Ibid. 
67 Stamhuis supra note 10 at 722. 
68 Shkalla v Albania App No 26866/05 (ECtHR, 10 August 2011) para 70; citing 
Iavarazzo v Italy App No 50489/99 (ECtHR, 4 December 2001). 
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knowledge cannot suffice.”69  This reinforces the notion that an accused can only decide 
to exercise his or her rights, or waive those rights, if the accused has the specific 
knowledge necessary to allow him or her to make an informed decision and demonstrates 
the essential link between notice and waiver.      
 The jurisprudence as to the second and third criteria needed to show effective 
waiver is less developed. When considered in the context of presence at trial, the public 
interest component prevents the accused from waiving his or her right to be present if 
there is an important public interest requiring the appearance of the accused.70 The 
European Court of Human Rights has not made clear what sort of important public 
interests could prevent the accused from waiving his or her right. The European Court of 
Human Rights specifically adopted the minimum safeguards element in Pfeifer and 
Plankl v Austria, following the European Commission on Human Rights’ introduction of 
that element in its earlier decision in the same case.71 In developing the standard, the 
Commission found that a waiver given when under pressure from the court, outside of the 
presence of the accused’s counsel, and where an immediate decision is made without an 
opportunity to reflect or consult with counsel, fails to meet those minimum safeguards.72  
The European Court of Human Rights later found in Zachar and Ćierny v Slovakia, that 
the appropriate minimum safeguards are lacking when the accused is notified of his or 
her rights by the responsible authorities without any commentary or explanation 
particular to the individual accused and the charges are such that they could be 
reclassified so as to carry with them much more serious consequences than those initially 
indicated.73  These decisions indicate that the minimum safeguards standard is not met if 
the facts suggest that the decision to waive was not made of the accused’s own free will, 
but was instead the product of pressure, compulsion or without the accused having a full 
understanding of the consequences of his or her decision. 
 It is apparent from the case law that the effectiveness of an accused’s waiver of a 
fundamental right is largely dependent on whether he or she had sufficient information to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Ibid citing T v Italy App No 14104/88 (ECtHR, 12 October 1992) para 28; Somogyi v 
Italy (2008) 46 EHRR 5, 10 November 2004, 75. 
70 Håkansson and Sturesson v Sweden (1991) 13 EHRR 1, 21 February 1990, para 67-68. 
71 Pfeifer and Plankl v Austria, Application No. 10802/84, Judgment, 25 February 1992, 
para 37; Pfeifer and Plankl v Austria, Application No. 10802/84, Report of the 
Commission, 11 October 1990, para 74. 
72 Pfeifer and Plankl Report of the Commission supra note 71 at para 78. 
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make an informed decision when making that waiver. This is in line with the general 
requirement that the accused have notice of the charges against him or her and the date 
and location of trial before his or her appearance can be effectively waived.  The Pfeifer 
and Plankl and Zachar and Ćierny decisions, together with the notice requirements, 
clearly indicate that waiver can only really be deemed effective when the accused is 
provided with the information needed to make an informed choice. The European Court 
of Human Rights’ decisions emphasise that generalised information is insufficient and 
that the accused must have information relevant to their situation to make an informed 
decision.  Further, the Court has been more likely to find that waiver was effective if the 
accused had access to advice from counsel suggesting that, in its view, an informed 
decision most often occurs when one can discuss the matter with his or her lawyer. The 
European Court’s decisions also underscore the importance of counsel to the extent that it 
was less willing to overturn a decision made with the assistance of counsel.  This again 
signals the weight the Court gives to adequate knowledge, as counsel should be able to 
make the accused aware of the benefits and consequences of waiving one or more rights.   
 Waivers can be separated into two broad categories; express waiver and implied 
or tacit waiver. 74  Express waiver of the right to be present is not particularly 
controversial.  It is generally agreed that trial may take place in the absence of the 
accused if the accused has expressly waived his or her right to be present at trial so long 
as it complies with the criteria discussed above.75 A more contentious issue involves the 
limits of express waiver and particularly whether the accused can utilize it so as to avoid 
attending trial in its entirety. Determining whether an accused has implicitly waived his 
or her right to be present at trial is a much more difficult inquiry.  It generally requires an 
analysis of whether he or she had sufficient notice of the proceedings against him or her, 
and whether the accused’s absence from trial constituted an informed decision not to 
attend.  The European Court of Human Rights has counselled extreme caution when 
courts seek to determine if an accused tacitly or implicitly waived a human right during a 
criminal proceeding.76 In addition to the factors normally considered when establishing 
the effectiveness of a waiver, finding the existence of an implied waiver also requires a 
showing that the accused “could reasonably have foreseen what the consequences of his 	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Trials in Absentia’ (2011-12) 37 NC J Intl L & Com Reg 489, 500. 
76 Kaste and Mathisen v Norway (2009) 48 EHRR 3, 9 November 2006, para 29. 
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conduct would be.”77  To find an implied waiver of the right to be present necessitates a 
showing that the accused is aware that he or she will not have access to those rights that 
are given meaning through his or her presence, including the right to participate and the 
right to confrontation.  
 5.4.2 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 	  
 The Barayagwiza case at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is a 
good example of a trial being conducted in its entirety in the absence of the accused on 
the basis of a waiver. Although the Barayagwiza case is best known for Barayagwiza’s 
prolonged period of pre-trial detention and the Tribunal’s failure to ensure his timely 
initial appearance before the Tribunal, it is also notable for his refusal to appear during 
trial. That refusal is all the more remarkable considering the fact that Barayagwiza was in 
the Tribunal’s custody during his trial and simply refused to appear in the courtroom.    
 Originally arrested in Cameroon on 15 April 1996, Barayagwiza remained 
incarcerated until 19 November 1997 at which time he was transferred to the custody of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.78  On 29 September 1997, Barayagwiza 
filed a writ of habeus corpus, which was never addressed by the Trial Chamber.79 
Barayagwiza remained in custody without appearing before the Tribunal until 23 
February 1998 at which time he pled not guilty to the charges against him.80 Barayagwiza 
challenged the validity of the delay in providing him with a preliminary hearing and on 3 
November 1999, the Appeals Chamber issued a decision dismissing the indictment with 
prejudice and ordering Barayagwiza’s release on abuse of process grounds. 81 
Subsequently, the government of Rwanda brought significant pressure on the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda by threatening non-cooperation with the 
Tribunal if the Appeals Chamber failed to reverse its 3 November 1999 decision.82  On 
31 March 2000 the Appeals Chamber changed its earlier decision on the grounds that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Jones v United Kingdom App No 30900/02 (ECtHR, 9 September 2003); Talat Tunç v 
Turkey App No 32432/96 (ECtHR, 27 March 2007) para 59; Battisti v France App No 
28796/05 (ECtHR, 12 December 2006); Hermi v Italy (2008) 46 EHRR 46, 18 October 
2006 at para 74.  
78 Gordon supra note 33 at 674-75. 
79 Barayagwiza v The Prosecutor (Decision) ICTR-97-19-AR72, A Ch (3 November 
1999) para 8 
80 Ibid at para 9; Gordon supra note 33 at 674-75. 
81 Barayagwiza supra note 79 at para 113. 
82 Barayagwiza v The Prosecutor (Decision) ICTR-97-19-AR72, A Ch (31 March 2000) 
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new facts brought forth by the prosecution on appeal revealed that Barayagwiza’s human 
rights had been violated during his detention however those violations were not co-
extensive with the omissions committed by the Prosecutor.83  The Court revoked its 
Order releasing Barayagwiza and found that any remedy for the violation of 
Barayagwiza’s rights would be fixed following trial “at the time of judgement.”84   
 When trial in this case, popularly referred to as “the Media Trial”, began on 23 
October 2000, Barayagwiza was not present.85  Barayagwiza believed, along with many 
others, that the political pressure exerted by the Rwandan government, and not the new 
facts discussed by the Appeals Chamber, was the real reason the decision to release him 
was reversed.86 He issued a statement indicating that he refused “to associate himself 
with a show trial” and that the trial against him was inherently unfair because the 
Tribunal had allowed itself to be “manipulated by the Rwandan government”. 87  
Although the trial lasted for almost three years, Barayagwiza remained absent for its 
entirety and was ultimately convicted in absentia.88  
 Near the outset of the trial, Barayagwiza’s lawyers filed a Motion to Withdraw as 
his counsel on the basis of Barayagwiza’s direction to them that they not represent him in 
any way at trial because of his perceived inability to receive a fair trial.89  In its decision 
denying the motion, the Chamber also reflected on his decision not to attend trial.  The 
Trial Chamber concluded that “where the accused has been duly informed of his on-
going trial, neither the Statute nor human rights law prevent the case against him from 
proceeding in his absence.”90 The Trial Chamber did not go so far as to analyse whether 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Ibid at para 74. 
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Barayagwiza’s failure to appear at trial constituted a waiver, although it did refer to his 
choice not to be present.91  
 In reaching that decision the Trial Chamber declared that Article 20 of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Statute is modelled on Article 14(3)(d) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and that both are the equivalent 
of Article 6(3)(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights.92  Based on the 
relationship between Article 20 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s 
Statute and Article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
the Tribunal relied on the Human Rights Committee’s interpretation of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Maleki v Italy, which the Trial Chamber alleged 
stands for the proposition that trials in absentia are “only permissible when the accused is 
summoned in a timely manner and informed of the proceedings against him.”93  The Trial 
Chamber also asserted that a similar principle had been developed in the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights.94  
 Following his conviction, Barayagwiza challenged the permissibility of his trial in 
absentia on the grounds that neither the Statute nor the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
allow the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to conduct in absentia 
proceedings. 95   In support of that position, Barayagwiza relied on the travaux 
preparatoires of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s Statute, 
and particularly the Secretary-General’s statement regarding trial in absentia, and 
jurisprudence arising before both of the ad hoc Tribunals.96   The Appeals Chamber 
rejected Barayagwiza’s appeal on the grounds that the Secretary-General’s statement and 
the cited jurisprudence pertained specifically to accused individuals that had not yet been 
apprehended by the Court and did not relate to defendants, like Barayagwiza, that refused 	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to participate in the trial.97   
 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Appeals Chamber justified its 
denial of Barayagwiza’s appeal on the basis of jurisprudence from the Human Rights 
Committee, European Court of Human Rights and International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, the appellate rules of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and a 
statement made by the African Human Rights Commission.98  Based on these sources, 
the Appeals Chamber came to the conclusion that trials in absentia are permissible if the 
accused exercises a free, unequivocal and knowledgeable waiver of that right.99  The 
Appeals Chamber found that Barayagwiza’s refusal to attend trial, even though he was 
aware that it was being held, constituted a free, explicit and unequivocal waiver of his 
right to be present at trial and that the Trial Chamber did not err in conducting trial in his 
absence.100 
 The Appeals Chamber’s judgment in Barayagwiza disregarded its earlier decision 
in Prosecutor v Blaškić on the grounds that its treatment of presence at trial in Blaškić 
was “an incidental matter” and that it “could not be interpreted as prohibiting the conduct 
of trial in the absence of the accused who had clearly waived his right to attend and 
participate.”101  The Blaškić decision specifically found that “even when the accused has 
clearly waived his right to be tried in his presence (Article 21(4)(d) of the Statute), it 
would prove extremely difficult or even impossible for an international criminal court to 
determine the innocence or guilt of that accused.”102 This statement indicates that even 
where an individual has notice of the charges against him or her, and has waived the right 
to appear, that trial in the accused’s absence should still be avoided.   While it is true that 
the Blaškić decision does not forbid conducting trial in the absence of an accused that has 
waived his or her right to be present, the Barayagwiza decision would have been stronger 
if it had more directly addressed the concerns raised in Blaškić.  
 In addition to disregarding its earlier decision in Blaškić, the Appeals Chamber 
also discounted the Secretary-General’s Report issued when the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s Statute was introduced. The Secretary General 
stated ““[t]here is a widespread perception that trials in absentia should not be provided 	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99 Ibid at para 109. 
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for in the statute as this would not be consistent with article 14 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which provides that the accused shall be entitled 
to be tried in his presence.”103  The Appeals Chamber dismisses this statement on the 
dubious grounds that the wording of the paragraph and its placement in the report 
indicate that the term “in absentia” refers exclusively to an accused that has not yet been 
arrested.104  In essence, the Appeals Chamber limited the Secretary-General’s use of the 
phrase “in absentia” to the extent that it only refers to trials being held against defendants 
not in the custody of the trying court. There is little basis to support that limitation.  
 Rule 82 bis was added to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence in May 2003, and established a procedure whereby trial could 
continue in the absence of the accused when the accused chooses to boycott trial.105  Rule 
82 bis states that the Trial Chamber may “order that the trial proceed in the absence of the 
accused” so long as his or her “refusal to appear persists.”106  The application of Rule 82 
bis is limited to the extent that an accused tried in this manner must have made his or her 
initial appearance before the tribunal, had notice from the Registrar that he is required to 
be present a trial and is represented by counsel.107  The lack of any requirement that the 
absence be construed as an implied waiver of the accused’s right to be present suggests 
that Rule 82 bis is imposing a duty on the accused to be present at trial.108 This is 
underlined by the fact that Rule 82 bis understands the presence of the accused as a 
requirement rather than the permissive exercise of his right to be present.  Taken together, 
these elements demonstrate that the accused is obligated to be present and that the Trial 
Chamber may continue trial in his or her absence without due consideration for his or her 
right to be present at trial. 
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 The provisions of Rule 82 bis are guided by the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda’s interpretation of the notice requirement originally set out by the Human 
Rights Committee in Maleki.  It is clear from the Trial Chamber’s decision in 
Barayagwiza that the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda took from Maleki that 
trial in absentia is permissible in international criminal law so long as the accused has 
received notice of the charges. While notice is a component of what can make trial in 
absentia permissible, the accused’s waiver of the right to be present is also a fundamental 
part of the analysis.  It is generally inadequate to conduct trial in its entirety in the 
accused’s absence without first identifying some form of waiver as doing so does not 
properly account for the accused’s right to be present at trial.   
 5.4.3 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 	  
 The most modern waiver procedure in use at an international or internationalised 
criminal court or tribunal for excusing an accused from appearing during trial is found in 
Rules 134 bis, 134 ter and 134 quater of the International Criminal Court’s Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.  The addition of these rules to the Court’s Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence represent a departure from the intent of the original drafter’s of the Rome 
Statute. Evidence for this conclusion is found in the fact that the Statute specifically 
authorises waiver of the right to be present during the Confirmation of Charges hearing 
but not during trial. Article 61(2)(a) of the Statute allows the Confirmation hearing to 
take place in the accused’s absence when he or she “[w]aived his or her right to be 
present”.109  Article 61(2)(a) is made operative by Rule 124 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence which requires the accused seeking to absent himself or herself from the 
hearing to submit a written request for permission to be absent and waive his or her right 
to be present.110 The Pre-Trial Chamber can elect to conduct consultations with the 
parties and waiver will be only be granted if the pre-trial chamber is satisfied that the 
accused understands his or her right to be present and the consequences of waiving that 
right.111  Pre-Trial Chamber I permitted Germain Katanga to waive his right to be present 
at the Confirmation of Charges hearing following a finding that he was fully aware of the 
consequences of the waiver and that he would not be prejudiced if the hearing continued 	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in his absence.112  Subsequently, in The Prosecutor v Banda and Jerbo, Pre-Trial 
Chamber II determined that both defendants understood their rights and the consequences 
of waiving those rights and allowed the Confirmation of Charges hearing to go forward in 
their absence.113   
 The existence of a waiver procedure during the Confirmation of Charges stage of 
proceedings suggests that the Statute’s drafters could have adopted a similar practice 
during the trial stage but chose not to. This supports the conclusion that the omission of 
any rule authorising trial to proceed in the accused’s absence was intentional.  The 
decision to allow the accused to waive his or her appearance at the Confirmation of 
Charges stage of proceedings is seen by some as a concession to those delegations at the 
Rome Conference advocating on behalf of permitting trials in absentia at the Court.114  
That the drafters could have included a similar rule during trial, and did not, is indicative 
of the fact that they did not believe that trial should be conducted in the accused’s 
absence. 
 The issue of whether an accused could waive his or her right to be present at trial 
largely remained dormant until 2013 when it was raised in the two Kenya cases, 
Prosecutor v Ruto et al. and Prosecutor v Kenyatta.  On 4 March 2013, Uhuru Kenyatta 
was elected president of Kenya and William Ruto was elected deputy president. 
Thereafter, both Kenyatta and Ruto submitted requests to the relevant Trial Chamber that, 
if granted, would permit them not to be continuously present at trial so that they could 
perform the duties of their offices.115 The Court was now presented with a situation in 
which two defendants were signalling their willingness to continue to engage in the on-
going proceedings, but who wished to waive their right to be present so that each could 
attend to their official duties as president and deputy president of Kenya. 
  The respective Trial Chambers both decided that the accused has a right to be 
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present at trial that can be waived voluntarily, but only if certain conditions are met.116 In 
the Ruto case, the Trial Chamber made clear that Ruto’s presence during trial was the 
appropriate default position and established a number of different types of hearings 
during which his attendance was required.117 Additionally, while he would be able to 
waive his right to be present during those court sessions that did not fall into those 
mandatory categories, he could only do so if his absence was directed towards 
performing his duties as deputy president.118  The Kenyatta Trial Chamber placed the 
same limitations on Kenyatta’s ability to waive his right to be present.119  It also took 
pains to emphasise that the decision in each case was the product of a desire to reach a 
reasonable accommodation between each man’s need to perform official functions and 
their responsibility to the Court, and neither decision should be perceived as authorising 
their absence in  “gratification of dignity of his own occupation of that office.”120  
 Following the prosecution’s appeal of the Ruto decision, the Appeals Chamber 
concluded that the right to be present at trial as embodied in Article 63(1) “does not 
operate as an absolute bar in all circumstances to the continuation of trial proceedings in 
the absence of the accused.”121  As a result, the Trial Chamber may excuse the accused 
from attendance in exceptional circumstances.122  The Appeals Chamber based its 
decision on a finding that Article 63(1) was not intended to prevent the accused from 
occasionally being absent from court, but rather, it was included in the Statute, in part, so 
as to prevent an interpretation of Article 67(1)(d) permitting the accused to be tried in 
absentia.123 However, the Appeals Chamber also found that although the Trial Chamber 
had the discretion to permit the accused to absent himself or herself from trial, it had 
exceeded that discretion by interpreting it too broadly.124 The Appeals Chamber reminded 
the Trial Chamber that under Article 63(1) the presence of the accused “must remain the 
general rule” and also found that the Trial Chamber had essentially provided Ruto with a 
blanket excusal from court “effectively making his absence the general rule and his 	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presence the exception.”125 To ensure that the presence of the accuse remained the 
general rule, the Appeals Chamber imposed six limitations on the Trial Chamber’s 
discretion to excuse the accused from trial.  Those restrictions are:  
(i) The absence of the accused can only take place in exceptional 
 circumstances and must not become the rule; 
(ii) The possibility of alternative measures must have been 
 considered, including, but not limited to, changes to the trial 
 schedule or a  short adjournment of the trial;  
(iii) Any absence must be limited to that which is strictly necessary; 
(iv) The accused must have explicitly waived his or her right to  be 
 present at trial;  
(v) The rights of the accused must be fully ensured in his or her 
 absence, in particular through representation by counsel; and 
(vi) The decision as to whether the accused may be excused from 
 attending part of his or her trial must be taken on a case-by- case 
 basis, with due regard to the subject matter of the specific 
 hearings that the accused would not attend during the period for 
 which excusal had been requested.126 
 
After the Appeals Chamber made its decision in Ruto, Trial Chamber V(B) reconsidered 
its original decision pertaining to the presence of Kenyatta during trial and issued a new 
decision in line with the holding of the Appeals Chamber.127 
 The guiding principle underlying the decisions of both the Trial Chamber and the 
Appeals Chamber is that the presence of the accused during trial is the norm and any 
approved absences from trial must be the exception.  What is at issue is the standard by 
which the decision to excuse the accused is made.  While the Trial Chamber intended to 
premise any decision to excuse the accused on whether the absence was necessary to 
allow him to perform his official duties, the Appeals Chamber only authorised absences 
that involve exceptional circumstances and are strictly necessary.  The language of the 
Appeals Chamber’s decision appears intended to suggest that not all duties of office 
should warrant an absence, but should only be reserved for those duties arising out of 
exceptional circumstances.     
 While the Court was trying to resolve whether Kenyatta and Ruto could 
voluntarily absent themselves from trial, it also found itself under intense political 
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pressure surrounding the issue of head of state immunity. Article 27(2) of the 
International Criminal Court’s Statute specifically asserts that the Court is not barred 
from exercising jurisdiction over an individual claiming immunity derived from his or her 
official capacity.128 Head of state immunity and trial in absentia are generally unrelated, 
however, because both Kenyatta and Ruto based their requests to absent themselves from 
trial on the need to fulfil the official functions of their offices, the issues became 
intertwined. During the Assembly of States Parties held in November 2013 various 
proposals were introduced to prevent the Court from proceeding against sitting heads of 
state including amending any or all of the following: Article 27, Article 63 or the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence.129  Ultimately, the States Parties acknowledged how difficult 
it would be to change the Statute and instead agreed to amend the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence in such a way as to permit an accused to waive his or her right to be present at 
trial. The decision to amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence resulted in the 
inclusion of Rules 134 bis, 134 ter and 134 quater. 
 Rule 134 bis authorises the defendant to request that he or she be permitted to 
appear remotely for “part or parts” of his or her trial through the use of video 
technology.130  Rule 134 ter allows the accused to request that he or she be permitted to 
absent him or herself from trial so long as he or she is still represented by counsel.131  
Such a request can only be granted in exceptional circumstances; where amendment to 
the trial schedule would be inadequate; where the accused has explicitly waived his or her 
right to be present; and the accused’s rights will be fully protected in his or her 
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absence.132  Both of these rules only allow portions of the trial to occur in the absence of 
the accused and do not permit the accused to be absent during the entire trial.  Rule 134 
quater, by comparison, could be used to permit the accused to absent himself or herself 
from the entirety of trial so long as the absence is due to the accused’s fulfilment of 
“extraordinary public duties at the highest national level” and the accused is represented 
by counsel at trial.133   Such a request must contain an explicit waiver of the right to be 
present at trial.134 A notable feature unique to Rule 134 ter and Rule 134 quater is the 
requirement that any absence on the part of the accused has to be accompanied by an 
explicit waiver of his or her right to be present at trial. None of the new rules allow for an 
implicit waiver.  
 It is interesting to note that Rules 134 ter and 134 quater only mandate that the 
waiver of the right to be present be explicit.  These Rules do not clearly require that a 
waiver be knowing, voluntary or made after receiving legal advice.135  As a result, it 
could be argued that the waiver provisions of Rules 134 ter and 134 quater do not 
comply with existing human rights standards.136  The European Court of Human Rights 
has found that any waiver of the right to be present at trial must “be attended by 
minimum safeguards commensurate to its importance” and must be voluntary, knowing 
and intelligent.137  However, the non-inclusion of these procedural necessities are likely 
the result of poor drafting rather than an effort to allow the accused to waive his or her 
rights without adequate protections.  This conclusion is borne out by the limitations found 
in Rule 124 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence mandating that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber may only grant a waiver of the right to be present during the Confirmation of 
Charges hearing when it is satisfied that the accused understands the right to be present 
and the consequences of waiving that right.138 It is highly unlikely that the International 
Criminal Court would allow the accused to waive his or her right to be present at trial 
based on a lesser showing than that which is required for waiving the right to be present 
at the confirmation of charges hearing.  Although it is not specified in Rules 134 ter and 	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134 quater, one should read the same knowledge standard found in Rule 124 into the 
later rules. 
 Another interesting feature of the rules is that a Trial Chamber considering a 
waiver request under Rules 134 bis and 134 ter always has the discretion to grant a 
waiver, but, so long as specific conditions are met, is obligated to grant a waiver 
requested under Rule 134 quater. Rules 134 bis and 134 ter provide that the Trial 
Chamber considering the issue “shall rule” on the request.139 By comparison, Rule 134 
quater states that the Trial Chamber “shall grant” a request to be absent so long as the 
prescribed conditions are met.140  Despite the seemingly obligatory formation of Rule 134 
quater, the Trial Chamber retains significant discretion when considering a waiver 
request made pursuant to the rule as such a request may only be granted if doing so is “in 
the interests of justice” and the rights of the accused are fully protected.141  Allowing the 
reviewing court to act only if it is in the interests of justice gives it significant leeway 
when deciding whether to grant a Rule 134 quater request. 
 The Assembly of State Parties did not directly follow the decision of either 
Chamber when it amended the rules to include Rule 134 quater.  Rule 134 quater allows 
the accused to be absent when he or she is “mandated to fulfill extraordinary public 
duties”, a formulation that appears to be an amalgamation of the decision of both 
chambers.142 Unfortunately, the term “mandated to fulfill extraordinary public duties” is 
ambiguous as it is susceptible to at least two different interpretations.  First, it can be 
understood to follow the Appeals Chamber’s distinction between normal official duties 
and duties arising out of exceptional circumstances, and only allow the accused’s absence 
when the latter situation exists.  Conversely, it can also be read to include any and all 
functions of a sitting president or deputy president, as those duties are necessarily 
extraordinary when compared to the duties of the average citizen.143  Such a reading 
exceeds the scope of both Chambers’ decisions and creates a scenario in which the 
accused may attempt to absent himself or herself from the entire trial.   
 Ruto wasted no time in trying to take advantage of this discrepancy between the 	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Rule and the Appeals Chamber’s decision when, less than a month after Rule 134 quater 
was introduced, he filed a request seeking to be excused from appearing at any part of his 
trial.  In making that request, Ruto suggested that Rule 134 quater meant that he could be 
absent “for as long as the accused person is mandated to fulfill extraordinary public 
duties at the highest national level.”144 By requesting permission under the rule to miss 
the entire trial, Ruto was clearly implying that all of his duties as deputy president 
constituted extraordinary public duties within the meaning of Rule 134 quater.    
 The Trial Chamber accepted the validity of Rule 134 quater, and the conditions 
contained therein, as the standard by which an accused may waive his or her right to be 
present at trial when making its decision about Ruto’s renewed request to be absent from 
trial. The Trial Chamber reached that conclusion despite recognising that Rule 134 quater 
does not accord with the earlier Appeals Chamber’s decision in Ruto.145 The Trial 
Chamber dismissed the discrepancy between the rule and the Appeals Chamber’s 
decision as a clarification on the part of the Assembly of State Parties as to what 
limitations must be placed on the scope of the Trial Chamber to authorise trial to take 
place in the absence of the accused.146 However, the Trial Chamber disagreed with 
Ruto’s interpretation of Rule 134 quater whereby he could be absent from the entire trial. 
147    Instead, it identified those parts of the trial during which Ruto’s presence was 
obligatory. Generally, Ruto had to appear for the hearings identified in the Chamber’s 
original decision, however his attendance was no longer necessary during the opening 
statements, but he now had to be present during all hearings conducted in the first five 
days after a judicial recess.148  Practically, the introduction of Rule 134 quater did not 
substantively change how the Court viewed the presence of the accused, what it did do 
was create a mechanism through which the Court could properly regulate the accused’s 
attendance at trial.   
 The decision to add Rules 134 bis, 134 ter and 134 quater was made in spite of 
the plain language of the Statute, which reads, “the accused shall be present during 
trial”.149 This is a straight-forward statement which cannot logically be interpreted as 	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permitting most of the trial to take place in the absence of the accused. However, the 
Assembly of State Parties, like the Trial Chambers and Appeals Chamber before it, was 
presented with a difficult real world situation that required it to find a way to advance the 
work of the Court while also respecting the fact that some of the defendants have 
responsibilities that must be attended to regardless of the fact he or she is on trial.  The 
danger in the addition of Rule 134 quater is that it carries the potential to create parallel 
trial systems whereby certain defendants, based on their official positions, are subject to 
different appearance rules than the rest of the defendants.150 This threatens to upset the 
balance found in the first sentence of Article 27, asserting that “[t]his Statute shall apply 
equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity.”151  
 Some argue that the success of international and internationalised criminal courts 
and tribunals depends on how they are perceived by states and other international 
actors. 152   That view is premised on the notion that the continued operation of 
international criminal entities necessarily depends on the support of their member states 
and that when reaching decisions courts must take actions “that enhance the court’s 
authority in the international community.”153  Through this lens it could be argued that 
the decision to change the Rules of Procedure and Evidence represented a necessary 
adjustment to the Court’s mandate so that it might better comply with the expectations of 
its various member states. The danger of that position is that it creates a precedent 
whereby anytime the Court makes a decision that runs counter to the expectations of one 
or more States Parties, those aggrieved States can protest the decision and expect it to be 
overturned so as to suit its expectations.  At that point, the court ceases to be an objective 
arbiter of the law and becomes a political body rubberstamping the will of its member 
states.  When making changes to its Statute or Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the 
Court must ensure that it is doing so for sound legal reasons and not just to appease its 
members. 
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5.5 CONCLUSION  
 Trials in absentia have experienced a new life in international criminal law in the 
past decade. The codification of trials in absentia in the Statute of the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon reinvigorated debate about a concept that had existed in international 
criminal law since the Second World War.  This renewed interest in trial in absentia 
evolved out of concerns that an absent accused could simply halt the course of trial by 
refusing to appear, an act thought to be contrary to the interests of justice.  Although trial 
in absentia is often used as a blanket term covering any sort of absence from trial, it is 
better understood as one of four types of absences.  A trial in absentia is a trial that is 
conducted in its entirety in the accused’s absence and where the accused has notice that 
the trial is taking place and waives his or her right to be present by refusing to appear 
during the proceedings.    
  Modern trials in absentia require the presence of two components, adequate 
notice and waiver, that must be found before trial can be conducted in the absence of the 
accused. Adequate notice requires that the accused learn of the charges against him or 
her, and the date and location of trial, with sufficient time to allow him or her to prepare a 
defence to the charges.  Waiver is an affirmative indication, either expressed or implied, 
that the accused does not wish to attend trial and that it can proceed in his or her absence.  
If one or both of those elements are missing, and trial is still conducted in the absence of 
the accused, it is of dubious legal value and may be better described as a trial by default.   
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CHAPTER 6: THE COMPATIBILITY OF TRIAL BY  
DEFAULT WITH THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT TRIAL 
 
 Trial by default is the second type of trial conducted without the participation of 
the accused. Trial by default and trial in absentia are similar in that both involve trial 
happening in its entirety in the absence of the accused.  What distinguishes these two 
types of trial is the extent to which the accused’s failure to attend trial is the result of an 
informed decision not to participate in person. A trial by default occurs in the absence of 
the accused without the accused having previously appeared before the court or tribunal 
and without any indication that the accused is aware that the trial is taking place. 1 
Without any affirmative indication that the accused possesses the information necessary 
to participate in trial it becomes very difficult for the applicable court or tribunal to 
determine whether the accused’s absence is the outcome of a conscious choice not to 
attend or whether it is the result of the accused’s ignorance about the proceedings. 2  
Because the court or tribunal does not know the reason for the absence it also cannot 
decide whether the accused has waived his or her right to be present.3 Conversely, in a 
trial in absentia the evidence demonstrates that the accused is aware of the allegations 
against him or her and the date and time of trial.4 An accused with notice of this 
information that does not appear for trial is seen as making a conscious choice not to 
attend trial.  That conscious choice is interpreted as a waiver of the right to be present.  
 International criminal law generally disapproves of proceeding against an accused 
who has not waived his or her right to be present because of the lack of clear evidence 
that the accused’s absence is the product of his or her conscious choice not to appear.5  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Paola Gaeta, ‘Trial in Absentia Before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’, in Amal 
Alamuddin, Nidal Nabil Jurdi and David Tolbert (eds), The Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon: Law and Practice (OUP 2014) 238; William A. Schabas and Veronique 
Caruana, ‘Article 63: Trial in the Presence of the Accused’, in Otto Triffterer and Kai 
Ambos, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:  A Commentary (3rd ed, 
Hart Publishing 2016) 1565. 
2 Wayne Jordash and Tim Parker, ‘Trials in Absentia at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: 
Incompatibility with International Human Rights Law’ (2010) 8 JICJ 487, 491. 
3 D.J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, E.P. Bates & C.M. Buckley, Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick Law 
of the European Court of Human Rights (3rd ed, OUP 2014) 410; Evert F. Stamhuis, ‘In 
Absentia Trials and the Right to Defend: The Incorporation of a European Human Rights 
Principle into the Dutch Criminal Justice System’ (2001) 32 VUW L Rev 715, 722. 
4 Gaeta supra note 1 at 238; Schabas and Caruana supra note 1 at 1565; Stan Starygin and 
Johanna Selth, ‘Cambodia and the Right to be Present:  Trials In Absentia in the Draft 
Criminal Procedure Code’ [2005] Singapore J Legal Stud 170, 171. 
5 Starygin and Selth supra note 4 at 171. 
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For the most part, this is a non-issue at the majority of international or internationalised 
criminal courts and tribunals because of their Statutory and jurisprudential unwillingness 
to commence trial in the absence of the accused under any circumstances. However, the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, as the first international or internationalised criminal court 
or tribunal since the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg to permit the entirety 
of the trial to be conducted in the absence of the accused, is statutorily permitted to 
conduct trials in absentia.  Further, the wording of the Statute’s trial in absentia provision 
may also allow trial by default under some circumstances. 6   
 As a preliminary point, it is important to stress that the Statute of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon specifically provides the accused with the right ‘to be tried in his or 
her presence’, but makes that right subject to the provisions of Article 22.7 Article 22(1) 
permits the Court to try defendants in their absence if one of three circumstances exists.  
Those circumstances are when the accused: (a) has expressly and in writing waived his or 
her right to be present; (b) has not been handed over to the Tribunal by the State 
authorities concerned; (c) has absconded or otherwise cannot be found and all reasonable 
steps have been taken to secure his or her appearance before the Tribunal and to inform 
him or her of the charges confirmed by the Pre-Trial Judge.8  There is no indication in the 
wording of the Statute as to whether the provisions of Article 22(1) are conjunctive or 
disjunctive.  However, Rule 106 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which makes 
Article 22(1) operative and largely restates the article verbatim, inserts the word ‘or’ 
between the second and third clauses signifying that they should be read disjunctively.   
 The provisions of Article 22(1) identify four different types of absent accused: 
those that explicitly waive the right to be present; those that are prevented by State 
authorities from appearing; those that abscond; and those that otherwise cannot be found.  
The situation covered by subparagraph (a), where trial takes places after the accused “has 
expressly and in writing waived his or her right to be present”, is a classic example of 
trial in absentia and should not be interpreted as authorising a trial by default.  The same 
should be said for those accused described as absconding. A person absconds “in order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Sarah Williams, Fair Trials: Hybrid and Internationalised Criminal Tribunals: Selected 
Jurisdictional Issues (Hart Publishing 2012) 372; Björn Elberling, Theefendant in 
International Criminal Proceedings (Hart Publishing 2012) 60-61. 
7 UN Security Council, Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (30 May 2007) art 
16(4)(d). 
8 Ibid at art 22(1). 
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evade justice”, i.e. to avoid trial. 9 An absconding accused is generally one that has been 
subject to the control of the court, has been released, usually on bail, and then fails to 
appear before the court at the appointed date and time.10 Because the act of absconding is 
performed to avoid being tried it is reasonable to surmise that an accused that absconds is 
aware of the charges against him or her.  This knowledge, and the accused’s subsequent 
failure to appear, acts as an implicit waiver of the right to be present and an absconding 
accused may be tried in absentia.11   
 The remaining two types of absent defendants, those that are detained by State 
authorities and those that “otherwise cannot be found”, can give rise to situations in 
which trial may take place without the accused’s knowledge.  In the scenario where State 
authorities prevent the accused from attending his or her trial, there is no guarantee that 
the interfering State authorities will notify the accused of the charges or the date and 
location of trial.  The Statute does allow for notification by way of “communication to the 
State of residence or nationality”, implying that an accused being stopped from attending 
trial can be properly notified of the charges so long as his or her state of residency or 
nationality is notified.12  However, this sort of notification will only be effective if the 
State blocking the accused from participating is also his or her State of residence or 
nationality. If the accused is being prevented from attending by a State other than that 
described above, this form of notification is not capable of providing the accused with 
effective notice. It is also important to keep in mind that the purpose of showing that an 
absent accused received notice of the charges is to permit the court or tribunal to reach a 
decision as to whether the accused’s absence is the result of a conscious choice not to 
attend and therefore act as a waiver of his or her right to be present. In a situation where 
the accused is aware of the charges against him or her, and the date and location of the 
trial, but the accused is being prevented by a State authority from attending trial, it is 
difficult to conclude that the absence is the result of the accused’s conscious decision not 
to attend even though he or she has notice of the charges.  Proceeding in the accused’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Christoph Safferling, ‘Part B Issues, Institutions, and Personalities: Trial in absentia’, in 
Antonio Cassese (ed), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (OUP 
2009) 642; see also Rupert Skilbeck, ‘Frankenstein’s Monster: Creating a New 
International Procedure’ (2010) 8 JICJ 451, 460.  
10 William A. Schabas, ‘In Absentia Proceedings Before International Criminal Courts’, 
in Göran Sluiter and Sergey Vasiliev (eds), International Criminal Procedure: Towards a 
Coherent Body of Law (CMP Publishing, Ltd 2009) 378. 
11 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (OUP 2003) 402. 
12 STL Statute supra note 7 at art 22(2)(a). 
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absence under these circumstances may comply with the letter of the rule regarding trial 
in absentia but not its spirit. 
 The remaining category of absent accused, those that “otherwise cannot be 
found”, serves as a catch-all to describe any other accused that fail to appear for trial. 
This category may include the defendants in the Prosecutor v Ayyash and the Prosecutor 
v Merhi cases (later consolidated into one case under the name Prosecutor v Ayyash) at 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.13  The procedure employed by the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon when permitting the Ayyash trial to take place in the absence of the accused is 
particularly notable. On 30 June 2011, the Registrar transmitted the indictments and the 
arrest warrants for four of the Special Tribunal’s suspects to Lebanon pursuant to Rule 
76(A).14   Rule 76(A) requires the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to formally provide the 
indictment “to the authorities of the State in whose territory the accused resides or was 
last known to be residing, or in whose territory or under whose jurisdiction he is believed 
likely to be found, in order to serve the indictment on the accused without delay.”15 
Subsequently, on 8 July 2011, the Pre-Trial Judge issued international arrest warrants for 
the four accused and authorised the Prosecution to request that Interpol issue “red 
notices” relating to the accused, indicating that the court wanted to locate and arrest the 
suspects.16  On 9 August 2011, the Public Prosecutor at the Lebanese Court of Cassation 
wrote a letter to the Court indicating that “the Lebanese authorities exerted its utmost 
efforts to execute any of the in absentee warrants” but that those efforts had not been 
successful.17  The Lebanese authorities then detailed their efforts to locate the accused 
and give them notice.  Those efforts included visiting residential and business addresses 
associated with the accused, checking electoral lists and civil status registers, 
interviewing individuals acquainted with the accused and reviewing the accused’s 
movements in and out of Lebanon in an effort to establish whether the suspects were still 
in the country.18  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Prosecutor v Ayyash et al. (Trial Transcript) STL-11-01/T/TC, T Ch (11 February 
2014) 95, lines 2-5; Prosecutor v Ayyash et al. (Decision on Trial Management and 
Reasons for Decision on Joinder) STL-11-01/T/TC, T Ch (25 February 2014). 
14 Prosecutor v Ayyash et al. (Order Pursuant to Rule 76(E)) STL-11-01/I/PRES, 
President of the Tribunal (18 August 2011) para 3. 
15 Ibid; see also Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Special Tribunal for Lebanon (29 
November 2010) rule 76(A). 
16 Prosecutor v Ayyash et al. (Order Pursuant to Rule 76(E)) supra note 14 at para 6. 
17 Ibid at para 8. 
18 Ibid at paras 9-12. 
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 The failure of the Lebanese authorities to locate the four accused led the court to 
act under Rule 76(E).  Rule 76(E) permits the President to establish that reasonable 
efforts have been made to serve the indictment and, following consultation with the Pre-
Trial Judge, to order an alternative form of service, which can include public 
advertisement.19 Antonio Cassese, then the president of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 
concluded that reasonable efforts had been made, both by the Tribunal and the Lebanese 
government, to serve notice on the suspects.20  President Cassese authorised the registrar 
to “identify and effectuate” the alternative means of service to be employed.21   
 President Cassese confirmed on 11 August 2011 that the court had been unable to 
serve notice on the accused.  He then took the interesting decision to make a public 
statement directed at the accused in which he referred to the active participation of the 
accused “as a major safeguard of a fair and just trial.”22 One week later, on 18 August 
2011, President Cassese issued an order pursuant to Rule 76(E) authorising service of the 
indictments in an alternative manner. President Cassese indicated in that order that “[a] 
trial – even one conducted in the absence of the accused – is a requisite step toward 
restoring in the long run the social peace disturbed by these crimes, with their persistent 
adverse consequences for the whole fabric of Lebanese society.”23  These two statements, 
made one week apart, highlight the tension between the importance of the accused’s 
presence at trial, and the positive impact it can have on ensuring that trial is fair, and the 
important societal function that trial can serve, even if it takes place in the absence of the 
accused.   
 Subsequently, the Registrar of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon sent two letters to 
the Lebanese Public Prosecutor pursuant to the Rule 76(E) order issued President 
Cassese.  This was authorised by Rule 76 bis, which permits the Registrar to transmit the 
form of advertisement to the officials of the relevant state.24 The first letter, sent on 31 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Special Tribunal for Lebanon supra note 15 rule 
76(A). 
20 Prosecutor v Ayyash et al. (Order Pursuant to Rule 76(E)) supra note 14 at paras 17-18. 
21 Ibid at para 22. 
22 Statement of Judge Antonio Cassese, President of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (11 
August 2011) < https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/media/press-releases/670-11-08-2011-
statement-of-judge-antonio-cassese-president-of-the-special-tribunal-for-lebanon> 
accessed 3 July 2017. 
23 Prosecutor v Ayyash et al. (Order Pursuant to Rule 76(E)) supra note 14 at para 22. 
24 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Special Tribunal for Lebanon supra note 15 at rule 
76 bis. 
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August 2011, contained the text of a wanted notice for the four accused so that it could be 
published in the Lebanese media.25  The second letter, sent 8 September 2011, indicated 
which news sources the wanted notice should be published in.26 The notices were 
published in five newspapers on 15 September 2011, including three Arabic language 
papers, one English paper and on French paper.27 
 On 17 October 2011, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued an order seizing the Trial 
Chamber so that it might make a determination as to whether trial could proceed in the 
absence of the accused, and ordering the Registrar to transmit certain documents to the 
Trial Chamber so that it might be able to make its decision.28  This decision was made in 
fulfilment of Rule 105bis, which authorises the Pre-Trial Chamber to ask the Trial 
Chamber to initiate in absentia proceedings in the event that the accused is notified of the 
indictment via publication and at least 30 days had passed between the date of the 
notification and the entry of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s order.29 
 The Trial Chamber issued its decision on 1 February 2012 in which it decided that 
the accused could be tried in their absence.  In reaching that decision, the Trial Chamber 
determined that the evidence indicated that the four accused had absconded within the 
meaning of the third of the three scenarios set out in Article 22 and Rule 106, thus 
authorising trial to proceed in the absence of the accused.30 In support of that holding, the 
Chamber found that because none of the four accused had been seen at their last known 
address since the indictments were transmitted to the Lebanese government, and because 
of the extensive media coverage in the case naming the four accused as suspects, all 
reasonable steps had been taken to inform them of the charges.31 
 The Trial Chamber justified its decision, in part, on its interpretation of 
international human rights law as it pertains to trials in absentia.  Specifically, the Trial 
Chamber found the following: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Prosecutor v Ayyash et al. (Order to Seize the Trial Chamber Pursuant to Rule 
105bis(a) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence to Determine Whether to Initiate 
Proceedings in Absentia) STL-11-01/I, PT Ch (17 October 2011) para 11. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid at para 12. 
28 Ibid at paras 26-27. 
29 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Special Tribunal for Lebanon supra note 15 at rule 
105 bis. 
30 Prosecutor v Ayyash et al. (Decision to Hold Trial in Absentia) STL-11-01/I/TC, T Ch 
(1 February 2012) paras 3, 111. 
31 Ibid at paras 106-111. 
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International human rights instruments require that an accused person is 
properly notified of the charges and invited to appear before the court (at 
least by summons) and is notified of the consequences of non-appearance - 
that is of the possibility of the court holding a trial in absentia - before the 
court can proceed to try the person in his or her absence. The accused must 
have waived the right to attend the trial by exercising their own free will or 
through their conduct. The objective is to ensure that the accused can 
properly exercise the right to appear, or conversely, not to appear at the 
trial. The State authorities have a wide discretion as to the method used to 
properly inform the accused; what counts is the effectiveness of that 
communication. International human rights law, however, imposes no 
obligations on State authorities, beyond taking these necessary notification 
steps, before a court may proceed to a trial in absentia.32 
 
Following a defence appeal of the Trial Chamber’s refusal to reconsider its original 
decision to conduct trial in absentia, the Appeals Chamber confirmed the Trial 
Chamber’s decision and found that the Trial Chamber had not committed any error in its 
decision to proceed against the accused in absentia.33  
6.1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW MAY NOT REQUIRE THAT 
 THE ACCUSED RECEIVE NOTICE BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH 
 TRIAL IN THEIR ABSENCE 
 In reaching its decision, the Trial Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
stated that international human rights law requires that States take “necessary notification 
steps” to notify the accused.34   However, this does not adequately portray the state of 
international human rights law.  While it is desirable to inform the accused of the charges 
against him or her and the date and location of trial what is required is that the court or 
tribunal attempting to notify the accused about the trial must make “reasonable efforts” to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ibid at para 32; citing International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) arts 
14(3)(a), (b), (d) and (e); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 
ETS 5 at arts 6(1) and 6(3); Somogyi v Italy (2008) 46 EHRR 5, 10 November 2004 at 
para 67; Colozza v Italy (1985) 7 EHRR 516, 12 February 1985 at paras 27-30, Sejdovic v 
Italy (2006) 42 EHRR 17, 1 March 2006 at paras 86, 88-90; Mbenge v Zaire Comm No 
16/1977 (25 March 1983) para 14.2. 
33 Prosecutor v Ayyash et al. (Decision on Defence Appeals Against Trial Chamber’s 
Decision on Reconsideration of the Trial in Absentia Decision) STL-11-01/PT/AC/ 
AR126.1, A Ch (1 November 2012) para 32. 
34 Prosecutor v Ayyash et al. (Decision to Hold Trial in Absentia) supra note 30 at para 
32. 
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provide the accused with notice and that there are limits to those efforts.35 Although 
courts and tribunals have generally declined to identify a set rule as to what constitutes 
“reasonable efforts”, it has been suggested that the assiduousness with which the 
appropriate authorities attempt to notify the accused and the diligence exercised by the 
accused to receive the information should be part of the consideration.36  Further, any 
failure to properly notify the accused can be remedied so long as the accused has a right 
to a new determination of the charges after learning that he or she has been prosecuted.   
 Authority on this issue can be found in the decisions of the Human Rights 
Committee and the European Court of Human Rights.37  Although the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon is not bound by the decisions of either body, it has relied on the decisions of 
each when determining general issues of international criminal law.  With regard to the 
European Court of Human Rights, the Appeals Chamber found that the European Court’s 
decisions are helpful “in assessing the highest standards of international criminal 
procedure” when considering the accused’s right to be present at trial.38 Additionally, 
Judge Cassese, in his position as president of the Tribunal, described the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights as “extremely important” to the Tribunal, and indicated 
that because such decisions are based on provisions similar to those found in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which is binding on Lebanon, they 
should be seen as “a crucial set of legal standards for the STL as well.”39  By expressly 
identifying the importance of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
President Cassese was also tacitly recognising the significance of the Human Rights 
Committee’s Views interpreting the International Covenant.   
 The case law from the European Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights 
Committee does not support the conclusion that there is an irrefutable rule of 
international criminal law that trial cannot commence outside of the accused’s presence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Council Directive (EU) 2016/343 of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain 
aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in 
criminal proceedings [2016] OJ L65/5 at para 39; Mbenge supra note 32 at para 14.2. 36	  Council Directive 2016/343 supra note 35 at para 38.	  
37 Maleki v Italy Comm No 699/1996 (27 July 1999) para 9.3; citing Mbenge supra note 
32 at para 14.1; Poitrimol v France (1994) 18 EHRR 130, 23 November 1993 at paras 
38-9; Sejdovic supra note 32 at para 82; Somogyi supra note 32 at para 66; Colozza supra 
note 32 at para 29; Krombach v France App No 29731/96 (ECtHR, 13 February 2001) 
para 85; Einhorn v France App No 71555/01 (ECtHR, 16 October 2001) para 33. 
38 Prosecutor v Ayyash et al. (Decision on Defence Appeals) supra note 33 at para 27. 
39 In the Matter of el Sayed (Order Assigning Matter to Pre-Trial Judge) CH/PRES/ 
2010/01, Order of the President (15 April 2010) para 26. 
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unless necessary steps have been taken to ensure that the accused received notice of the 
charges. In Maleki v Italy, the Human Rights Committee was asked to consider whether 
an Italian court’s decision to try Maleki in absentia constituted a violation of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.40  The Committee found that there 
had been a violation of Maleki’s rights because he had not been “summoned in a timely 
manner and informed of the proceedings against him”.41 However, the Committee went 
on to find that the violation could have been remedied if Maleki had been entitled to a 
retrial once he was arrested and transferred to the jurisdiction of the trial court.42  The 
decision in Maleki shows that while it is a violation to proceed against an accused that 
does not have proper notice, that violation can be remedied if the accused is granted a 
fresh determination of the charges.  Therefore, there is no per se bar against trying an 
accused without notice, however the decision of a court or tribunal to proceed in such a 
manner lacks legitimacy if the absent accused does not have a right to a new trial.    
 In Poitrimol v France, the European Court of Human Rights reached a similar 
conclusion to that of the Human Rights Committee, although it formulated its finding 
somewhat differently. In Poitrimol, the European Court was presented with a case where 
the applicant, Poitrimol was tried and convicted in absentia by a French Court.43 He 
challenged his conviction on the grounds that he had been deprived of his right found in 
Article 6(3)(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights that he be allowed “to 
defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing”.44  In finding a 
breach of his rights, the European Court of Human Rights stated, “[p]roceedings held in 
an accused’s absence are not in principle incompatible with the Convention if the person 
concerned can subsequently obtain from a court which has heard him a fresh 
determination of the merits of the charge, in respect of both law and fact.”45  Poitrimol’s 
rights were violated because he was denied such an opportunity.46 It is important to note 
that the European Court of Human Rights did not tie the violation of Poitrimol’s rights to 
a lack of notice, in fact he had notice of the trial and declined to appear, but instead found 
that his rights were violated because he was not given the opportunity to have a new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Maleki supra note 37 at para 1. 
41 Ibid at para 9.3; citing Mbenge supra note 32 at para 14.1. 
42 Maleki supra note 37 at para 9.5. 
43 Poitrimol supra note 37 at para 15-16. 
44 European Convention on Human Rights supra note 32 at art 6(3)(c). 
45 Poitrimol supra note 36 at para 31. 
46 Ibid at para 38-9. 
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determination of the law and the facts.47  This suggests that a lack of notice may not be 
necessary so long as an accused has the opportunity to have the charges against him or 
her considered again once he or she chooses to submit to the jurisdiction of the court.   
 The European Court of Human Rights has taken up this issue on other occasions, 
most notably in Sejdovic v Italy, and has generally found that denying an accused 
convicted in absentia a new determination about the merits of the charges against them 
constitutes a denial of justice.48  The European Court went even further in Stoichkov v 
Bulgaria and found that when a court refuses to reopen proceedings conducted in the 
absence of the accused and there is no indication that the accused waived his or her right 
to be present at trial that it constitutes a “flagrant denial of justice” that is “manifestly 
contrary” to the provisions and principles of Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.49  Again, the violation of the accused’s rights lies in the fact that he was 
not given a new trial rather than because the court held trial without any indication that 
the accused waived his right to be present.   
 The European Court of Human Rights has identified two situations in which an 
absent accused is not necessarily entitled to a new determination of the charges. First, the 
European Court has found that the accused does not have a right to an automatic 
rehearing of the facts if he or she waived his or her right to appear at trial and present a 
defence.50  Second, the accused is not entitled to an automatic retrial if the accused’s 
failure to appear at trial is the result of the accused intentionally trying to evade justice.51  
What these two exceptions have in common is that in either case the accused must 
necessarily have received notice of the charges against him or her and his or her resulting 
absence was a result of an informed decision not to appear for trial.  The important point 
is that an accused should be able to obtain a new trial at any time after he or she first 
learns about the charges against him or her.52  Therefore, any person being tried by 
default is entitled to a fresh determination of the charges once he or she becomes aware 
of the charges.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Ibid at para 35. 
48 Sejdovic supra note 32 at para 82; Somogyi supra note 32 at para 66; Colozza supra 
note 32 at para 29; Krombach supra note 37 at para 85; Einhorn supra note 37 at para 33. 
49 Stoichkov v Bulgaria (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. 14, 24 June 2005 at para 56. 
50 Sejdovic supra note 32 at para 82; Somogyi supra note 32 at para 66; Colozza supra 
note 32 at para 29; Krombach supra note 37 at para 85; Einhorn supra note 37 at para 33. 
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 The European Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee reached 
similar conclusions that an accused can be tried in his or her absence even when the trial 
court fails to take adequate steps to notify him or her of the charges against them.  
However, such a trial is only permissible if the accused has the right to a new trial, or 
some other fresh determination of the charges, after he or she comes under the control of 
the trial court.  The two decisions differ to the extent that the European Court found that 
the lack of a fresh determination of the charges was the reason the accused’s convention 
rights were violated whereas the Human Rights Committee found that the violation arose 
out of insufficient notice but that it could have been remedied had a new trial been 
conducted. Despite these different approaches, it is clear that international criminal law 
does not contain a strict prohibition against trying an accused in his or her absence 
without notice, so long as the accused have an automatic right to be retried after 
surrendering or being apprehended by the trial court. 
 The Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon complies with international 
criminal law because it grants an absent accused a near automatic right to retrial.  Article 
22(3) of the Statute grants an accused convicted in his or her absence the right to a retrial 
unless he or she designates a defence counsel of his or her choosing or he or she accepts 
the in absentia judgment.53 These limitations are substantively similar to those imposed 
by the European Court of Human Rights.54 By creating the limitation that an accused may 
only be retried if he or she has not appointed counsel, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is 
simply recognising that an accused that has appointed counsel must be aware that the trial 
is taking place and is actively choosing not to attend. Further, the Tribunal can be 
confident that the rights of an accused that has chosen his or her own counsel are being 
protected because the accused is represented and he or she played a role in choosing that 
representation.  Similarly, limiting retrial in situations where the accused accepts the in 
absentia judgment is logical as there is no reason to repeat the burdensome process of 
trial if the accused agrees with the outcome of the original proceeding.  The important 
point is that an accused should be able to obtain a new trial at any time after he or she 
first learns about the charges against him or her if he or she wishes.55  Therefore, any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 STL Statute supra note 7 at art 22(3). 
54 Sejdovic supra note 32 at para 82; Somogyi supra note 32 at para 66; Colozza supra 
note 32 at para 29; Krombach supra note 37 at para 85; Einhorn supra note 37 at para 33; 
Medenica supra note 51 at para 55. 
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person being tried by default at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is entitled to a fresh 
determination of the charges once he or she becomes aware of the charges but the 
exercise of that right remains dependent upon whether he or she wants to be retried. 
 Paola Gaeta argues that the retrial provision contained in Article 22(3) actually 
exceeds what is required under international criminal law. She reaches this conclusion on 
the grounds that the right to retrial at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is available to any 
absent defendant regardless of whether he or she had notice of the trial and/or waived his 
or her right to be present, so long as he or she did not appoint counsel.56 By providing all 
defendants that meet these criteria with the right to a retrial, and not limiting retrial to 
only those defendants being tried by default, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon has 
transformed the right to retrial from a remedy for the violation of the accused’s right to be 
present into a primary right held by an formerly absent accused.57  
 One area of concern arises when an accused is being tried under Article 22(1)(b) 
of the Statute.  Article 22(1)(b) permits the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to proceed in 
the absence of an accused that “[h]as not been handed over to the Tribunal by the State 
authorities concerned”.58 The legality of proceeding in the accused’s absence under these 
circumstances has been questioned mainly on the grounds that the accused’s absence is 
not the result of a conscious choice not to attend but because he or she is being barred 
from appearing.59 A situation could exist where the accused is aware that he or she is 
being tried in absentia, wishes to attend trial, but is unable to do so because a government 
unwilling to cooperate with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is detaining the accused. A 
strict reading of the rule, particularly one taking into account its underlying purpose, 
could lead to the conclusion that such a defendant is not entitled to a retrial because he or 
she was aware the first trial was taking place.  However, such a construction would lead 
to an unjust result. Fortunately, it is unlikely that an accused in this position would have 
the opportunity to appoint counsel and would therefore maintain his or her right to retrial.  
This approach is favourable because it does not mechanically determine if the accused 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Gaeta supra note 1 at 247. 
57 Ibid at 247-248. 
58 STL Statute supra note 7 at art 22(1)(b). 
59 Niccolò Pons, ‘Some Remarks on in Absentia Proceedings before the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon in Case of a State’s Failure or Refusal to Hand over the Accused’ (2010) 8 
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has notice of the proceedings and based on that determination mandate whether there will 
be a retrial.  
 Another issue relating to the right to retrial involves the limited period of time 
during which the Special Tribunal for Lebanon will be in operation. Specifically, there is 
trepidation that if an accused is convicted in his or her absence, and subsequently 
apprehended after the court ceases operation, that those defendants convicted in absentia 
will not have access to a new trial.60 This limitation on the right to retrial could have both 
short-term and long-term consequences for the Tribunal.61  In the short term it could 
impact on the legitimacy of the Tribunal if the perception persists that the Tribunal is 
operating outside of established human rights norms.62  In the long term it could have 
implications on the formation of future international or internationalised courts and 
tribunals and the extent to which they protect the fair trial rights of the accused.63  The 
danger of what will happen when the Special Tribunal for Lebanon closes is now 
somewhat diminished as it seems likely that some mechanism akin to those established 
for the ad hoc Tribunals and the Special Court for Sierra Leone will be created to carry 
on the Special Tribunal’s jurisdiction. 
 Gaeta dismisses concerns about how previously absent defendants might be 
retried after the Special Tribunal for Lebanon closes on the dual grounds that Article 
22(3) of the Statute does not require that a retrial take place before the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon and that a verdict rendered in absentia does not constitute a final verdict and 
therefore a new trial is permitted in a court other than the Special Tribunal.64  With regard 
to the first point, Gaeta asserts that the Statute does not expressly require the retrial to 
take place before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and therefore the Statute implicitly 
authorises retrial in another venue, including Lebanese national courts.65 However, the 
plain language of the Statute may not support her interpretation. Article 22(3) states, “the 
accused… shall have the right to be retried in his or her presence before the Special 
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62 Ibid. 
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64 Paola Gaeta, ‘To Be (Present) or Not To Be (Present): Trials in Absentia Before the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2007) 5 JICJ 1165, 1173. 
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Tribunal, unless he or she accepts the judgement.”66  The Statute does not state that the 
retrial can take place anywhere; instead, it indicates that retrial will occur “before the 
Special Tribunal”.  While that phrase does not explicitly exclude the right to retrial in 
other venues, it does place a limitation on where retrial can take place under the Statute.  
Article 5(1) of the Statute also makes abundantly clear that any retrial cannot take place 
in the national courts of Lebanon as it specifically asserts, “[n]o person shall be tried 
before a national court of Lebanon for acts for which he or she has already been tried by 
the Special Tribunal.”67  This unequivocal statement precludes retrial in Lebanese Courts.    
 Gaeta’s second argument alleges that the very existence of the right to a retrial 
indicates that an in absentia verdict rendered by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is not 
final and therefore does not constitute res judicata necessary to prevent retrial in an 
alternate venue.68  This argument relies on the assumption that a verdict must be final 
before the possibility of retrial is foreclosed and is largely based on the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and several European legal conventions.  Article 
14(7) of the International Covenant forbids trying an accused on charges for which a final 
verdict has been reached.69 Article 14(7) does not delineate what constitutes a final 
verdict and instead, leaves that up to the penal procedure of the relevant country. Article 
4(1) of Protocol Seven of the European Convention on Human Rights indicates that there 
can be no new trial or new punishment imposed “under the jurisdiction of the same State 
for an offence for which he [or she] has already been finally acquitted or convicted.”70  
Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union also prohibits 
trial where there has been a final acquittal or conviction.71  Article 54 of the Schengen 
Convention forbids one State from conducting trial against an accused where another 
State has entered a final judgment as to the same crimes. 72   Collectively, these 
Conventions suggest that a judgment must be final before a court can be foreclosed from 	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69 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights supra note 7 at art 14(7). 
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holding a new trial.  
 Despite being enshrined in the above-cited conventions, international criminal law 
does not necessarily mandate the entry of a final judgment before retrial is precluded.  
The International Criminal Court’s Statute only requires that accused has been acquitted 
or convicted of the same conduct by another court and there are no questions regarding 
the legitimacy of the first trial.73 The Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals also do not require 
that a judgment be final before eliminating the prospect of a retrial.74  The same holds 
true for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary African Chambers and the 
Kosovo Specialist Chambers.75  All of these Statutes were drafted after the introduction 
of the International Covenant, the Schengen Agreement and Protocol 7, suggesting that 
the drafters of the Statutes of the various international and internationalised courts and 
tribunals could have included the finality requirement but opted not to.   
 There is also no consensus in domestic law requiring finality before a retrial can 
be prohibited.  The language of Article 5(1) is similar to ne bis in idem (also called 
double jeopardy) rules as applied in other jurisdictions. The principle of ne bis in idem 
generally prevents a person from being tried more than once for the same crime.  The 
United States Supreme Court applies the most liberal interpretation of this rule by finding 
that trial commences for the purpose of the double jeopardy rule at the time the jury is 
empanelled and sworn.76  Several other nations forbid a new trial from being held if the 
first trial resulted in either an acquittal or conviction, i.e., where the first trial was 
litigated to a conclusion.77 England and Wales now permit retrials following an acquittal, 
but only when new evidence has been discovered that could have some bearing on a 
determination as to the guilt or innocence of the accused.78 Germany and France permit 
retrial following an acquittal if the verdict is not final and even permit the reopening of a 	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final judgment where new evidence is introduced or the initial resolution of the case was 
based on fraud.79 This variety of approaches to when a new trial is permitted following an 
acquittal or conviction indicates that there is no consensus found in domestic law 
supporting Gaeta’s position that a new trial is permitted until a final judgment has been 
reached. 
 Finally, the Arab Charter of Human Rights, propounded by the League of Arab 
States, of which Lebanon is a member, prohibits a person from being tried twice for the 
same crime and does not make any prospective second trial contingent on the finality of 
the judgment in the first trial.80 Lebanese law only provides for a retrial when three 
criteria are met: (1) following a conviction and not an acquittal; (2) when the new trial is 
being sought by the convicted person and not by the State; and (3) where new evidence 
has come to light suggesting that the convicted person is innocent.81  The finality of the 
judgment is not a relevant consideration. The lack of agreement surrounding the 
requirement of finality, and its exclusion from numerous international and domestic 
statutes, undermines Gaeta’s res judicata argument as finality of the judgment may be a 
requirement in European law, but it is not one in international criminal law or Lebanese 
law, and should not be imposed on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.  
 International criminal law does not prevent trial from being held in the absence of 
the accused when he or she does not have notice of the proceedings.  However, an absent 
accused must be provided with a new determination of the charges after learning that trial 
was conducted in their absence. The limitations placed on the right to retrial by the 
Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights are meant to 
distinguish between an accused that is genuinely ignorant about the existence of the 
proceedings and an accused that was aware trial was taking place but chose not to attend. 
Both human rights bodies take the position that defendants who intentionally fail to 
attend trial should not be rewarded with a new evaluation of the charges simply because 
they were not present.  That right should be reserved those individuals whose non-
attendance was inadvertent due to lack of notice.  This approach to the right to re-trial 	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recognises the distinction between voluntary and involuntary absence and attempts to 
ensure that the rights of those that did not choose to absent themselves from trial are 
respected.  It also creates a safety net whereby even if an accused is tried in his or her 
absence, he or she has access to a fresh determination of the charges after coming under 
the control of the trial court. 
6.2 THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON REQUIRES NOTICE 
 BEFORE TRYING AN ABSENT ACCUSED 
 Even if international criminal law does not require that the accused receive notice 
of the charges against him or her before trial can be commenced in his or her absence, 
such a requirement is contained in the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.  The 
decisions of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber 
both asserted that the Statute requires that the accused received notice in one of the 
manners set out in Article 22(2) before the Trial Chamber can proceed with a trial in 
absentia.82 The Appeals Chamber explicitly found that before a trial in absentia can 
commence Article 22(2)(a) requires that the accused receive notice of the proceedings 
and that he or she also be informed about the consequences of not appearing.83 The first 
subparagraph of Article 22(2) of the Statute details what sort of notice is required to 
properly inform the accused of the charges.  It states that: 
When hearings are conducted in the absence of the accused, the Special 
Tribunal shall ensure that: (a) the accused has been notified, or served with 
the indictment, or notice has otherwise been given of the indictment 
through publication in the media or communication to the State of 
residence or nationality…84   
 
The methods of notice identified in Article 22(2) can be divided into two general 
categories: actual notice and implied notice.  Actual notice occurs when the accused is 
told of the charges against him or her and therefore knows about them.  For there to be 
actual notice, evidence must exist that the accused really knows about the charges or that 
he or she was “served with the indictment.”85 In either situation no doubt remains that the 
accused received notice of the proceedings. Implied notice exists when the Court can 
infer, but does not know for certain, that the accused has learned about the charges. 	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Under the Statute, notice can be implied when information about the indictment is spread 
through publication in the media or when notice is given to the accused’s State of 
residency or nationality.86 
 The Ayyash and Merhi cases are both instances in which the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon was required to find that notice on the part of the accused could be implied.  
There was no clear indication that four of the five suspects have actual notice of the 
charges against them.  One of the suspects did give an anonymous interview to Time 
Magazine in 2011 in which he demonstrated that he was aware of the charges.87 
However, without knowing the identity of the interviewee it is impossible to ascribe 
knowledge to any of the accused in particular.  No other evidence exists to suggest that 
any of the suspects are actually aware of the charges.  Further, none of the accused have 
been personally served with a copy of the indictment.  Therefore, notice has to be implied 
through one of the methods authorised by the Statute. 
 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon is not the first international criminal court or 
tribunal to imply notice on the part of the accused through alternative means. Martin 
Bormann, one of the individuals indicted by the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg, was not in custody as the start of trial approached.  As a result, the 
International Military Tribunal ordered that he be served through alternative means.  Rule 
2(a) of the International Military Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure required that each 
individual defendant be given copies of the indictment, the Tribunal’s Charter, other 
documents lodged with the indictment and a statement of the right to counsel not less 
than 30 days before the commencement of trial.88  Rule 2(b) indicated that those 
individuals not in custody be given notice of the indictment and his right to receive the 
documents described in part (a) of the rule “by notice in such form and manner as the 
Tribunal may prescribe.”89  To comply with that provision, the Tribunal introduced a 
form of notice stating that Bormann had been indicted for crimes against peace, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, indicating the date and time of trial and containing a 
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declaration that if he did not appear he could be tried in his absence.90  The notice was to 
be read over the radio once a week for four weeks and also published in four separate 
issues of newspapers circulated in Bormann’s home city.91  Additionally, the American 
government printed 100,000 copies of the official notice and posted them throughout 
Germany and in prisoner of war camps.92   The Tribunal considered these efforts 
sufficient to imply that Bormann had notice of the charges against him and the date and 
location of trial and allowed the prosecution to proceed with its case against him.   
 The Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
relied on a similar justification when deciding that the steps taken to inform the absent 
accused about the charges against them were adequate to imply notice. 93 The Trial 
Chamber determined that the four defendants in Ayyash had sufficient notice of the 
charges against them due to the “the near saturation media coverage in Lebanon” naming 
the four suspects, identifying the contents of the indictment and publicising other 
documents and decisions produced by the Tribunal. 94 It also found that the “massive if 
not blanket coverage” made it “inconceivable” that the suspects were not aware of the 
charges.95 Because the accused failed to appear when summoned by the Court, the Trial 
Chamber concluded that they did not want to participate in trial, effectively waiving their 
right to be present and opening the possibility of trial proceeding in their absence. 
 The Appeals Chamber found that for notice to be effective at the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon, the Trial Chamber must be satisfied that: (1) reasonable efforts have been 
taken to personally notify the accused; (2) the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the evidence 
demonstrates that the accused actually knew about the proceedings against them; and (3) 
that the evidence establishing notice does so ‘with such a degree of specificity’ that the 
absence of the accused means that he or she has elected not to appear at trial and has 
waived his or her right to be present.96 The Appeals Chamber concluded that these three 
requirements had been met in the Ayyash case, permitting trial to be conducted in the 	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absence of the accused.97 In reaching that conclusion, the Appeals Chamber found that 
the extent of Lebanon efforts to publicise the indictment made it “inconceivable that [the 
four accused] could be unaware that they had been indicted”.98 
 The first two elements set out by the Appeals Chamber that must be met when 
determining whether notice is effective are necessarily fact specific and any evaluation of 
them will be subjective. While one may not agree with the weight accorded to the facts 
proving these elements, it is difficult to argue that the Trial Chamber’s decision as to 
these parts was demonstrably wrong.  However, there is some doubt that the Trial 
Chamber complied with international human rights law when reaching its decision that 
the absence of the accused could be construed as indicating a decision not to appear and a 
waiver of the right to be present at trial. The European Court of Human Rights has 
established that waiver of any right guaranteed by the European Convention on Human 
Rights, including the right to be present at trial, must be made in an unequivocal 
manner.99  In a judgment released just a few months before the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon’s decision, the European Court of Human Rights reiterated that “to inform 
someone of a prosecution brought against him is a legal act of such importance that it 
must be carried out in accordance with procedural and substantive requirements capable 
of guaranteeing the effective exercise of the accused’s rights; vague and informal 
knowledge cannot suffice.”100 The European Court of Human Rights accepts that an 
accused’s unequivocal indication of the waiver of a right can be either explicit or implied 
through conduct.101  However, the European Court gives only three examples of actions 
that are sufficiently unequivocal to constitute a waiver.  They are: where the accused 
states publicly or in writing that he or she does not intend to participate; where the 
accused has become aware of the proceedings from unofficial sources and intentionally 	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evades an attempted arrest; or where the evidence unequivocally shows that the accused 
was aware of the charges and still did not appear.102 Failure to appear following implied 
notice through the media would likely fall under the third of these three categories.      
 Whether the Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber’s findings with regard to notice 
and waiver comply with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights is 
largely one of semantics.  The case law of the European Court emphasises that the 
evidence needed to imply waiver of the right to be present at trial must “unequivocally” 
show that the accused was aware of the charges.103  When given its common meaning, 
unequivocal means “[u]nambiguous, clear, free from uncertainty.”104  This is largely an 
objective definition. Conversely, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon found that it was 
“inconceivable” that the suspects had not received notice of the indictment through the 
media.105  Inconceivable means “impossible to comprehend” and “unbelievable.”106  This 
is a subjective definition.  Whether something is believable depends largely on the person 
or persons perceiving the information. Therefore, the Trial Chamber’s finding may not 
accord with European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence as it determined awareness 
on the part of the accused to a subjective standard and not an objective one.   
 Paola Gaeta argues that there is no discrepancy between the two terms and that 
the decision of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon accords with the European Court of 
Human Rights’ case law.  Gaeta asserts that: 
[t]he reasoning of the Appeals Chamber tended to demonstrate, although it 
did not expressly say so, that the four accused unequivocally knew about 
the charges and the consequences of their absconding, and therefore 
clearly waived their right to participate in the criminal proceedings.107 
 
Gaeta’s point is weakened by the indefinite nature of her statement.  First, Gaeta 
concedes that the Appeals Chamber did not expressly find that the four accused 
unequivocally knew about the charges.  Second, Gaeta indicates that the reasoning of the 	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Appeals Chamber “tended to demonstrate” the unequivocal knowledge of the accused.  
However, this is not an entirely accurate statement of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ jurisprudence.  The European Court does not require the knowledge of the 
accused to be unequivocal.  Rather, “what is decisive is whether the facts of the case 
show unequivocally that the applicant was sufficiently aware” of the opportunity to 
exercise his or her rights.108  If the reasoning of the Appeals Chamber merely “tended to 
demonstrate” the knowledge of the accused, that is insufficient to meet the European 
Court’s standard that “the facts of the case show unequivocally” that the accused had the 
requisite knowledge.  The phrase “tended to demonstrate” does not suggest reasoning that 
is free from doubt.  Rather, it implies that it is more likely than not that the accused had 
the requisite knowledge, which falls short of the unequivocal standard applied by the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
 However, the prodigious scope of the publicity surrounding the identities of the 
suspects and the crimes alleged against them should not be discounted.  Following the 
Pre-Trial Judge’s decision on 16 August 2011 to make the full indictment public, 
including identifying the four original Ayyash accused, virtually every Arabic, English 
and French language news source in Lebanon, including print, television, radio and 
electronic media, published the indictment in full or provided commentary on it.109 The 
Trial Chamber described the media coverage given to the charges and the indicted 
individuals as “near saturation” and found that “[t]he evidence of the widespread 
publication of the indictment and the identifying information is overwhelming.”110  The 
Trial Chamber came to a similar conclusion in the Merhi case, finding that all of the main 
print and media outlets in Lebanon publicised the indictment against Merhi, that the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s spokesman conducted interviews with national and 
international news organisations identifying Merhi as a suspect and that the Special 
Tribunal disseminated a radio broadcast discussing Merhi’s involvement in the case that 
was also widely publicised in Lebanon.111 The Special Tribunal also used Facebook and 
Twitter to bring further attention to the charges against Merhi.112 These efforts to notify 	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Merhi of the charges against him led the Trial Chamber to conclude that it was satisfied 
that “Merhi must have been aware that he had been indicted as a co-accused in the 
Ayyash case” due to “the enormous publicity in Lebanon”.113  Based on the extent of the 
publicity given to the indictments it is reasonable to conclude that the evidence 
unequivocally shows that the accused were sufficiently aware of the charges against 
them, even if the Trial Chamber failed to explicitly make such a finding.  The holding 
that the efforts made to inform the accused were sufficient to imply notice also implicitly 
acknowledges the diligence exercised by the appropriate authorities when seeking to 
notify the accused about the trial. 
 Article 22(2)(a) of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute mandates that an 
absence accused must have actual or implied notice of the proceedings against him or her 
before being tried in absentia. It is clear that, with the exception of the one anonymous 
accused that positively demonstrated his knowledge of the charges during a interview 
with Time magazine, there is no evidence that the five individuals accused by the Special 
Tribunal have actual knowledge of the charges against them. The terms of the Statute 
made it necessary for the Trial Chamber to determine if it could imply notice on the part 
of the accused and try them in absentia.  It found that it could, and the Appeals Chamber 
supported that decision. While there is some question about the appropriateness of 
implying a waiver of the right to be present under these circumstances, the Trial 
Chamber’s decision to do so appears to comply with the existing jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights.  Therefore, although there is no evidence supporting 
the conclusion that the accused had actual knowledge of the charges against them, the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon took suitable steps to determine that notice could be 
implied and that the trial was being conducted in compliance with international criminal 
law standards.  
6.3 THE FORM OF THE NOTICE USED MAY NOT HAVE COMPLIED 
 WITH INTERNATIONAL  CRIMINAL LAW OR THE SPECIAL 
 TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON’S STATUTE 
 Although the steps taken to notify the accused were legally sufficient to justify 
trying them in absentia, there is some question as to whether the form of the notice 
provided by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon complied with international criminal law.  
The advertisement prepared by the Special Tribunal’s Registrar, and provided to the 	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Lebanese officials for publication, identified the accused by name and photograph, set out 
their dates and places of birth, named their parents and summarised the charges contained 
in the indictment.114 The advertisement did not specify the location and date of the trial. 
 Omitting the location and date of trial from the advertisement may have caused it 
not to conform to the existing jurisprudence on notice.  Multiple human rights bodies 
impose a duty on the trial court to inform the accused of the date and location of trial.  
The Human Rights Committee determined in Osiyuk v Belarus that the trial court’s 
failure to inform the accused of the date of trial constituted insufficient efforts to notify 
the accused about the impending court proceedings in violation of his right to be present 
at trial.115  The European Court of Human Rights found in Sibgatullin v Russia that 
before a court can find that the defendant has effectively waived his or her right to be 
present, the court has an obligation “to check whether the defendant has had the 
opportunity to know of the date of the hearing and the steps to be taken in order to take 
part.”116 In the Nahimana case, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda found that in order for notice to be sufficient to imply waiver “the 
accused must have had prior notification as to the place and date of trial.”117  The purpose 
of requiring the trial court to notify the accused of the date and location of trial is to give 
him or her sufficient time in which to prepare his or her defence and to otherwise 
participate in trial.118  
 The case law demonstrates that before an international or internationalised court 
or tribunal proceeds against an absent accused it must determine whether the accused had 
an opportunity to know the date and location of trial.  However, it does not suggest that 
the accused must be informed of the date and location of trial simultaneously with the 	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charges.  In fact, the law is unclear as to whether the trial court has the responsibility 
itself to notify the accused of the date and location of trial or whether the accused can 
learn of it through more informal means.  The Human Rights Committee’s Views in 
Osiyuk seem to impose that duty on the trial court, but the European Court of Human 
Rights and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda only require that the accused 
have prior notice and does not specify the source of that notice.  As a result, the omission 
of the date and location of trial from the advertisement notifying the accused of the 
charges may not be defective so long as the accused learned those details sufficiently in 
advance of trial to permit them to prepare their defence.   
 The failure to include the date and location of trial in the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon’s notices may be attributed to two causes.  First, the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon’s Statute does not contain a provision requiring the inclusion in the notice of the 
date and location of trial even if that information is necessary under international criminal 
law.  Article 22(2)(a) states that the accused must be made aware of the contents of the 
indictment either through service, publication in the media or notification to the 
accused’s State of residency or nationality.119 It does not require notice of the date and 
location of trial. Therefore, the information contained in the advertisement met the 
requirements set out by the Statute even if it did not comply with international criminal 
law.   
 Second, the rules requiring notice of the date and location of trial were established 
to protect the rights of an accused being tried soon after the events that make up the 
substance of the trial and where the trial is not the focus of significant notoriety.  By 
comparison, the trial at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon has been the subject of intense 
international publicity and more than eight years passed between the day Rafik Hariri 
was assassinated and the start of trial.  Further, two and a half years elapsed from when 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon first tried to notify the accused of the charges against 
them and the start of trial.  This indicates that there was ample time and opportunity for 
the accused to learn that they were accused of the crimes being addressed by the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon and to then separately ascertain the date and location of trial so that 
they could prepare for, and participate in, trial. While the failure of the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon to inform the accused about the date and location of trial may not technically 
comply with some interpretations of international criminal law, the accused still had 	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sufficient time to find out the information necessary to enable them to adequately 
participate in trial. The trial date was established nearly six months before the start of 
trial.120 The Trial Chamber confirmed the starting date for trial more than two months in 
advance.121  This suggests that the trial date was set far enough in advance to give the 
accused the opportunity to learn the date and location of the trial and choose to 
participate if they desired.  
 There is also some doubt that the form of the notice conforms to the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence. That uncertainty arises out of 
an incongruity about the manner in which the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Trial 
Chamber characterised the nature of the absence of the four accused in Ayyash in its 
decision to conduct trial in absentia.  In that decision, the Trial Chamber concluded that 
the original four accused in Ayyash could not be found and had absconded.  However, the 
Statute draws a distinction between an absconding accused and one that cannot be 
found.122  The former designation implies that the accused were aware of the charges 
against them and were intentionally evading justice.123  The latter can include those 
accused that do not know they have been charged.  However, it becomes clear from the 
context of the decision that the Trial Chamber regards the accused as having absconded 
rather than being unable to be found. The Trial Chamber’s decision identifies several 
reasons indicating why the accused likely knew of the charges including: the number of 
times Lebanese authorities visited personal and business addresses associated with each 
accused and the widespread publicity throughout Lebanon given to the names and images 
of each accused.124 The Trial Chamber also pointed out that there was evidence indicating 
that three of the four accused disappeared after being connected in the Lebanese media to 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s indictment.125  
 The Trial Chamber also did not draw a distinction between an absconding accused 
and one that “otherwise cannot be found” when it separately determined that Merhi could 
be tried in his absence. The Chamber concluded that the large amount of media coverage, 	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Merhi’s absence from his recorded place of residence and the distribution of wanted 
posters identifying Merhi as a suspect, demonstrated that a trial in absentia was 
appropriate under the circumstances.126 Despite the fact that the Statute appears to divide 
these two types of absent accused, the Trial Chamber approaches them as being the same.  
However, the context in which the terms are used, together with the Chamber’s ultimate 
decisions to proceed with a trial in absentia, indicates that the Trial Chamber believed 
that the accused should be described as absconding because they had notice of the 
charges and their failure to appear represented an attempt to evade justice.  
 Whether it is appropriate to describe the accused as absconding, and subject to a 
trial in absentia, or as accused that otherwise cannot be found, which may result in a trial 
by default, turns largely on the adequacy of the notice they may or may not have received 
about the charges against them.  Within the context of the Statute, the publication of the 
charges was considered sufficient to constitute notice.  The Statute authorises trial in 
absentia when “notice has otherwise been given of the indictment through publication in 
the media.”127 Rule 76 bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence elaborate on the 
procedure that must be followed when advertising the indictment.  The advertisement 
must provide notification “of the existence of an indictment” and should also call “upon 
the accused to surrender to the Tribunal” or otherwise submit to its jurisdiction.128  
 The advertisement publicising the indictment against the four accused in the 
Ayyash case was titled “Warrants of Arrest Issued By The Special Tribunal For Lebanon” 
and it identified each accused by name and photograph, their date and place of birth, their 
parents’ names, and contained a summary of the charges contained in the indictment 
against each accused. 129  The advertisement issued in the Merhi case was almost 
identical.130 Neither advertisement called upon the accused to surrender or otherwise 
submit to the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal in contravention of Rule 76 bis.  
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However, the advertisement does comply with the Statute, which only requires that notice 
be given of the indictment when notice is effectuated through publication.  Here, the 
advertisement did just that by summarising the contents of the indictment.  
 It can be argued that although the advertisement does not explicitly call upon the 
accused to surrender to the jurisdiction of the Court, it contains the implication that the 
accused should surrender. The advertisements indicated that a warrant of arrest had been 
issued for each accused, which can clearly be interpreted as calling upon the accused to 
submit to the jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.  The statement made by 
President Cassese in conjunction with the issuance of the advertisement also supports the 
notion that the advertisement impliedly called upon the accused to participate in the 
proceedings.  On 11 August 2011, one month before the advertisement was published, 
Cassese issued a public statement, directed at the accused and their families, discussing 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s mission and goals.131 In that statement, he specifically 
addressed the procedure employed by the Special Tribunal when trying an accused in his 
or her absence while also acknowledging that “a major safeguard of a fair and just trial is 
the active participation of the accused.”132 To that end, he urged “all the indictees to 
come before the Tribunal. If you do not wish to come to the Tribunal in person, the 
option might be available…of appearing by video-link, thus participating in the 
proceedings without physically coming to The Hague.”133 The Trial Chamber found that 
the dissemination of President Cassese’s 11 August 2011 open letter to the suspects “was 
so widely published and broadcast in Lebanon that each of the four Accused would have 
had to have been aware at the time of its publication that they were entitled to participate 
in a trial.”134   
 Similar efforts were made to encourage Merhi to submit to the jurisdiction of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon. On 14 October 2013, the Special Tribunal issued an audio 
recording in Arabic, English and French to be broadcast on the radio, in which it “invited 
Mr. Merhi to participate in the proceedings, because, ‘by participating, the accused can 
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fully defend themselves against the charges and evidence presented against them.’”135 A 
second statement, released on 21 October 2013, indicated that following service through 
alternative measures the president of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon would seek an 
order from the Trial Chamber authorising trial to be conducted in Merhi’s absence and 
inviting him “to consider whether you are prepared to face the Special Tribunal.”136 A 
third statement released on 13 December 2013 again asked if Merhi was “prepared to 
face the Special Tribunal for Lebanon”, urging him to get legal advice, to appoint counsel 
on his behalf and advising him that he may have the right to participate in trial via video 
conference.137   
 The advertisements, when taken together with the information contained in other 
communications from the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, lead to the conclusion that the 
Special Tribunal wished to communicate to the accused that it wanted them to submit to 
its jurisdiction so that they could participate in the trial. Further, although that 
information was not explicitly found in the advertisements, it was publicised to an extent 
that makes it reasonable to find that the accused knew the Special Tribunal wished for 
them to participate.  Any finding that the accused lacked sufficient notice because the 
necessary information was not contained in the actual advertisements could only result 
from a very mechanical reading of the Statute and the Rules that failed to give proper 
regard to the purpose of the rule. What is important is that each accused had the 
information and could exercise his free will when deciding whether or not to attend and 
participate in the trial.  Because the accused had notice of the charges and did not appear 
for trial the Trial Chamber properly described them as absconding accused rather than 
ones that could not be found.  Therefore, the trial conducted against them is best 
described as a trial in absentia rather than a trial by default. 
6.4 CONCLUSION  
 Trial by default is distinct from trial in absentia in that it involves trial taking 
place in its entirety in the absence of the accused without an affirmative indication that 
the accused is aware of the charges against him or her or that the trial is being conducted.  
International criminal law generally disfavours trial by default but there is no prohibition 
against them.  It is accepted that trials by default may take place; however, an accused 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Prosecutor v Merhi (Decision to Hold Trial in Absentia) supra note 111 at para 39. 
136 Ibid at para 41. 
137 Ibid at para 43. 
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that is tried without his or her knowledge must be entitled to an automatic retrial for the 
trial by default to be considered legitimate. 
 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon is the first international or internationalised 
criminal court or tribunal since the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg that is 
authorised to conduct trials in absentia.  The Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute 
specifically allows it to conduct trials in absentia, but it may also permit trials by default 
under certain circumstances.  Whether the Special Tribunal is trying an accused in 
absentia or by default is dependent on the nature of the notice he or she received prior to 
the commencement of trial and whether his or her appearance at trial is sufficient to 
imply waiver of the right to be present.    
 The decisions in Ayyash and Merhi to try the accused in their absence put this 
issue to the test.  Ultimately, the Trial Chamber determined, and the Appeals Chamber 
confirmed, that although the accused did not receive actual notice of the charges against 
them, notice could be implied for a number of reasons including the widespread publicity 
of the charges in Lebanon.  Because the Special Tribunal for Lebanon found that the 
accused had implied notice of the charges against them the trial currently being 
conducted is a trial in absentia and not a trial by default.  Further, whether the trial is in 
absentia or by default is largely a distinction without a difference, as international 
criminal law would not prevent the trial from taking place in either situation.  
International criminal law does not preclude courts and tribunals from holding trials by 
default so long as the accused has an automatic right to a retrial after he or she comes 
under the jurisdiction of the Court.  The Special Tribunal for Lebanon does provide for an 
automatic retrial for those being tried by default and therefore its approach to this issue 
complies with international criminal law.  
 The decisions in Ayyash and Merhi also accentuate that what is really important 
about notice is that the accused possess the necessary information to make an informed 
choice to attend trial or not.  The form in which that notice is conveyed is of lesser 
importance.  While actual notice carries with it the indicia of reliability, it does not negate 
the potential efficacy of implied notice.  A trial will be considered in absentia or by 
default based on what information the accused actually possessed and not the form in 
which he or she learned it.    
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CHAPTER 7: ABSENCES THAT ARISE AFTER THE BEGINNING OF TRIAL 
 
 The least controversial form of trial in absentia occurs when trial is allowed to 
continue in the absence of the accused after he or she has previously appeared before the 
court. Absence that starts after trial has begun is a form of trial in absentia because the 
accused has notice of the charges against him or her and has voluntarily decided to absent 
himself or herself from trial.1 Some commentators describe this form of absence as a 
“partial in absentia trial” because the accused is only absent from some court sessions but 
not the entire trial.2 Trial is often allowed to continue during this sort of absence because 
any concern about whether the accused had proper notice of the proceedings is eliminated 
by the fact that the accused previously appeared before the court.3 Such absences are 
generally viewed as a waiver of the accused’s right to be present.4  
 If the accused’s right to be present at trial is understood as the right to choose 
whether or not to appear, absence that occurs after the trial has commenced is often 
interpreted as an affirmative decision on the part of the accused not to appear and a tacit 
agreement that trial can continue. There are numerous types of absences that can broadly 
be described as absences that begin after trial has commenced.  They can generally be 
divided into one of two categories: voluntary or involuntary absences.  The former 
category includes: when the accused disrupts trial to the extent that he or she must be 
removed from the court room; when the accused is in custody and refuses to leave his or 
her cell and appear in the courtroom; when the accused absconds after trial has already 
started; and absences authorised by the court or tribunal.  The latter category consists of: 
when the accused is too physically ill to attend court sessions; when the accused 
disappears without explanation; when the accused is incarcerated by an authority other 
than the one conducting trial; and the death of the accused. Each of these categories is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Ralph Riachy, ‘Trials in Absentia in the Lebanese Judicial System and at the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2010) 8 JICJ 1295, 1301-2. 
2 Mohammad Hadi Zakerhossein and Anne-Marie de Brouwer, ‘Diverse Approaches to 
Total and Partial In Absentia Trials by International Criminal Tribunals’ (2015) 26 Crim 
LF 181, 183; Chris Jenks, ‘Notice Otherwise Given: Will In Absentia Trials at the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon Violate Human Rights?’ (2009) 33 Fordham Intl L J 57, 68. 
3 Niccolò Pons, ‘Some Remarks on in Absentia Proceedings before the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon in Case of a State’s Failure or Refusal to Hand over the Accused’ (2010) 8 
JICJ 1307, 1310. 
4 Francis A. Gilligan and Edward J. Imwinkelreid, ‘Waiver Raised to the Second Power: 
Waivers of Evidentiary Privileges by Lawyers Representing Accused being Tried in 
Absentia’ (2005) 56 S Car L Rev 509, 510. 
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distinct, although some types of absence will fall into more than one category.  
7.1 VOLUNTARY ABSENCES 
 7.1.1 DEFENDANTS REMOVED FOR BEING DISRUPTIVE 	  
 All of the major international criminal courts and tribunals allow trial to continue 
in the absence of the accused where the accused has to be removed from the courtroom 
for being disruptive. Article 63(2) of the International Criminal Court’s Statute states that 
if the accused “continues to disrupt the trial, the Trial Chamber may remove the 
accused…for such duration as is strictly required.” 5  The Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence of both ad hoc Tribunals include Rule 80, which generally authorises the 
exclusion of any individual from the courtroom in order to maintain the dignity and 
decorum of the proceedings and specifically allows the Trial Chamber to order the 
removal of the accused if he or she has been consistently disruptive and has been warned 
that he or she may be removed.6  Trial may continue in the absence of an accused 
removed under Rule 80.7  The Rules of Procedure and Evidence at the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon, Special Court for Sierra Leone and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia all also permit the Trial Chamber to continue trial in the absence of a 
disruptive accused.8  
 In many instances involving removal the accused is understood to have impliedly 
waived his or her right to be present through his or her disruptive behaviour. In The 
Prosecutor v Mladić, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s 
Trial Chamber ordered Mladić out of the courtroom for being disruptive and made an oral 
ruling that his behaviour constituted a waiver of his right to be present during the 
testimony of the witness then on the stand.9  The International Criminal Court followed a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) art 63(2). 
6 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (as amended 8 July 2015) rule 80; Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (as amended 13 May 2015) rule 80. 
7 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (as amended 8 July 2015) rule 80(B); Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (as amended 13 May 2015) rule 80(B). 
8 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Special Tribunal for Lebanon (as corrected 3 April 
2014) rule 138(B); Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Special Court for Sierra Leone (as 
amended 31 May 2012) rule 80(B); Internal Rules, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia (as amended 16 January 2015) rule 37(2). 
9 Prosecutor v Mladić (Trial Transcript) IT-09-92-T, T Ch I (8 October 2012) 3730, lines 
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similar course in the Ruto et al. case where the Appeals Chamber found that when the 
Trial Chamber is faced with a continuously disruptive defendant “the requirement that the 
accused be present during trial is superseded by the duty of the Court to ensure that 
proceedings are carried out in an orderly manner in the interests of the fair and proper 
administration of justice.”10  Therefore, “the continuously disruptive behaviour of the 
accused may be construed as an implicit waiver of his or her right to be present.”11  
 In reaching a similar conclusion, the European Court of Human Rights explained 
that the proper administration of justice requires that judicial proceedings be conducted 
with dignity and order.12  In Ananyev v Russia, the European Court of Human Rights 
determined that “the flagrant disregard by a defendant of elementary standards of proper 
conduct” need not be tolerated by the Court and can justify the removal of the defendant 
from court and the continuation of trial in his or her absence on the grounds that his or 
her behaviour threatened the proper administration of justice.13 In such a situation, the 
defendant’s behaviour can be construed as an implicit waiver of his or her right to be 
present but only if the defendant could have reasonably foreseen that trial would continue 
in his or her absence.14 
 Although the international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals that 
have considered the issue are in agreement, it is a questionable conclusion that a 
disruptive defendant necessarily implicitly waives his or her right to be present at trial.  
These rulings seem to be a way for the deciding court to justify its decision to remove the 
accused from the courtroom on the grounds that the accused waived his or her right to be 
present, when in fact the Court is really acting of its own volition. However, implying 
waiver in this situation may lack the necessary indicia required to find that an accused 
has properly waived a fundamental right. For the waiver of a fundamental right to be 
implied, it must be unequivocal.15 An implicit waiver of the right to be present is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13-15. 
10 Prosecutor v Ruto et al. (Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the 
Decision of Trial Chamber V(A) of 18 June 2013 entitled “Decision on Mr Ruto's 
Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial”) ICC-01/09-01/11, A Ch (25 
October 2013) para 51. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ananyev v Russia (2012) 55 EHRR 18, 30 July 2009 at para 44.  
13 Ibid at paras 44-45. 
14 Ibid at para 45. 
15 Colozza v Italy (1985) 7 EHRR 516, 12 February 1985 at para 28; Oberschlick v 
Austria (1991) 19 EHRR 389, 23 May 1991 at para 51; Pfeifer and Plankl v Austria 
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unequivocal when it is determined that the accused unambiguously wants trial to continue 
in his or her absence and that he or she was aware that sufficiently disruptive behaviour 
could result in removal.16  Although it demands a case specific inquiry, it is unlikely that 
every disruptive accused wishes to be removed from the courtroom and for trial to 
continue in his or absence.  In fact, in many instances it is probably the opposite; that the 
accused would like to remain in the courtroom so that he or she might continue to 
interrupt the smooth running of the proceedings.  
 The existence of the accused’s right to be present means it cannot be unilaterally 
taken away absent some action on the part of the accused. Normally that action is a 
waiver of the right to be present.  However, some courts and tribunals have concluded 
that the accused can also forfeit his or her right to be present in recognition of the fact 
that the accused also has a duty to be present.17 This concept of forfeiture is interesting 
because legal commentators have found that forfeiture is distinct from waiver.18  Both 
involve the holder of a right relinquishing that right, however, what the court must find 
when determining the difference between waiver and forfeiture is quite different.  Before 
a right can be considered waived a court must find that the holder of the right made a 
conscious decision to waive his or her rights, that he or she understood the parameters of 
that right, and the consequences of waiving it.19 Forfeiture occurs by operation of law 
without accounting for the accused’s state of mind.20  A classic example of forfeiture 
drawn from United States’ jurisprudence occurs when the accused pleads guilty before 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(1992) 14 EHRR 692, 25 February 1992 at para 37; Jones v United Kingdom App No 
30900/02 (ECtHR, 9 September 2003); Khalfaoui v France (2001) 31 EHRR 42, March 
2000 at para 51; Sibgatullin v Russia App No 32165/02 (ECtHR, 14 September 2009) 
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trial and forfeits his or her right to a number of different fundamental rights.21    
 The underlying logic of finding that a disruptive accused had forfeited his or her 
right to be present is valid even if it eliminates the need for the traditional waiver of the 
right to be present.  In many ways it is a more elegant justification for removing an 
accused from court than the more convoluted procedure of finding that the accused’s 
behaviour constitutes an implied waiver of the right to be present.  The failing of 
forfeiture, and the reason it should not be relied on when excluding an accused from 
court, is that it does not account for the requirement that the accused’s decision not to 
attend trial must be unequivocal.   
 Forfeiture of the right to be present is also tied to the idea that proceeding in the 
absence of the accused is a punishment for the accused’s disruptive behaviour.  
Disrupting the trial can be viewed as an attempt to interrupt the administration of 
justice.22   Interruptions to the administration of justice can result in forfeiture of the right 
to be present, which in turn can be punished by proceeding in the accused’s absence.23 
This has been borne out by the practice of international and internationalised criminal 
courts and tribunals.  When Judge Alphons Orie of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia ordered Ratko Mladić out of the courtroom on 10 April 2013, 
he stated “Mr. Mladić is removed from the courtroom for the duration of the testimony of 
the witness, the testimony of the witness during whose testimony he misbehaved.”24 The 
Trial Chamber’s use of the term ‘misbehaved’ when ordering Mladić’s removal suggests 
that he was excluded from trial as punishment for his actions. Additionally, Judge Orie 
ordered Mladić’s removal from the courtroom without any advance warning of the 
consequences of his actions.  This implies that Mladić forfeited his rights rather than 
waived them, as he had no opportunity to make an informed decision to waive his right to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Ibid; Gilligan and Imwinkelreid supra note 4 at 523. 
22 Prosecutor v Sesay et al. (Ruling on the Issue of the Refusal of the Third Accused, 
Augustine Gbao, to Attend Hearing of the Special Court for Sierra Leone on 7 July 2004 
and Succeeding Days) SCSL-04-15-T, T Ch (12 July 2004) para 8.  
23 Mbenge v Zaire Comm No 16/1977 (25 March 1983) para 14.2; Maleki v Italy Comm 
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Absentia Before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’, in Amal Alamuddin, Nidal Nabil 
Jurdi and David Tolbert (eds), The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Law and Practice 
(OUP 2014) 237. 
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be present. 25   
 While some may see differentiating implied waivers from forfeiture as a 
distinction without a difference, it is necessary to be cautious about the long-term impact 
of such a conclusion.  Interpreting trial disruptions leading to exclusion from trial as 
forfeiture fundamentally alters the character of presence at trial. It becomes less of a right 
controlled by the accused and more of a duty imposed on the accused. This difference in 
interpretation causes the accused to lose some control over his or her right to be present if 
more instances of removing a disruptive accused from court are interpreted as forfeitures 
rather than waivers. This change could lead to the greater exclusion of defendants from 
court and, in turn, threaten the accused’s ability to effectively exercise other fair trial 
rights.  
 Exacerbating this problem is the fact that the Statutes of the international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals are silent as to what constitutes a 
disruption sufficient to require the removal of the accused, leaving that determination up 
to the individual Trial Chambers.26 Chambers confronted with this issue must be careful 
not to stifle legitimate dissent when permitting trial to continue in the absence of a 
disruptive accused.27 To avoid this danger, Trial Chambers must be able to discern what 
constitutes a disruption from what is a legitimate legal argument.  So as to prevent this 
provision from being abused, the International Criminal Court’s Statute does specify that 
such measures can only be taken “in exceptional circumstances” and “after reasonable 
alternatives have proved inadequate.”28 However, Trial Chambers are still left with 
relatively little guidance as how to best adjudicate this issue.  
 The lack of clarity as to when to remove a disruptive accused is not exclusive to 
the International Criminal Court. A Trial Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
tied its decision to continue trial in Samuel Hinga Norman’s absence, in part, to the fact 
that he exhibited disruptive behaviour in the courtroom “on a number of occasions.”29 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibid at 9564, lines 15-25; 9565, lines 1-12. 
26 William A. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome 
Statute (2nd ed, OUP 2016) 967. 
27 William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (4th ed, CUP 
2011) 307. 
28 Schabas A Commentary on the Rome Statute supra note 26 at 967. 
29 Prosecutor v Norman et al. (Ruling on the Issue of Non-Appearance of the First 
Accused, Samuel Hinga Norman, The Second Accused, Moinina Fofana and the Third 
Accused, Allieu Kondewa at the Trial Proceedings) SCSL-04-14-PT, T Ch (1 October 
2004) para 18. 
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However, the disruptions cited by the Court were in the form of two letters, submitted on 
7 September 2004 and 20 September 2004, in which he threatened his absence from court 
if certain procedural issues remained unresolved, and not disruptive outbursts during trial 
hearings.30 While threatening the smooth progress of court proceedings is certainly not 
the best way to have procedural issues addressed, this type of ‘disruption’, to use the 
Trial Chamber’s characterisation, is not the sort that should lead to the exclusion of the 
accused from trial. There is a clear difference between threatening to disrupt the trial by 
not appearing and actually interrupting proceedings through in-court actions. The Special 
Court for Sierra Leone compounded its error by failing to consider the impact its decision 
would have on Norman’s right to be present, rendering its decision suspect as it lacked 
adequate grounds to justify his exclusion from trial.  
 The ad hoc tribunals recognised the danger of unfairly excluding a disruptive 
accused and both tribunals chose to employ the proportionality principle to protect 
against it.  The proportionality principle in this context stands for the proposition that any 
infringement on the accused’s right to be present “must be in service of a sufficiently 
important objective” and that it must not impair the right to be present any more than 
necessary to accomplish that objective.31 It remains to be seen whether the actions of 
either tribunal comply with that principle when ordering the exclusion of a disruptive 
accused.32  
 Michael Scharf attempts to clarify this issue by categorising the different types of 
disruptions that the accused may cause during trial and proposing responses to each type 
of disruption.  The six categories suggested by Scharf are: (1) passive disrespect which 
should be generally ignored unless it substantially disrupts the proceedings; (2) a refusal 
to comply with the basic rules governing the proceedings should be met with an inquiry 
into why the defendant is refusing to comply and the reassurance that the defendant’s 
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rights will be protected as well as a warning that he or she may be excluded from trial if 
he or she fails to comply with court rules; (3) a single outburst or obscenity should be 
addressed with a warning that future similar behaviour will be met with sanctions 
including exclusion from court; (4) repeated interruptions may be addressed with 
exclusion from court following the appropriate warnings, and if the accused is excluded 
he or she should be kept apprised of the proceedings and be able to communicate with his 
or her counsel; (5) the use of a televised trial to incite mass violence must be guarded 
against as the court must not permit such actions; and (6) physical violence, which cannot 
be tolerated under any circumstances and should result in the immediate expulsion of the 
accused or the use of physical restraints.33   
 Scharf’s recommendations indicate that a Trial Chamber interested in excluding 
the accused from trial should be cautious about doing so, and that in situations that do not 
involve physical violence, exclusion should be preceded by warnings that signal to the 
accused the consequences of their disruptions. Professor Scharf’s view is generally 
comprehensive; however, he fails to address whether there should be any limitation as to 
the length of the exclusion and what sort of procedure should be followed when 
determining when the accused can return to trial.  It is necessary to clarify these two 
issues because exclusions of unlimited duration have the potential to undermine the 
perceived fairness of trial and allow the court to conduct a trial in absentia even in 
instances where such trials are specifically forbidden.  
 A consideration of how long a disruptive accused may be excluded from trial 
before he or she can return to the courtroom is necessary to understand whether the 
exclusion complies with the right to be present. Article 63(2) of the International 
Criminal Court’s Statute addresses this issue by obliquely stating that the removal should 
continue “only for such duration as is strictly required.”34  The term “duration as is 
strictly required” would appear to refer to the minimum amount of time it will take to 
achieve a particular goal although the Statute does not identify the goal that must be 
achieved during that period of time.  It is assumed from the context that the Statute is 
referring to the minimum amount of time it will take to allow the accused to return to the 
courtroom without further disrupting the trial. This interpretation is supported by a 2016 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Michael P. Scharf, ‘Lessons from the Saddam Trial: Chaos in the Courtroom: 
Controlling Disruptive Defendants and Contumacious Counsel in War Crimes Trials’ 
(2007) 39 Case W Res J Intl L 155, 167-68. 
34 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court supra note 5 at art 63(2). 
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Directive issued by the Council of the European Union, which indicates that an disruptive 
accused should only be temporarily removed from the courtroom for the purpose of 
“securing the proper conduct of the criminal proceedings.”35  However, it could also refer 
to the period of time it will take to accomplish other court objectives including 
maintaining the proper administration of justice and ensuring the expeditiousness of trial. 
This lack of precision has the tendency to confuse the question of when a disruptive 
accused should be allowed to return to the courtroom.     
 None of the Statutes, Rules of Procedure and Evidence or Internal Rules of the 
other international or internationalised criminal courts and tribunals make any attempt to 
identify how long a disruptive accused should be excluded from court. The ad hoc 
Tribunals, Special Court for Sierra Leone and Special Tribunal for Lebanon all have 
almost identical rules pertaining to this issue and all are silent as to the appropriate length 
of the exclusion.36 Internal Rule 37 at the Extraordinary Chamber in the Courts of 
Cambodia is worded differently from the rules of the other courts and tribunals but it 
largely has the same effect.37 Rule 37(a), which is applicable to any person causing a 
disruption during trial, permits the Trial Chamber to exclude a persistently disruptive 
individual from attending the proceedings while Rule 37(b) specifically authorises the 
removal of a disruptive accused from the courtroom without identifying any limit on the 
length of the exclusion.38 Although no specific time period is identified, the implication 
to be drawn from Rule 37 is that the Trial Chamber has the discretion to permanently bar 
any disruptive individual, including the accused, from attending the entirety of the 
remainder of the trial. 
 The omission from the Statutes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the 
International Criminal Court, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone of the procedure to be followed when determining 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Council Directive (EU) 2016/343 of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain 
aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in 
criminal proceedings [2016] OJ L65/5 at para 40. 
36 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (as amended 8 July 2015) rule 80; Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (as amended 13 May 2015) rule 80; Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, Special Court for Sierra Leone (as amended 31 May 2012) rule 
80; Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Special Tribunal for Lebanon (as corrected 3 April 
2014) rule 138. 
37 Internal Rules, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (as amended 16 
January 2015) rule 37. 
38 Ibid. 
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how long to exclude a disruptive accused is somewhat mitigated through the inclusion of 
a provision in each court’s rules permitting an excluded accused to continue to attend trial 
via videoconferencing.39  These provisions act as a guarantee that the accused can 
continue to participate in trial even after being excluded from the courtroom.  That right 
is only limited to the extent that the Special Court for Sierra Leone has no provision 
mandating that the accused be able communicate with his or her counsel while remotely 
participating in trial.  However, in practice it is unlikely the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone would forbid an excluded accused from communicating with his or her counsel 
due to the fair trial concerns that would be raised by such a prohibition. 
 In light of the ad hoc Tribunals’ emphasis on the importance of the accused’s 
presence at trial, it is surprising that they have not followed suit and found that a 
disruptive accused be permitted to participate in trial by way of video technology. 
Implementing a system that allows an excluded accused to continue to participate in trial 
complies with the proportionality principle by producing the dual effect of protecting the 
order and decorum of trial while also letting the accused continue to participate in trial. 
The failure of the ad hoc Tribunals to pursue this practice represents a missed 
opportunity. 
 Instead, it was left to the Trial Chambers of the ad hoc Tribunals to determine the 
duration of a disruptive accused’s forced absence from court. In the Mladić case, Trial 
Chamber I at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia had many 
opportunities to consider this issue due to Mladić’s repeated disruptions. Each time 
Mladić was removed from the courtroom he was not allowed to return until after the 
completion of the testimony of the witness then on the stand.40 The Court’s decision to 
identify a specific period of time for the exclusion, rather than specifying what Mladić 
must do to be allowed to return to court, supports the idea that a disruptive accused has 
forfeited his or her right to be present for which he or she must be punished.  The 
limitation on the duration of the exclusion found in Article 63(2) of the International 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court supra note 5 at art 63(2); Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, Special Court for Sierra Leone supra note 36 at rule 80; Internal 
Rules, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia supra note 37 at rule 38(b). 
40 Prosecutor v Mladić (Trial Transcript) IT-09-92-T, T Ch I (8 October 2012) 3738, lines 
1-4; Prosecutor v Mladić (Trial Transcript) IT-09-92-T, T Ch I (11 October 2012) 4041, 
lines 1-2; Prosecutor v Mladić (Trial Transcript) IT-09-92-T, T Ch I (30 January 2013) 
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Criminal Court’s Statute stands in contrast to the procedure followed by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.  It reinforces the notion that the accused’s 
exclusion is not a punishment by making the accused’s return to the courtroom 
contingent on the accused’s ability to observe the proper decorum of the court.41  
 All of the international criminal courts and tribunals permit trial to continue in the 
absence of the accused when his or her disruptive behaviour necessitates his or her 
removal from the courtroom and exclusion from trial.  This form of absence is considered 
acceptable, even by those courts or tribunals that make a point of highlighting the 
importance of the accused’s presence at trial, because it satisfies another significant 
objective, the proper administration of justice.  In an effort to accommodate the exclusion 
of the accused from trial with his or her right to be present, most courts and tribunals 
interpret the disruption as an implied waiver of the right although it is debatable whether 
such a waiver is sufficiently unequivocal to be effective. However, some courts and 
tribunals are also willing to construe the accused’s disruption as a forfeiture of the right 
to be present and exclusion from trial as punishment for their actions.  It is not always 
clear what aim is being achieved by excluding the accused, but the practice of 
international and internationalised courts and tribunals suggests that the exclusion serves 
to discipline disruptive defendants and give them an opportunity to change their 
behaviour so as to be able to continue to participate in the trial. 
 7.1.2 AN INCARCERATED ACCUSED REFUSES TO APPEAR FOR TRIAL 	  
 Significant questions exist about how a court should proceed when an 
incarcerated accused refuses to appear for trial. When faced with an accused that refuses 
to appear, courts generally try to ascertain the reason for the accused’s refusal and 
determine whether or not it is appropriate to proceed under the circumstances.  Courts 
that do decide to continue trial without the accused typically do so by finding that the 
accused’s decision not to attend trial constitutes a waiver of his or he right to be present.    
 The Special Court for Sierra Leone is the Court with perhaps the most experience 
prosecuting defendants that were in custody but refused to appear in court.  Despite the 
fact that Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone extends the 
right to be present at trial to the accused, Rule 60 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
identifies situations in which trials may be conducted in the absence of the accused. Rule 	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60 authorises the Court to conduct trials in absentia when the accused has appeared for 
his or her initial appearance and either refuses to exercise his or her right to appear at trial 
or absconds.42  In either case the accused “may be represented by counsel of his choice” 
and the matter can proceed if the Judge or Trial Chamber “is satisfied that the accused 
has, expressly or impliedly, waived his right to be present.”43  The requirement that the 
accused must make his or her initial court appearance before the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone can commence with an in absentia trial exists so as to ensure that the accused had 
notice of the charges against him or her before being tried in his or her absence.  It also 
satisfies the principle semel praesens semper praesens, meaning that to be present once at 
trial entails being present forever.44  
 Charles Taylor tested the parameters of Rule 60 as he repeatedly voluntarily 
absented himself during his trial. He refused to appear at the start of his trial because of 
concerns about the adequacy of his defence team, his ability to receive a fair trial and his 
inability to communicate those concerns to the Principal Defender employed by the 
court.45 The Trial Chamber ruled that pursuant to Rule 60(A)(i) and 60(B), Taylor’s non-
attendance acted as a waiver of his right to be present and the Chamber allowed the 
prosecution to make its opening statement in Taylor’s absence.46 Taylor was again absent 
when the Trial Chamber reconvened on 25 June 2007 and the Chamber again found a 
voluntary waiver and continued in his absence.47   
 Taylor eventually agreed to attend trial, although he was voluntarily absent from 
trial on several other occasions.  The reasons for his subsequent absences varied widely 
and included illness, religious observances, a refusal to attend trial because of complaints 
about how he was transported to the courtroom and concerns that his personal effects had 
been tampered with at the detention centre.48  In each instance, Taylor either explicitly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Special Court for Sierra Leone (as amended 7 March 
2003) rule 60(A). 
43 Ibid at rule 60(B). 
44 Gaeta supra note 23 at 232-33. 
45 Prosecutor v Taylor (Trial Transcript) SCSL-03-01-T, T Ch (4 June 2007) 250, lines 
15-24. 
46 Ibid at 258, lines 28-29; 259, line 1; 267, lines 4-16. 
47 Prosecutor v Taylor (Trial Transcript) SCSL-03-01-T, T Ch (25 June 2007) 342, lines 
13-19. 
48 Prosecutor v Taylor (Trial Transcript) SCSL-03-01-T, T Ch (18 August 2008) 14051, 
lines 16-29; 14052, lines 1-19; Prosecutor v Taylor (Trial Transcript) SCSL-03-01-T, T 
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waived his right to be present and trial continued in his absence or, if he did not waive the 
right to be present, the court agreed to adjourn trial until he was able to return.49  The 
Trial Chamber typically permitted an adjournment upon a finding that continuing in 
Taylor’s absence could result in a violation of his right to a fair trial, however, before 
ordering the adjournment the Trial Chamber demanded that the threat to his fair trial 
rights must be based on more than a supposition.50  
 The most significant absence occurred when Taylor and his defence team walked 
out of trial immediately before the prosecution’s closing arguments due to the Court’s 
refusal to consider his Final Trial Brief after finding that it had not been submitted in a 
timely fashion. The Court ruled that Taylor was voluntarily absenting himself from trial 
in accordance with Rule 60 and ordered that the trial continue in his absence.51  Both 
Taylor and his counsel refused to appear the following day and Taylor sent a note to the 
court indicating that he waived his right to be present.52  Taylor and his counsel did not 
return to court until the Appeals Chamber reversed the decision of the Trial Chamber not 
to accept the defence’s Final Trial Brief.53  Trial was then able to resume and continue 
until its conclusion. 
 The Trial Chamber took a fairly permissive approach to Taylor’s presence 
throughout much of the trial.  The Chamber generally allowed Taylor to exert significant 
control over when he would or would not be present by agreeing to adjourn trial at his 
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request or continue pursuant to Taylor’s explicit waiver.  However, it departed from that 
practise both at the beginning and the end of trial.  Although Taylor raised significant 
procedural concerns that may have had a bearing on his ability to receive a fair trial, the 
Chamber saw fit to find that Taylor’s refusal to appear warranted continuing trial in his 
absence.  The Chamber’s decision to continue proceedings under these circumstances 
stands in stark contrast to its decision on 18 August 2008 to adjourn trial out of a concern 
that to proceed could threaten Taylor’s right to a fair trial.54  This sort of inconsistency in 
application tends to suggest that the decision to proceed or adjourn trial in these situations 
were not informed by a desire to protect Taylor’s fair trial rights but rather, were the 
result of some other consideration. It is likely that the Court drew a distinction between 
instances in which it believed Taylor’s non-attendance was a result of his intentionally 
interrupting trial versus situations where his absence was not of his own choosing. 
Despite the fact that the Special Court for Sierra Leone has specific objective rules to 
follow when the accused does not appear for trial, it is apparent that decisions to adjourn 
or continue trial are most likely based on the court’s own assumption about the reasons 
for the accused’s absence.   
 The Taylor trial was not the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s only opportunity to 
apply and interpret Rule 60.  On 7 July 2004, Defendant Augustine Gbao refused to 
appear in court and indicated that he would not be attending the remainder of the 
proceedings because he did not recognize the authority of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone.55  In dealing with this issue, The Trial Chamber reiterated an earlier oral ruling in 
which it found that Gbao had expressly waived his right to be present at trial by refusing 
to appear.56  The Chamber acknowledged that trial in the absence of the accused is “an 
extraordinary mode of trial” but it also determined that the existing jurisprudence 
demonstrates “the legal sustainability of trial in absentia in certain circumstances.”57 The 
Chamber found that this was one of those circumstances and that trial could continue in 
the absence of Gbao pursuant to Rule 60(A)(1) of the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s 
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Rules of Procedure and Evidence.58  The Trial Chamber also observed in its decision that 
criminal law does not allow an absent or disruptive accused “to impede the 
administration of justice or frustrate the ends of justice.”59  
 A Trial Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone had to deal with this issue 
again the same year when all three of the Defendants in Prosecutor v Norman, et al. 
refused to appear for trial.  On 20 September 2004, trial was briefly halted when none of 
the Defendants appeared for the afternoon hearing.60  When court resumed later that day, 
Allieu Kondewa appeared in the absence of the other two defendants and explained that 
he was ill and was granted permission to be excused so that he might rest and 
recuperate.61 Through counsel, Moinina Fofana linked his non-appearance to concerns 
regarding witness anonymity, although the following day he reconsidered his position 
and agreed to return to court.62  Samuel Norman indicated via letter that he would not 
attend court sessions again until certain perceived procedural deficiencies were 
addressed.63 In determining that trial could continue in Norman’s absence, the Chamber 
relied heavily on the earlier decision in the Gbao case and found “that it is settled law, 
nationally and internationally, that while an accused person has the right to be tried in his 
presence, there are circumstances under which a trial in the absence of the accused can be 
permitted.”64  In the judgment of the Trial Chamber, it is not “in the interests of justice to 
allow the Accused’s deliberate absence from the courtroom to interrupt the trial” and that 
any deliberate absence “will certainly undermine the integrity of the trial and will not be 
in the interests of justice.”65   
 In both the Gbao case and the Norman case, the respective Trial Chambers 
expressed a concern that the interests of justice are undermined when the accused’s 
deliberate absence is allowed to disrupt the course of trial.  As the decision regarding 
Zdravko Mucić in the Čelebići Camp case at the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia demonstrates, threats to the proper administration of justice have been 
used to justify the continuation of trial against the accused even in the absence of 
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waiver.66 During the Čelebići Camp case, one of the accused, Zdravko Mucić, refused to 
appear in court and also explicitly refused to waive his right to be present.67 The Trial 
Chamber chose to proceed in Mucić’s absence despite the fact that he had refused to 
waive his right to be present.  The Trial Chamber reasoned that Mucić’s absence was a 
tactic to delay trial and that a “a moral and legal obligation” was owed to Mucić, “the 
country and to the universe at large and to all involving the administration of justice” to 
continue trial in his absence.68  The Trial Chamber indicated that Mucić could not 
unilaterally decide not to attend trial and refuse to waive his right to be present as 
permitting him to do so would be tantamount to a finding that Mucić had the right to 
control the progress of the proceedings.69    
 The Trial Chamber also made clear that Mucić was required to appear at trial, or 
nominate counsel to appear on his behalf, unless able to provide a valid excuse for his 
non-appearance.70  The Trial Chamber asserted that “[i]f he wants to stay away, he has to 
forgo his rights -- he has to waive his right to be present”.71  Although expressed 
somewhat artlessly, the Trial Chamber essentially reached the conclusion that refusal to 
appear at trial without an excuse acts as an implied waiver of the right to be present at 
trial.  This interpretation is borne out by the fact that the Registrar informed Mucić that 
his refusal to come to court was interpreted by the Trial Chamber as a waiver of his right 
to be present.72  
 The requirement that a waiver of the right to be present be unequivocal would 
seem to preclude a finding that Mucić impliedly waived the right to be present at trial.  
Here, Mucić specifically declared that he did not wish to waive his right to be present.  
Therefore, any implied waiver of the right would necessarily be equivocal as it stands in 
direct contradiction to his explicit statement.  That the Trial Chamber decided to proceed 
in has absence despite this conflict suggests that while it may be procedurally preferable 
to find that the accused has either explicitly or implicitly waived his or her right to be 	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present, such a waiver is not strictly necessary if the court can justify continuing trial on 
the grounds that to do so would facilitate the proper administration of justice.  
 The issue of how to proceed when an accused refuses to attend trial was also 
taken up by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Rule 82bis was added to the 
Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence in May 2003 following the Barayagwiza 
trial to establish a procedure whereby trial could proceed when the accused refuses to 
attend trial.73 In that case, the Court interpreted Barayagwiza’s refusal to appear as a 
boycott of the trial.  However, the decision to conduct the entirety of trial in his absence 
means it should be considered a trial in absentia rather than an absence occurring after 
the start of trial.   
 The International Criminal Court has never faced the issue of an incarcerated 
accused refusing to appear in court absent some other justification. Whether trial will 
continue at the Court in this situation remains an open question although its answer may 
lie in Rules 134 bis, 134 ter and 134 quater of the Court’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.  It is thought that the new rules prevent an accused from simply refusing to 
appear for trial at the International Criminal Court, however it is unclear in practice what 
the consequence might be if an accused refuses to appear. 74    
 As with other absences from trial, international and internationalised criminal 
courts and tribunals confronted with an incarcerated accused that simply refuses to appear 
in court typically try to find that the accused has waived his or her right to be present 
during trial and to proceed with trial.  However, in at least one instance a defendant 
explicitly refused to waive his right to be present and the relevant Trial Chamber chose to 
proceed in the accused’s absence.  Electing to proceed when waiver has been explicitly 
refused indicates that waiver may not be strictly necessary to continue trial in the 
accused’s absence and that trial may continue so as to maintain the proper administration 
of justice.  The practice followed by the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the Taylor case 
also demonstrates that there is room for discretion based on the perceived voluntariness 
of the absence when deciding whether to proceed in the absence of an accused that 
refuses to appear for trial.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Gaeta supra note 23 at 235-36; William A. Schabas, ‘In Absentia Proceedings Before 
International Criminal Courts’, in Göran Sluiter and Sergey Vasiliev (eds), International 
Criminal Procedure: Towards a Coherent Body of Law (CMP Publishing, Ltd 2009) 364. 
74 William A. Schabas and Veronique Caruana, ‘Article 63: Trial in the Presence of the 
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 7.1.3 THE ACCUSED ABSCONDS AFTER THE START OF TRIAL 	  
 There are few, if any, examples in international criminal law of the accused 
absconding during the course of proceedings. It is an issue that more commonly arises in 
courts of national jurisdiction. Most national courts choose to continue trial in the 
absence of an absconding accused regardless of whether that court permits trials in 
absentia under other circumstances. An example of this can be found in the federal courts 
in the United States.  Typically, United States’ federal courts allow trials in absentia in 
very limited circumstances; the primary exception being when the accused absconds 
during trial. Rule 43(a) of the United States’ Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
specifically indicates that the accused must be present for “every trial stage, including 
jury empanelment and the return of the verdict”.75  However, when an accused absconds 
after trial begins, Rule 43(c) permits courts to depart from that general presence 
requirement and assume that the accused impliedly waived his or her right to be present 
and allow trial may continue to completion in the absence of the defendant.76 The United 
States Supreme Court confirmed in Crosby v The United States that the absence of the 
accused from court following the commencement of trial constitutes “a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of the right to be present.”77 The Supreme Court justified its decision on 
the grounds that the continuation of the trial after the accused has become absent 
“deprives the defendant of the option of gambling on an acquittal knowing that he can 
terminate the trial if it seems that the verdict will go against him.”78   
 Continuing trial against an absconding accused is not a practice limited to 
accusatorial criminal justice systems.  Some civil law countries that generally do not 
allow trials in absentia, like Germany and Turkey, also allow trial to continue if the 
accused absconds after the beginning of proceedings.  Rule 231(2) of the 
Strafprozeßordnung (the German Code of Criminal Procedure) only permits trial to 
continue in the absence of the accused when: 1) the trial court has already examined the 
accused; and 2) the court does not think the outcome of the trial is dependent on the 
continuing presence of the accused.79  This system recognises the important role the 
accused plays in the process of determining the truth, which is a central feature of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, United States of America (2017) rule 43(a). 
76 Ibid at rule 43(c). 
77 Crosby v The United States, 506 U.S. 255, 261 (1993). 
78 Ibid. 
79 Code of Criminal Procedure, Germany (as amended 23 April 2014) section 231(2). 
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German criminal trial, but is also willing to dispense with the presence of the accused 
once that role has been fulfilled. It imagines that the accused’s most important function 
during trial is as a source of information, and that he or she does not play as important 
part in confronting the witnesses or otherwise testing the evidence against him or her.  
Turkey follows a somewhat similar procedure to that of the Germans. The Ceza 
Muhakemesi Kanunu (the Turkish Penal Procedure Code) allows trial to continue if the 
accused escapes from the courtroom during trial, but only if he or she has already been 
questioned during the proceedings and the court determines that his or her presence is no 
longer necessary.80 In Turkey, trial can also be conducted in the absence of an accused 
that has not testified so long as sufficient evidence exists to sustain a judgment other than 
conviction.81   
 The willingness of national courts that otherwise do not allow trials in absentia to 
continue without the participation of an absconding accused suggests a similar rule 
should apply at international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals.  
However, there is some belief that national court practices as to absconding defendants 
do not have relevance in international criminal law.  One particular cause for unease 
relates to the public perception of international trials held under these circumstances. The 
need to ensure a fair trial and to “avoid any miscarriage of justice” is of paramount 
concern in the international context.82  These are also sources of anxiety in national 
courts, but those issues are balanced by the need to prevent individuals from avoiding 
punishment for crimes they are alleged to have committed by remaining absent until the 
expiration of the applicable statutory limitation periods expire for the crime he or she is 
alleged to have committed.83  This is not a concern in international courts because 
international crimes do not have statutory limitations and courts will not become time-
barred from prosecuting an accused coming under their control.84  
 Instead, many international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals are 
temporary, and the contumacious accused may be able to avoid adjudication by 
remaining absent until the temporary court closes.85  This concern has diminished since 
the founding of the International Criminal Court and the establishment of the United 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Code of Criminal Procedure, Turkey (2009) art 194. 
81 Code of Criminal Procedure, Turkey (2009) art 193. 
82 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (OUP 2003) 404. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court supra note 5 at art 29. 
85 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd Ed, OUP 2008) 393-394. 
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Nations Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals and the Residual Special Court 
for Sierra Leone.  The former, as a permanent court, is not temporally limited with regard 
to its period of operation and will remain open indefinitely to try any accused that come 
under its control. The latter two bodies were established specifically to continue the 
jurisdiction of the ad hoc Tribunals and the Special Court for Sierra Leone respectively, 
and their existence guarantees that a venue will exist to try an absconding accused if he or 
she is located after the court or tribunal that would otherwise have had jurisdiction has 
closed.86    
 The Statutes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the various international 
criminal courts and tribunals are largely silent as to whether trial can continue if the 
accused has absconded from trial after its start. The International Law Commission and 
the Preparatory Committee charged with creating a draft statute for the International 
Criminal Court both considered including a rule in the International Criminal Court’s 
Statute allowing trial to continue when the accused absconded or refused to appear at trial 
but that rule never made it into the final Rome Statute. 87  The absence of authority 
specifically addressing the issue of an accused who absconds has led to disagreement 
over whether trial in absentia against an absconding accused may occur at the 
International Criminal Court. Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji questioned the assumption that the 
Rome Statute forbids trial in absentia against an absconding accused in his dissenting 
opinion to the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration 
of the Decision excusing Uhuru Kenyatta from Continuous Presence at Trial.88  However, 
a number of other International Criminal Court judges disagree with Judge Eboe-Osuji’s 
interpretation of the Statute and largely feel that the Statute prevents the court from trying 
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August 2010) art 1. 
87 ‘Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
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the International Criminal Court: An Article-By-Article Evolution of the Statute, vol 2 
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an absconding accused in absentia.89  In the end, the Court has never been called upon to 
definitively decide this issue and the debate surrounding it is entirely limited to the dicta 
of a several different opinions and dissents.  
 How international criminal law should treat an absconding accused remains 
speculative as there has yet to be a situation in which an international or internationalised 
criminal court or tribunal has been called upon to decide the issue.  This lack of authority 
leads to the conclusion that there is no rule addressing whether trial can continue in the 
absence of an absconding accused.  While some guidance might be derived from the 
debate contained in dicta at the International Criminal Court, it is important to note that 
those arguments were mainly based on interpretations of the Statute and not grander 
international criminal law principles.  Therefore, it appears that whether trial can continue 
without an absconding accused will largely depend on how the controlling Statute is 
interpreted rather than a pre-existing rule of international criminal law. 
 7.1.4 COURT AUTHORISED ABSENCES 	  
 There have been instances in which international and internationalised courts and 
tribunals have agreed to excuse the accused from attending some parts of the trial 
proceedings after the beginning of trial.  This practice was common during trials held at 
Nuremberg following World War II where defendants received permission to be absent 
from trial to facilitate defence preparation, attend to family matters and for other 
“compassionate reasons”. 90   The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia also dealt with a similar issue when it granted Vinko Pandurević’s request for 
provisional release to attend a memorial service for his father during the winter trial 
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of 18 June 2013 entitled “Decision on Mr Ruto's Request for Excusal from Continuous 
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recess in December 2007.91 Due to circumstances beyond Pandurević’s control, he was 
unable to return to The Hague prior to the recommencement of trial in January.92  The 
Court continued trial in his absence and considered him to have waived his right to be 
present a trial.93  Viewing a request to be absent as a waiver of the right to be present is a 
logical conclusion. When making a request to be excused from trial the accused must 
have considered that one effect of his or her absence is that trial will continue without 
them. Further, the accused must have also decided that the reason underlying their 
request to be absent, be it to prepare their case, attend a funeral, or some other 
compassionate reason, outweighs the benefit they will receive from being present during 
trial.  Therefore, although the accused may not have expressly waived the right to be 
present, the request for excusal is a tacit waiver of the right to be present.   
 The International Criminal Court also addressed how to deal with a defendant’s 
request to be excused from trial in both the Kenyatta and Ruto and Sang cases.  There, 
the requests were based on the need of Kenyatta and Ruto to fulfil their official duties as 
president and deputy president of Kenya.  The litigation history of this issue, and its 
ultimate outcome, is addressed more fully in other chapters, but for the purposes of this 
section it should be noted that each Trial Chamber decided that Kenyatta and Ruto could 
be absent from some parts of their trials but had to be present for other parts.94 However, 
consistent with Rule 134 quater of the Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, any 
request for excusal from those sessions at which attendance is not required has to be 
accompanied by a written waiver of the right to be present.95 By requiring a written 
waiver of the right to be present the Court emphasized the fact that a waiver must 
accompany an excusal from trial.   
 Vojislav Šešelj raised a related issue during his trial at the International Criminal 	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Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia he demanded that the Trial Chamber remove him 
from court asserting that he had the right to request his own removal.96 The Trial 
Chamber rejected that request on the grounds that no such right exists and opined that 
Šešelj had misunderstood the law on presence.97  However, it could be argued that the 
accused does have the right to request his or her removal from the courtroom.  If the 
accused has the right to refuse to appear in court at all, as demonstrated at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, he or 
she should also be able to excuse himself or herself from a hearing if he or she sees fit.  
This is essentially what Charles Taylor did during the closing arguments in his case as 
discussed at greater length in the next section. There is no substantive difference between 
Taylor’s refusal to appear in court and Šešelj’s request to be removed from court.  In 
actual fact, moments after he made his request to be removed, the Trial Chamber ordered 
Šešelj’s removal for being disruptive.98  This allowed the court to give the appearance 
that it was in control of the situation because it ordered Šešelj’s absence rather than 
acceding to his request that he be allowed to absent himself.  In so doing, the court could 
claim a small, if hollow, victory. 
 It appears that international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals 
prefer to understand an absence precipitated by the accused as a waiver of the right to be 
present as opposed to an exercise of a right to be absent.  To the extent a right to be 
absent exists, it has been suggested that the accused can only effectively exercise it by 
disrupting proceedings to such an extent that the court orders his or her removal.99 
However, as the Šešelj case demonstrates, the court will maintain its authority over the 
situation by not allowing the accused to unilaterally absent himself or herself from the 
courtroom during a trial session at which he or she as already appeared.  It is likely that 
courts wish to approach the issue in this way to avoid a position granting the accused the 
ability to take over the trial schedule by insisting on being brought to, and removed from, 
the courtroom at his or her discretion.  
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7.2 INVOLUNTARY ABSENCES FROM TRIAL  
 7.2.1 THE ACCUSED IS ABSENT FROM COURT DUE TO ILLNESS  
  
 Absences resulting from the accused being too ill to appear constitute a disruption 
to trial, albeit a non-intentional one.100 International and internationalised criminal courts 
and tribunals have proven to be flexible and have responded with greater care when the 
accused’s absence results from illness because the accused has no control over this sort of 
absence. 101 During the Nuremberg Trial the Tribunal was informed at the beginning of 
each day whether illness would prevent one or more defendants from attending that day’s 
hearings. 102   The Tribunal took no particular action with regard to those absent 
defendants, and counsel for the absent defendants rarely objected to trial proceeding 
outside of their clients’ presence.103   By the close of trial, a defendant’s absence was 
noted in the record but the Court had stopped tracking the reasons that individual 
defendants were not present in court.104 
 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was repeatedly 
confronted with the question of how to properly proceed in the absence of an unwell 
accused. When Slobodan Milošević arrived at the Tribunal in 2001, Milošević already 
suffered from severe essential hypertension and hypertrophic heart disease and his health 
continued to deteriorate during the course of his incarceration and trial.105  The Court had 
to twice reduce the number of days the it could sit during any two-week period due to 
Milošević’s ill health.106 Despite this reduced trial schedule, Milošević’s poor health 
caused the adjournment of 66 trial days during the presentation of the prosecution’s case 
and the opening of the defence case had to be delayed on five occasions.107The situation 
was exacerbated by the fact that Milošević was representing himself and his absences 
meant that any attempt to continue trial in his absence would also result in his being 
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unrepresented.   
 On 31 August 2004, the Trial Chamber issued an oral ruling in which it imposed 
counsel on Milošević out of a concern that failure to do so might cause the trial to last for 
an unreasonably long time or that it might not be concluded at all.108 The Trial Chamber 
determined that the risk to Milošević’s health, and the prospect that the trial would be 
disrupted, were so great so as to be “likely to undermine the integrity of the trial 
process.”109 The Trial Chamber based this conclusion on a finding that it had a duty to 
ensure the accused a fair and expeditious trial and a responsibility to preserve the 
integrity of the proceedings.110  
 The Trial Chamber’s insistence that it had to impose counsel on Milošević in 
order to ensure his right to a fair and expeditious trial is questionable. The purpose 
underlying the right to an expeditious trial does not justify abrogating the accused’s other 
fair trial rights in an effort to ensure that he or she is tried expeditiously. The accused is 
the primary beneficiary of expeditious trial provisions.111  Expeditious trial rights exist: 
(1) to prevent “oppressive pre-trial incarceration”; (2) to minimize the anxiety of the 
accused; (3) to limit the extent to which the defence will be impaired by a delay in trial; 
and (4) to prevent arbitrary incarceration.112 The right to a speedy trial “is intended to 
limit infringements on personal freedom” and to “minimize the emotional strain on the 
accused caused by pending criminal proceedings.”113 None of these factors are applicable 
if the trial delays are the result of the accused’s ill health. Therefore, if the accused is 
responsible for delaying trial, the need for a speedy trial largely does not exist. Justifying 
the imposition of counsel on the accused on the grounds that it protects his or her right to 
an expeditious trial fails to achieve any of the goals the right is designed to protect.  
 The regular interruptions in the Milošević trial had an impact on how the 
accused’s right to be present was perceived by other international criminal courts and 
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tribunals.  Commentators believe that the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s decision in 
Prosecutor v Norman, et al. and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s 
decision in Prosecutor v Barayagwiza to allow trial to proceed in the accused’s absence 
were a direct result of the harsh criticism directed at the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia ‘s efforts to accommodate Milošević.114  To avoid similar 
condemnation, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda erred on the side of finding that trial could continue without the accused 
being present. 
 The Milošević case did not represent the only instance in which the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia had to deal with an accused absent through 
illness.  In addition to his persistent disruptions during trial, Ratko Mladić was also 
regularly absent from trial due to his health.  The Trial Chamber typically chose to 
adjourn trial on the days Mladić did not attend for health reasons, although on at least one 
occasion Mladić provided a formal waiver of his right to be present.115  The practise of 
adjourning trial due to Mladić’s poor health continued throughout the trial despite the 
Chamber’s reminder to defence counsel that “[i]t is the Chamber who finally determines 
whether the accused is fit to appear” and not the accused or his counsel.116    
 The Trial Chamber’s attitude when determining whether to adjourn trial based on 
the accused’s health is illuminating.  It demonstrates that the Trial Chamber considered 
absence due to ill health to be different from an accused’s refusal to appear for trial.  
With respect to the former, the Trial Chamber would only conduct trial in the accused’s 
absence if the accused first waived his right to appear.  In the latter, the Trial Chamber 
viewed the failure of the accused to appear as an implicit waiver of the accused’s right to 
appear at trial. It is likely that the apparent difference between the two types of absence 	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2013) 156. 
115 Prosecutor v Mladić (Trial Transcript) IT-09-92-T, T Ch I (13 July 2012) 824, 10-16; 
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relates to the perceived voluntariness of each.  Absence resulting from illness is usually 
out of the control of the accused.  Absence resulting from the accused’s refusal to appear 
is the product of a conscious decision. The decisions made by the Trial Chamber in 
Mladić demonstrate a willingness to accommodate one type of absence and to more 
strictly apply the rules when confronted with the other. 
 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s willingness to 
accommodate an unwell accused was severely tested in The Prosecutor v Stanišić et al.  
Although Stanišić was found physically fit to stand trial prior to its commencement, his 
health prevented him from attending numerous court hearings.117 The trial started on 28 
April 2008 in Stanišić’s absence and continued until 16 May 2008 when the Appeals 
Chamber issued a ruling adjourning the trial so that Stanišić’s health could be 
reassessed.118  More than a year elapsed before the Trial Chamber found that trial could 
re-commence.119  The court instituted a limited hearing schedule and a protocol to 
determine on a daily and weekly basis whether Stanišić continued to be well enough to 
attend trial.120  That protocol included a direction that trial would be adjourned if Stanišić 
was deemed too unwell to attend, but if he could attend, and refused to do so, his refusal 
would be considered a waiver of his right to be present and trial would continue in his 
absence.121  This decision is inline with Trial Chamber I’s decision in Mladić to 
distinguish between a defendant’s refusal to appear for trial and his or her inability to 
appear due to illness.  Having found that Stanišić was able to appear, his non-attendance 
became the result of a refusal to attend.  On that basis, the Court felt justified in 
continuing in his absence. 
 This protocol was almost immediately put to the test when Stanišić informed the 
Trial Chamber that he was too unwell to attend court, that he did not consent to trial 
continuing in his absence and that he did not wish to follow the progress of trial by video-
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link.122  In consultation with Stanišić’s doctor, the court found that no objective medical 
reasons existed to prevent Stanišić from attending trial, either in person or by video-link, 
and that the trial would proceed in his absence.123 Stanišić’s absence persisted, and trial 
continued without him, with the Trial Chamber explaining that Stanišić bore the burden 
of showing that he was too unwell to attend trial and that he had failed to make such a 
showing.124 The Chamber’s decision to continue trial in the accused’s absence was based 
on the judgment entered by the Appeals Chamber in The Prosecutor v Pavle Strugar 
where the Appeals Chamber found that placing the burden of proof of illness on the party 
alleging the illness was consistent with the approach used in common law jurisdictions.125 
Stanišić eventually overcame his illness to an extent sufficient to permit him to attend 
trial. 
 Stanišić’s return to the courtroom was short-lived and he again fell ill. On one 
occasion he had to absent himself from court to be urgently rushed to hospital for 
treatment.126  Rather than continue in his absence, as the Trial Chamber had done in 
response to previous absences, the court only addressed procedural matters in his absence 
on the grounds that Stanišić had not waived his right to appear.  This decision 
demonstrates the Trial Chamber’s willingness to suspend proceedings when it was 
confronted with what it considered to be an involuntary absence resulting from a 
legitimate illness.  It also highlights the fact that the Trial Chamber was concerned with 
protecting the accused’s right to be present, and was willing to adjourn trial when 
necessary to protect that right, but that it would only do so when it believed that the 
circumstances warranted postponement.  	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 The United Nations Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals, the 
successor to the ad hoc tribunals, was also confronted with how to conduct trial in light 
of Stanišić’s illness.  After being found not guilty by the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia’s Trial Chamber in May 2013, the Appeals Chamber quashed 
his acquittal in December 2015 and ordered that Stanišić stand for retrial.127 Pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1966 establishing the Mechanism, and Annex 2 to that 
resolution, the Stanišić matter was transferred to the Mechanism for re-trial.128 Stanišić 
sought leave from the Court to remain on provisional release during the new trial and to 
waive his right to appear for the entirety of the Prosecution’s case on the grounds that his 
absence would “greatly increase the expeditiousness of the trial”, reducing the costs 
incurred by the Mechanism and the risk of further deteriorations to his health.129 The 
Chamber denied his request and found that it would not be appropriate or in the interests 
of justice to permit Stanišić to be absent from the opening of trial but agreed to revisit the 
issue prior to the first judicial recess in the case.130  True to its word, the Chamber 
revisited the issue before the summer recess and found that Stanišić could be 
provisionally released not only for the duration of the recess, but until 27 September 
2017.131  His provisional release was later extended until 30 January 2018.132 
 The Mechanism’s Statute contains the same provision regarding the accused’s 
right to be present found in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, but its Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence outline a much more permissive procedure to be followed when the 
accused refuses to appear for trial.133  Rule 98 permits trial to proceed in the accused’s 
absence if the accused refuses to appear for trial so long as the following conditions are 
met: (i) the accused has made an initial appearance under Rule 64; (ii) the Registrar has 
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duly notified the accused that the accused is required to be present for trial; (iii) the 
accused is physically and mentally fit to be present for trial; (iv) the accused has 
voluntarily and unequivocally waived, or has forfeited, his right to be tried in his 
presence; (v) the interests of the accused are represented by Counsel.134  The Trial 
Chamber took these factors into account when authorising Stanišić’s provisional release 
and found that each criterion had been met.   
 In truth, the decision to grant Stanišić’s request was grounded more in whether 
releasing him would comply with the provisional release rules than its impact on the right 
to be present. While recognising that its decision to allow Stanišić’s provisional release 
during the presentation of evidence was unprecedented at the ad hoc tribunals, the 
Mechanism felt justified in permitting Stanišić’s provisional release on the basis that it 
would “have an appreciable impact on the expeditious conduct” of the proceedings.135 
Stanišić’s right to be present was a secondary concern of the court because it was clear 
that the requirements of Rule 98 had been complied with.  By having explicit guidelines 
about what must happen for the accused to waive his or her right to be present, the court 
was able to deal with this issue as a matter of routine. 
 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda took a somewhat different 
approach to absences resulting from illness.  There the Trial Chamber often erred on the 
side of continuing trial in the absence of an unwell accused.  The International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda’s Trial Chamber chose to continue trial in Prosecutor v Bagosora et 
al. despite the medically related absence from trial of defendant, Anatole Nsengiyumva. 
The Trial Chamber applied the proportionality principle and concluded that there had 
been no violation of the accused’s right to be present on the grounds that the potential 
loss of testimony that might result of trial was postponed outweighed the remote 
possibility that the accused would be prejudiced if those witnesses were examined in his 
absence. 136   The Appeals Chamber sided with the Trial Chamber and found that 
Nsengiyumva’s unauthorised absence constituted a forfeiture of his right to be tried in his 
presence pursuant to Article 20(4)(d) of the Statute.137   	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 Even if one accepts forfeiture as a valid basis for continuing trial in the accused’s 
absence, it is difficult to endorse the Trial Chamber’s decision to do so in Bagosora. 
Although the Court did not authorise Nsengiyumva’s absence during the relevant time 
period, two medical reports supported his reasonable belief that he was too ill to appear in 
court.138 It is an extreme sanction to view Nsengiyumva’s absence as a forfeiture, and 
thus akin to the behaviour of a persistently disruptive defendant, under these 
circumstances. Nsengiyumva’s failure to appear is more appropriately regarded as an 
implied waiver of his right to be present and not a forfeiture of that right.    
 The International Criminal Court has taken a much more relaxed approach to 
permitting the accused’s absence from trial for medical reasons.  The first such instance 
occurred during the Lubanga Trial when on 12 May 2009, Lubanga was absent from 
court due to illness. Before continuing the trial, the Trial Chamber specifically 
acknowledged Lubanga’s right to be present and left the commencement of that day’s 
proceedings up to his discretion in recognition of his right to be present during trial.139  
Lubanga agreed to waive his right to be present and the trial went on in his absence.140 
 In the Bemba case, Trial Chamber III of the International Criminal Court 
proceeded in the accused’s absence on several occasions.  On 7 November 2011, the 
defence team informed the court and the prosecution both before and during the hearing 
that Bemba had a medical appointment that would prevent him from attending trial and 
that Bemba had indicated that trial could continue in his absence.141 Neither the Chamber 
nor the prosecution objected to Bemba’s absence and the hearing went ahead.142 Bemba 
was absent again on 12 April 2013.  He asked to be excused in advance and his request 
was granted.143 Bemba was also given permission to be absent from a status conference 
on 3 May 2013 and again from a trial hearing on 24 June 2013.144  The Appeals Chamber 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
para 48. 
138 Prosecutor v Bagosora et al. (Decision on Nsengiyumva Motions to Call Doctors and 
Recall Eight Witnesses) ICTR-98-41, T Ch I (19 April 2007) paras 5, 7. 
139 Prosecutor v Lubanga (Trial Transcript) ICC-01/04-01/06, T Ch I (12 May 2009) 1, 
lines 15-25; 2, lines 1-2. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Prosecutor v Bemba (Trial Transcript) ICC-01/05-01/08, T Ch III (7 November 2011) 
1, lines 22-25; 2, lines 1-4. 
142 Ibid at 2, lines 5-10. 
143 Prosecutor v Bemba (Trial Transcript) ICC-01/05-01/08, T Ch III (12 April 2013) 62, 
lines 23-24. 
144 Prosecutor v Bemba (Trial Transcript) ICC-01/05-01/08, T Ch III (3 May 2013) 2, 
lines 24-25; 3, line 1; Prosecutor v Bemba (Trial Transcript) ICC-01/05-01/08, T Ch III 
	   193 
later indicated its approval of these sorts of absences finding that part of the duty of the 
Trial Chamber is to be flexible when managing trial proceedings and that neither the 
interests of justice nor the psychological well-being of the witnesses would be well 
served if an automatic adjournment occurred every time an accused needed to be 
temporarily absent from trial.145 
 The practice employed by the Trial Chamber in the Bemba case when permitting 
Bemba to be absent is remarkable for two reasons.  First, Bemba’s absences were granted 
without any argument or really any discussion amongst the parties.   Bemba would 
request to be excused in advance of the session and the Trial Chamber would grant the 
request and note it on the record during the hearing.  Second, unlike the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber III did not make any 
distinction between the reasons why Bemba wished to be absent.  It treated his absence to 
attend a medical appointment in the same way as it treated other absences. 
 Generally, an accused wishing to be absent from trial because of illness will 
explicitly waive his or her right to be present. In those instances where the accused has 
not waived the right to be present, the Trial Chamber tends to consider whether or not the 
absence was truly warranted.  Court is usually adjourned in situations where the Chamber 
believes that the accused is genuinely unable to attend because of illness.  However, if the 
Chamber feels as if the accused can attend, and is using illness as an excuse to avoid trial, 
it is much more likely to continue trial in the accused’s absence. The practice at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is an exception to this general practice. It 
tended to ignore the voluntariness of the absence and continue trial based on a belief that 
the absent accused had forfeited his or her right to be present.  Much as with other 
absences, basing the decision on whether the accused’s illness was sufficiently severe to 
actually inhibit the accused’s ability to appear in court reflects the Chamber’s desire to 
ensure that it, and not the accused, controls when trial is adjourned.  
 7.2.2 ABSENCE DUE TO DISAPPEARANCE, INCARCERATION OR DEATH 	  
  Other than non-appearance arising out of illness, there are at least three additional 
types of absences that can happen after trial has begun that might be classified as 
involuntary.  The first occurs when an accused fails to appear for a hearing without 
explanation. This is not strictly an involuntary absence as the reason for the absence is 	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unknown and could be the result of the accused’s decision not to attend.  However, it 
appears that a court or tribunal confronted with this situation will likely halt trial until it is 
satisfied that the accused’s absence is the result of a conscious choice not to attend. The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia followed that approach during 
the Čelibići Camp case when defendant Esad Landžo did not appear in Court on 4 
November 1997 and no explanation was provided for his absence. The Court chose to 
adjourn proceedings for the day in recognition of Landžo’s right to be present and to give 
the defence counsel an opportunity to find out the reason for his absence.146 He returned 
to court the following day and trial continued without ever determining the reason for 
Landžo’s absence or whether it was voluntary. The Court’s approach to this situation 
suggests that when an accused’s absence from trial is unexplained the court will treat it as 
involuntary and adjourn trial to conduct an inquiry into the reason underlying the 
absence.  
 Another form of involuntary absence that may arise after the start of trial occurs 
when an authority other than the one conducting the accused’s trial detains the accused. 
An example of this might be when an accused being tried before an international or 
internationalised court or tribunal is arrested by a national authority while on conditional 
release and that national authority refuses to surrender the accused to the trial court.  
Article 22 of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute accounts for this eventuality and 
permits trial to continue in the accused’s absence when the accused “[h]as not been 
handed over to the Tribunal by the State authorities concerned”.147 While this clause was 
likely introduced to keep national authorities from preventing trial from beginning, there 
is nothing in the Statute to suggest that it would not also apply after trial has already 
begun.  Additionally, although the Statute does not directly refer to individuals being 
detained by State authorities, such a situation would surely fall under its ambit. In 
recognition of the involuntary nature of the absence the Tribunal adopted Rule 107, 
which attempts to enable an accused who is being prevented from appearing to 
participate in trial “in the most appropriate way”, and to ensure that the requirements of 
Article 22(2), including that he or she receive proper notice of trial and are being 
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represented by counsel, are being enforced.148 Following this approach, an accused 
detained in another place can be tried in his or her absence, but steps must be taken to 
ensure that sufficient procedural steps regarding notification and representation are still 
observed.   
 Some commentators have challenged the legality of proceeding under these 
circumstances. Niccolò Pons finds it “extremely difficult to find a convincing lawful 
basis” for holding trial under these circumstances.149  He views foreign detention of the 
accused as a “legitimate impediment or lawful excuse” justifying the accused’s 
absence. 150   Björn Elberling calls it “highly doubtful” that Article 22(1)(b) is in 
conformity with the right to be present at trial.151  In part, this opinion is based on a 
concern that the absence is due to circumstances beyond the accused’s control and not the 
result of the accused’s own free choice as demonstrated through a waiver of the right to 
be present.152  The accused’s absence also cannot be framed as a forfeiture of his or right 
to be present as the reason for the absence is out of the control of the accused.  It may be 
possible to establish a proper administration of justice justification for continuing in the 
accused’s absence under these circumstances, particularly in a multiple defendant trial 
where some of the accused are present.  However, a court proceeding under such 
circumstances should follow the lead of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and make sure 
that the absent accused’s fair trial rights are protected during trial and that he or she has a 
right to retrial should they subsequently come under the control of the court. 
 A third type of involuntary absence exists when the accused dies during trial. The 
death of Slobodan Milošević on 11 March 2006 is the most famous example of this 
phenomena; however, there are at least six other instances in which an accused at an 
international or internationalised criminal court or tribunal has died after the beginning of 
trial but before a verdict was rendered.  In all seven of these instances the proceedings 
were terminated as a result of the accused’s death.153  Additionally, there was one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Special Tribunal for Lebanon (29 November 2010) 
rule 107; see also STL Statute supra note 147 at art 22(2). 
149 Pons supra note 3 at 1312. 
150 Ibid at 1313. 
151 Björn Elberling, ‘The Next Step in History-Writing Through Criminal Law: Exactly 
how Tailor-Made is the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’ (2008) 21(2) LJIL 529, 537.  
152 Ibid. 
153 Prosecutor v Milošević (Order Terminating the Proceedings) IT-02-54-T, T Ch (14 
March 2006); Prosecutor v Mrkšić et al (Order Terminating Proceedings Against Slavko 
Dokmanović) IT-95-13a-T, T Ch (15 July 1998); Prosecutor v Hadžić (Order 
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occurrence of a defendant dying during the pendency of his appeal, which also resulted in 
the termination of proceedings.154  There is also one instance in which the European 
Court of Human Rights was asked to consider the conviction of an individual following 
his death.155  Despite expressing “serious reservations” about a court system that permits 
the conviction of a dead person, the Court declined to rule on whether convicting the 
deceased constituted a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
instead found a violation of the Convention on other grounds.156  
 It is clear that international criminal law dictates that proceedings be terminated 
when the accused dies before a final judgment is reached.  The basis for ending trial 
under these circumstances is best explained by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia’s Appeals Chamber.  As it points out, jurisdiction ratione personae is 
limited to living persons and therefore proceedings cannot continue after a defendant’s 
death.157  The Appeals Chamber also cited with approval the decision reached by Pre-
Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court in Prosecutor v Kony et al., to 
terminate proceedings against the accused, Raska Lukwiya, following his death.  The 
Pre-Trial Chamber based its decision, in part, on the grounds that “the purpose of 
criminal proceedings is to determine individual criminal responsibility and that the 
Chamber cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person who has deceased”.158  This loss of 
jurisdiction over the accused triggers the termination of the proceedings against an 
accused that is involuntarily absent from trial as a result of his or her death.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Terminating the Proceedings) IT-04-75-T, T Ch (22 July 2016); Prosecutor v Chea et al. 
(Termination of the Proceedings Against the Accused Ieng Sary) 002/19-9-
2007/ECCC/TC, T Ch (14 March 2013); Prosecutor v Thirith (Termination of the 
Proceedings Against the Accused Ieng Thirith) 002/19-9-2007/ECCC/TC, T Ch (27 
August 2015); Prosecutor v Norman, et al (Decision on Registrar’s Submission of 
Evidence of Death of Accused Samuel Hinga Norman and Consequential Issues) SCSL-
04-14-T, T Ch 1 (21 May 2007); Prosecutor v Ayyash et al. (Decision on Badreddine 
Defence Interlocutory Appeal of the ‘Interim Decision on the Death of Mustafa Amine 
Badreddine and Possible Termination of Proceedings”) STL-11/01/T/AC/AR126.11, A 
Ch (11 July 2016) para 53. 
154 Prosecutor v Delić (Decision on the Outcome of the Proceedings) IT-04-83-A, A Ch 
(29 June 2010). 
155 Grădinar v Moldova, 7170/02, ECtHR, Judgment, 8 July 2008. 
156 Ibid at paras 109, 117. 
157 Ibid at para 6. 
158 Prosecutor v Kony et al. (Decision to Terminate the Proceedings Against Raska 
Lukwiya) ICC-02/04-01/05, PT Ch (11 July 2007) 4. 
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7.3 CONCLUSION 
 Several important conclusions can be drawn from the ways international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals have dealt with absences of the accused 
occurring after the start of trial.  First, courts and tribunals have drawn a clear distinction 
between absences resulting from the accused’s conscious choice not to participate in trial 
and absences that are not of their own making.  Absences falling into the former category 
include: removal from the courtroom following a disruption; refusing to attend trial, 
absconding and requesting excusal from trial.  In these situations the Courts have 
generally displayed a tendency to imply a waiver of the accused’s right to be present, 
even in situations where the accused has specifically refused to waive his or her right, and 
proceed in his or her absence.  The latter category is made up of involuntary absences 
which can include those caused by: illness, death, detention in another place and 
unexplained disappearance.  In these situations the court or tribunal will typically 
suspend trial until the accused is again able to attend.  The divergent approaches to these 
two sorts of absences demonstrate that courts and tribunals believe there is a qualitative 
difference between them determined by the motivation underlying the reason for the 
absence. 
 Another interesting issue arises out of the willingness of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to imply waiver on the part of the accused 
even if the accused has specifically refused to waive his or her right to be present.  
Related to this is the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s practise of ruling that 
under certain circumstances the accused is thought to have forfeited his or her right to be 
present. These processes indicate that although presence at trial is traditionally viewed as 
a right held by the accused that can be waived, courts and tribunals are also willing to 
find that there are situations in which the right to be present must give way absent the 
explicit or implicit consent of the accused.  This supports the conclusion that in addition 
to the right to be present, there is also a duty to be present arising out of the need to 
maintain the orderly administration of justice. Failure to comply with that duty can result 
in trial continuing in the accused’s absence without either an expressed or implied waiver 
of the right to be present.  
 Continuing trial when the accused absents himself or herself after the start of trial 
is a relatively common practice.  This is true, in part, because unlike other types of 
absence, the court already has confirmation that the accused is aware of the charges 
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against him or her, as well as the date and time of trial.  Therefore, the trial court need 
only determine whether the accused waived his or her right to be present before 
concluding that trial can take place in the accused’s absence. Normally, there is a clear 
indication that the accused has waived that right, although courts and tribunals have 
liberally construed whether the accused has provided an implicit waiver. The real danger 
in this area lies in whether courts and tribunals are being too liberal when finding an 
implicit waiver and basing their decisions on a desire to continue trial rather than in 
recognition of the accused’s effective waiver of the right to be present. When reaching 
decisions as to this issue, courts need to ensure that they are upholding the accused’s right 
to be present and not allowing it to be overwhelmed by other interests.   
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CHAPTER 8: WHEN IS PRESENT NOT PRESENT: THE RIGHT TO BE  
PRESENT AND THE ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND AND PARTICIPATE IN 
PROCEEDINGS 
 
 The right to be present at trial involves more than just the physical presence of the 
accused.  It also extends to the ability of the accused to understand and participate in the 
proceedings. As the Privy Council of the United Kingdom stated in Kunnath v The State: 
It is an essential principle of the criminal law that a trial for an indictable 
offence should be conducted in the presence of the defendant. The basis of 
this principle is not simply that there should be corporeal presence but that 
the defendant, by reason of his presence, should be able to understand the 
proceedings and decide what witnesses he wishes to call, whether or not to 
give evidence and if so, upon what matters relevant to the case against 
him.1 
 
This principle is further supported by the notion that one of the main purposes underlying 
the accused’s right to be present is to afford him or her the ability to effectively 
participate in trial.2  Participation is only thought to be effective when the accused 
understands the proceedings.3  This includes the ability to hear and follow what is 
happening in the courtroom.4  Effective participation has also been more generally 
interpreted to include the requirement that the accused in a criminal trial “has a broad 
understanding of the nature of the trial process” and that he or she also understands what 
is at stake and the potential penalties that can be imposed if the accused is found guilty.5  
Participation in this context refers to the direct participation of the accused and does not 
relate to whether or not the accused is represented by counsel during trial.  An accused 
that cannot personally understand the proceedings is unable to participate even if he or 
she has a lawyer that is able to comprehend what is taking place in the courtroom.   
 The participation of the accused during trial can take many forms.  A present 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Kunnath v the State [1993] 1 WLR 1315. 
2 Sarah J. Summers, Fair Trials: The European Criminal Procedure Tradition and the 
European Court of Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2007) 113; Catherine S. Namakula, 
‘Language Rights in the Minimum Guarantees of Fair Criminal Trial’ (2012) 19(1) J 
Speech Lang & L 73, 84. 
3 William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (4th ed, CUP 
2011) 306; Fawzia Cassim, ‘The Accused’s Right to be Present: A Key to Meaningful 
Participation in the Criminal Process’ (2005) 38 Comp & Intl L J S Afr 285, 287. 
4 SC v United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 10, 10 November 2004 at para 28; Stanford v 
United Kingdom App No 16757/90 (ECtHR, 23 February 1994) para 26; Grigoryevskikh 
v Russia App No 22/03 (ECtHR, 9 July 2009) para 78. 
5 Grigoryevskikh supra note 4 at para 78; Güveç v Turkey App No 70337/01 (ECtHR, 20 
April 2009) para 124. 
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accused can instruct and consult his or her defence counsel; suggest questions to be posed 
to witnesses during cross-examination; and contribute to the truth seeking function by 
testifying before the relevant Court or Tribunal.6 An accused that can understand and 
participate in trial benefits from being able to take an active role in his or her defence, 
however the accused is not the only beneficiary of his or her active participation in trial.  
The accused’s ability to contribute to the trial process also assists the finder of fact by 
ensuring that the fullest picture of the alleged crimes is presented for its consideration.7  
 The importance of the accused being able to instruct his or her counsel was 
demonstrated during the prosecution of Martin Bormann during the Nuremberg Trials. 
Bormann’s counsel, Bergold, had virtually no access to exculpatory evidence and lacked 
the ability to discover any evidence that might have aided in his defence of Bormann. As 
Bergold stated in his closing statement during the Nuremberg trials: 
The defendant Bormann is absent.  He has not even been able to defend 
himself against the charges made against him.  He has not been able to 
give me any information and I have not been able to find any witnesses 
who would have sufficient knowledge of the matter and who would be 
able to disclose to me any exonerating evidence concerning the 
accusations made.8  
 
 Telford Taylor, a member of the American prosecution team at the Nuremberg 
trials, reinforced this point in his memoir about the trial, stating that Bormann’s presence 
could have assisted in identifying witnesses and relevant documentary evidence to be 
presented in his defence.9  Instead, Bergold was left with “fewer than a dozen documents 
for which the best one could say was that Bormann had written some letters that did not 
incriminate him.”10 As a result, Bergold’s defence of Bormann took about an hour to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (OUP 2003) 403; Francis A. Gilligan and 
Edward J. Imwinkelreid, ‘Waiver Raised to the Second Power: Waivers of Evidentiary 
Privileges by Lawyers Representing Accused being Tried in Absentia’ (2005) 56 S Car L 
Rev 509, 524; Niccolò Pons, ‘Some Remarks on in Absentia Proceedings before the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon in Case of a State’s Failure or Refusal to Hand over the 
Accused’ (2010) 8 JICJ 1307, 1310 n. 16. 
7 Abel S. Knotternus, ‘The International Criminal Court on Presence at Trial: The 
(In)validity of Rule 134quater’ (2014) 5 Intl Crim Database 1, 10. 
8 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, 
Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 - 1 October 1946, vol 19 (1948) 116-7. 
9 Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir 
(Bloomsbury Publishing Limited 1993) 465.   
10 Ibid.   
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present and Bormann was convicted in absentia and sentenced to death.11 It is likely 
Bormann would have been found guilty even if he had been present, the evidence against 
him was thought to be overwhelming, but it highlights the difficult position counsel is 
placed in when they are not able to receive assistance from their client.    
 Contemporary commentators also recognise the significant role that a present 
defendant plays in the trial process.  It is difficult for defence counsel to answer the case 
presented by the prosecution without the participation of the accused, and cases decided 
without the accused’s involvement can lead to unsafe verdicts.12 The prosecution’s case 
will always appear persuasive if the defence does not adequately test it.13An effective 
defence in a criminal trial requires more than identifying inconsistencies in the evidence 
presented by the prosecution; it also necessitates specific answers to factual questions and 
the rebuttal of the prosecution’s allegations.14  The evidence needed to mount this sort of 
defence is often known only to the defendant and without his or her active participation it 
will difficult or impossible for the defence to mount an effective case.  Further, in the 
context of the ad hoc Tribunals, defence counsel is required to ‘take full instruction on 
the facts’ in fulfilment of the accused’s right to representation.15  An accused unable to 
participate in trial cannot give full instruction on the facts, as he or she is not aware of the 
immediate goings on in the trial. This demonstrates a link between the right to effective 
counsel and the right to be present at trial and shows that if either is missing trial may be 
unfair.16  
 There can be a limit to the utility of the accused’s participation in trial.  An overly 
involved accused may hinder his or her counsel by creating distractions during the 
presentation of evidence or insisting that irrelevant lines of questioning be pursued.17  
Conversely, the accused may be present but refuse to participate at all, sitting silently at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid at 466.   
12 Wayne Jordash and Tim Parker, ‘Trials in Absentia at the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon: Incompatibility with International Human Rights Law’ (2010) 8 JICJ 487, 500-
01. 
13 Stan Starygin and Johanna Selth, ‘Cambodia and the Right to be Present:  Trials In 
Absentia in the Draft Criminal Procedure Code’ [2005] Singapore J Legal Stud 170, 173. 
14 Jordash and Parker supra note 12 at 502. 
15 Ibid; see also Prosecutor v Strugar (Decision Re: The Defence Motion to Terminate 
Proceedings, Trial Chamber) IT-01-42-T, T Ch I (26 May 2004) para 22. 
16 Mohammad Hadi Zakerhossein and Anne-Marie de Brouwer, ‘Diverse Approaches to 
Total and Partial In Absentia Trials by International Criminal Tribunals’ (2015) 26 Crim 
LF 181, 204. 
17 Neil Cohen, ‘Trial in Absentia Re-Examined’ (1973) 40(2) Tenn L Rev 155, 182. 
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the counsel table.18  This latter situation is similar in effect to absence, as the presence of 
the accused and his or her refusal to participate implies an informed decision not to 
participate in trial.  This suggests that the accused’s de facto absence is voluntary and his 
or her unwillingness to participate could be interpreted as a waiver of the right to be 
present and participate in trial. 
 Of greater interest are those instances in which the accused is physically present 
in the courtroom but unable to understand and participate due to either: not being able to 
comprehend the language of the court or when the accused’s mental condition is such that 
he or she is unable to understand and participate in the proceedings.  These both qualify 
as involuntary absences from trial as the accused’s absence, as represented by his or her 
inability to understand or participate in proceedings, is not the result of a conscious 
choice not to participate, but is the consequence of forces outside of his or her control.  
They are distinct from the involuntary absences discussed in the previous chapter because 
these involve an accused physically present in the courtroom as opposed to one who is 
physically absent. Because these types of absence are involuntary, international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals confronted with them will generally try to 
mitigate or eradicate their effects on the accused’s right to be present instead of choosing 
to proceed against an accused who is effectively absent from trial.  
8.1 THE RIGHT TO AN INTERPRETER 
 A criminal trial, by its very nature, is an act of communication.19  The defendant’s 
inability to understand the language used by the court can be a major obstacle in 
international criminal trials and there will always be a need for interpretation and 
translation to ensure that all of the parties understand the proceedings.20  Simply put, an 
accused unable to understand his or her trial is not present.21   
 Both the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, governing the Nuremberg 
Trial, and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, governing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ibid. 
19 Richard Vogler, ‘Lost in Translation: Language Rights for Defendants in European 
Criminal Proceedings’, in Stefano Ruggeri (ed), Human Rights in European Criminal 
Law: New Developments in European Legislation and Case Law after the Lisbon Treaty 
(Springer 2015) 97. 
20 Håkan Friman, ‘Procedural Law of Internationalized Criminal Courts’, in Cesare P.R. 
Romano, André Nollkaemper, and Jann K. Kleffner (eds), Internationalized Criminal 
Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia (OUP 2004) 341-42. 
21 Schabas supra note 3 at 307. 
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the Tokyo Trial, contained provisions ensuring that trial would be conducted in a 
language understood by the accused.22  The Nuremberg Tribunal was conducted in four 
languages, English, German, French and Russian, and it was the first Tribunal to employ 
simultaneous translation during trial.23  This process presented significant challenges, 
causing prosecutor and United States Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson to comment 
“I think that there is no problem that has given me as much trouble and as much 
discouragement as this problem of trying to conduct a trial in four languages.”24  Arthur 
Comyns Carr, one of the prosecutors at the Tokyo Trial, described the trial as a “modern 
Tower of Babel.”25 
 Providing a criminal defendant with an interpreter is not a particularly 
controversial proposition.  The right to an interpreter is generally recognised by the 
Statutes establishing international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals and 
is seen by some as complementing the right to counsel.26  Both counsel and an interpreter 
assist the accused in understanding specialised information relevant to the trial process.27 
Most modern international and internationalised courts and tribunals have recognised the 
need to provide a defendant with an interpreter if he or she does not speak one of the 
languages of the Tribunal.   
 The right to an interpreter is directly connected to the right to be present at trial as 
it gives effect to the defendant’s ability to understand the proceedings and to make 
informed decisions relating to the case.28 The link between the right to an interpreter and 
the right to be present was first recognised by the English Court of Criminal Appeal in R 
v Lee Kun.  In Lee Kun, the Court was confronted with a situation in which a non-English 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Charter of the International Military Tribunal – Annex to the Agreement for the 
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (8 August 
1945) art 16(c); Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (19 January 
1946) art 9(b). 
23 Francesca Gaiba, The Origins of Simultaneous Interpretation: The Nuremberg Trial 
(University of Ottawa Press 1998) 25. 
24 Catherine S. Namakula, Language and the Right to Fair Hearing in International 
Criminal Trials (Springer International Publishing 2014) 8; citing Joshua Karton, ‘Lost in 
Translation: International Criminal Tribunals and the Legal Implications of Interpreted 
Testimony’ (2008) 41 Vand J Transnatl L 1, 20. 
25 Arthur S. Comyns Carr, ‘The Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East’ (1949) 34 Prob Pub & Priv Intl L 141, 151. 
26 Stefan Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (OUP 2005) 332. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Celia Brown-Blake, ‘Fair Trial, Language and the Right to Interpretation’ (2006) 13 
Intl J Minority & Group Rts 391, 394. 
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speaking defendant was convicted following a trial during which none of the testimony 
was translated into a language spoken by the defendant.29  The Court found that “[t]he 
presence of the accused means not merely that he must be physically in attendance, but 
also that he must be capable of understanding the nature of the proceedings.”30 However, 
the Court also found that there had to be a ‘substantial miscarriage of justice’ to support a 
finding that the accused’s fair trial rights had been violated.31  The Court held that there 
was no substantial miscarriage of justice because the pre-trial evidence had been 
interpreted and provided to the defendant, that the evidence presented during trial 
conformed with the pre-trial evidence and that even if the trial testimony had been 
translated it would not have changed the verdict.32  
 In the international human rights context, the Human Rights Committee has 
examined when the accused’s right to an interpreter arises pursuant to Article 14(3)(f) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Article 14(3)(f) permits the 
accused “[t]o have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak 
the language used in court.”33   The Human Rights Committee elaborated on the 
provisions of Article 14(3)(f) in General Comment No. 13 and General Comment No. 32.  
In General Comment No. 13, the Committee asserted that the right to free interpretation 
is “of basic importance in cases in which ignorance of the language used or difficulty in 
understanding may constitute a major obstacle to the right of defence.”34 The Human 
Rights Committee also clarified that the right to interpretation applies equally regardless 
of the citizenship of the accused and that its application cannot be made dependent on the 
outcome of trial.35  General Comment No. 32 reiterated some of these principles and also 
indicated that the accused has the right to interpretation at all oral stages of proceedings.36  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 R v Lee Kun [1916] 1 KB 337, 339. 
30 Ibid at 341. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid at 339-340. 
33 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 14(3)(f). 
34 United Nations Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment 13: (Administration of 
Justice) Equality before the Courts and the Right to a Fair and Public Hearing by an 
Independent Court Established by Law (13 April 1984) U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 
(1984) para 13. 
35 Ibid. 
36 United Nations Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 32: Right of 
Equality Before Courts and Tribunals and to Fair Trial’ (23 August 2007) Doc. No. 
CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007) para 40. 
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 Much of the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee on this issue has 
focused on whether an accused has the right to testify in his or her mother tongue even if 
he or she understands the language of the Court.37  The Human Rights Committee has 
generally found that interpretation is only required when the accused does not understand 
the language of the Court or cannot express him or herself in that language, and that it 
does not require the court to accommodate the linguistic preference of the accused.38  The 
Human Rights Committee expanded on this conclusion in General Comment No. 32 
when it declared that an accused is not entitled to free interpretation into his or her own 
mother tongue when he or she knows the language of the court sufficiently to defend 
himself or herself effectively.39  The Human Rights Committee has also found that a 
statutory provision obligating the court to provide the accused with an interpreter “if the 
court is satisfied that the interests of justice so require” is compatible with, and even 
exceeds the protection mandated by Article 14(3)(f).40 
 The European Court of Human Rights also took up the subject of interpretation as 
a component of the right to be present at trial.  Article 6(3)(e) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights is identical to Article 14(3)(f) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and permits the accused “to have the free 
assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in 
court.”41  Obviously, the plain meaning of the article indicates that an accused without 
any ability to speak the language of the court is entitled to interpretation.  However, the 
Convention fails to address whether an accused with some proficiency in the court’s 
language is entitled to translation and, more importantly, at what point translation is no 
longer required. The European Court has found that there is no single, objective standard 
whereby an interpreter needs to be appointed. Rather, the trial court must determine 
whether providing an interpreter will allow the accused to have knowledge of the case 
against him or her, to mount a defence against the charges and to enable him or her to 
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France, Comm No 219/1986 (25 July 1990) para 10.2; Cadoret and Le Bihan v France, 
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39 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32 supra note 36 at para 40. 
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   206 
present his or her version of events.42  
 The burden is on the court to ensure that the absence of an interpreter will not 
affect the fair trial rights of the accused once the court is on notice that the accused has 
problems comprehending the court proceedings.43 The European Court of Human Rights 
also extended the right to an interpreter to pre-trial proceedings and has even found that 
the defendant’ fair trial rights are violated where the trial court fails to exclude a pre-trial 
statement made by the defendant without the assistance of an interpreter.44  Therefore, the 
accused’s right to a fair trial can still be violated even if the accused had the benefit of an 
interpreter during trial if the trial court relies on evidence developed without the 
assistance of an interpreter during the pre-trial phase of the case.  
 Pursuant to the European Convention of Human Rights, the right to an interpreter 
arises once an individual is charged with a crime and applies to the pre-trial, trial and 
appeals proceedings.45 The defendant is entitled to interpretation sufficient to enable the 
defendant to have knowledge of the case, to defend him or herself against the charges and 
to present to the court the accused’s version of events.46  Whether the accused can 
understand the language of the Court is an issue of fact and it is the judge’s responsibility 
to determine whether the accused needs an interpreter.47 
 The right to an interpreter is also contained in Article 8(2)(a) in the American 
Convention on Human Rights.  It specifically states that “the right of the accused to be 
assisted without charge by a translator or interpreter, if he does not understand or does 
not speak the language of the tribunal or court”.48  The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights has never found a violation of Article 8(2)(a) but it has stressed the importance of 
the principles it is meant to protect.49  In Vélez Loor v Panama, the Court emphasised the 
“particular vulnerability” a person is subject to when confronted with a judicial process in 	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43 Cuscani v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 2, 24 December 2002 at para 38. 
44 Baytar v Turkey, App No 45440/04 (ECtHR, 14 January 2015) paras 54-55, 58. 
45 Kamasinski v Austria (1991) 13 EHRR 36, 19 December 1989 at para 74; Gungor 
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46 Kamasinski supra note 45 at 74. 
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48 American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into 
force 18 July 1978) art 8(2)(a). 
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a language that he or she does not understand, and calls on courts to “recognize and 
resolve any real disadvantages faced by those brought to justice.”50  Despite this 
seemingly unambiguous position on the issue, the evidence suggests that domestic court 
systems subject to the American Convention on Human Rights are failing to consistently 
provide members of indigenous communities with interpretation.51 The Inter-American 
Court appears to be aware of this problem and has expressed the opinion that indigenous 
people involved in the legal process should be offered interpreters to ensure that they 
“understand and are understood”.52    
 The international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals also 
recognise the accused’s right to an interpreter.  The Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals allow 
the accused to be assisted by an interpreter. Article 21(4)(f) of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s Statute and Article 20(4)(f) of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Statute are identical as to this issue and provide the 
accused with the right “[t]o have the free assistance of an interpreter if he [or she] cannot 
understand or speak the language” of the Tribunal.53  However, the right to be assisted by 
an interpreter is not unlimited.  In particular, the accused is not entitled to interpretation 
in his or her mother tongue or in a language of his or her choosing but only to 
interpretation in a language he or she understands.54  In The Prosecutor v Delalić et al., 
the Trial Chamber denied the request of one of the defendants, Zdravko Mucić, to 
translate the proceedings into ‘Croatian’ as there was already translation into ‘Serbo-
Croatian’, a language sufficiently similar to permit the accused to understand the 
proceedings.55 
 The Statute of the International Criminal Court also contains a provision setting 	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52 Tiu-Tojín v Guatemala (Judgment) Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C 
No. 190 (26 November 2008) para 100.  
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on the Interlocutory Appeal Against the Oral Decision of the Pre-Trial Judge of 11 
December 2007) IT-05-88/2-AR73.1, A Ch (28 March 2008) para 15; Schabas supra note 
3 at 305. 
55 Delalić et al. supra note 54.  
	   208 
out the accused’s right to free translation.  Article 67(1)(f) describes the accused’s right 
to have “the assistance of a competent interpreter and such translations as are necessary 
to meet the requirements of fairness, if any of the proceedings of or documents presented 
to the Court are not in a language which the accused fully understands and speaks.”56  
This provision contains two clauses not found in the Statutes of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda.  The first is the requirement that translations are necessary “to meet the 
requirements of fairness.”57   The second is the assertion that the translation is in a 
language that the accused “fully understands and speaks.”58   
 In The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, the Appeals Chamber of the International 
Criminal Court elaborated on the level of language proficiency a defendant must display 
to fully understand and speak a particular language.59   In its 27 May 2008 decision, the 
Appeals Chamber found that a defendant fully understands and speaks a language if the 
defendant “is completely fluent in the language in ordinary, non-technical 
conversation.”60  The defendant need not understand the language “as if he or she were 
trained as a lawyer or judicial officer” and any doubt as to whether the defendant fully 
understands the language of the Court should be resolved in favour of translation into the 
language requested by the accused.61  The Appeals Chamber concluded that credence 
must be given to an accused’s claim that he or she cannot fully speak one of the 
languages of the Court.62  The Chamber may determine that the accused’s claim is made 
in bad faith but should err on the side of providing translation in the requested language 
where there is any doubt as to whether the accused can fully understand proceedings.63   
 The Appeals Chamber’s decision in the Katanga case represents a departure from 
the jurisprudence of other international tribunals.  That difference can largely be 
attributed to the inclusion of the word ‘fully’ in Article 67(1)(f).  The Katanga court 
makes clear that the use of the word fully reflects an intention to create a higher standard 	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decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the Defence Request Concerning 
Languages”) ICC-01/04-01/07-522, A Ch (27 May 2008). 
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than the standard then existing in other courts.64  The International Criminal Court’s 
approach to interpretation appears to be an anomaly because international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals established subsequently declined to adopt 
the International Criminal Court’s higher standard.   
 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the Special Court for Sierra Leone adopted 
provisions in their Statutes identical to that found in Article 21(4)(f) of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s Statute and Article 20(4)(f) of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Statute.65 The decision of the drafters of 
those subsequent Statutes to return to the provisions used in the Statutes of the ad hoc 
tribunals, and not to follow the lead of the International Criminal Court, suggests that the 
heightened standard is unique to the International Criminal Court and not universally 
applicable throughout international criminal law. 
 The type of interpretation that must be provided for hearing impaired defendants 
is a companion issue to the larger topic of language interpretation. In France, courts are 
required to provide a deaf accused with a sign language interpreter or other person 
qualified to communicate with deaf people.66  This issue has not come up in any of the 
international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals but has been addressed 
by the European Court of Human Rights.  In Stanford v United Kingdom, the European 
Court clarified that Article 6(3)(e) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
extended to deaf defendants.67 In the view of the court the right to follow and participate 
in proceedings, including being able to hear the proceedings, is implicit in the very notion 
of an adversarial trial.68 The European Court of Human Rights also indicated that Article 
6(3)(e) is not violated if the accused fails to make the court aware of his or her hearing 
difficulties. 69   Although none of the statutes pertaining to international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals directly discuss the issue of sign language 
translation, the provisions affording defendants the right to translation are expansive 	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2002) art 17(4)(f). 
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enough to encompass sign language translation if needed.     
 Ancillary to the interpretation of live court proceedings is the requirement that 
certain documents must also be interpreted into a language understood by the accused.  In 
the same way that conducting trial against an accused in a language that he or she cannot 
understand violates his or her right to participate in trial, relying on written evidence the 
accused cannot understand is also a violation. The Human Rights Committee has found 
that the accused does not necessarily have the right to have all relevant case documents 
translated into a language that he or she understands, particularly when the accused is 
represented by a lawyer that can read the document in question and speak the language of 
the court.70  The Human Rights Committee reasoned that counsel could then familiarise 
the accused with the relevant documents alleviating the need for translation.71 
 The European Court of Human Rights does not require that all documents be 
translated but does require that translations are made of “all statements which it is 
necessary for [the accused] to understand in order to have a fair trial.”72 The European 
Court also does not specify who is responsible for determining which documents should 
be translated, although it is likely the judge as he or she also bears the responsibility for 
determining whether the accused requires oral translation of the court proceedings.  
Further, the European Court of Human Rights has also found that because Article 6(3)(e) 
refers to the right to an interpreter, and not the right to a translator, that “oral linguistic 
assistance”, i.e. having relevant documents read to the accused rather than providing him 
or her with a translated copy, may be sufficient to comply with the Convention.73 
 The European Court of Human Rights does not provide any further explanation as 
to what documents must be translated.  The European Directive on the Right to 
Interpretation and Translation in Criminal Proceedings (“European Directive”) addresses 
this issue by asserting that translation is limited to those documents “which are essential 
to ensure that (defendants) are able to exercise their right of defense and to safeguard the 
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fairness of proceedings.”74 Essential documents include any decision depriving a person 
of his or her liberty, any charge or indictment, any judgment and all other documents 
found to be essential by the competent authority.75  This lack of specificity regarding 
which documents must be translated would likely lead a prudent court to order the 
translation of most documents. No court would want to be responsible for failing to have 
some documents translated only for a court of second or third instance to determine that 
the failure to translate those documents compromised the accused’s right to a fair trial. 
Therefore, it is logical to assume that most courts would have all those documents 
translated that could have any substantive bearing on the case. 
 A dispute at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda over what written 
evidence should be translated led one of the defendants in the Media Trial to boycott 
some court hearings.  Hassan Ngeze initially refused to appear at trial in protest of the 
Trial Chamber’s decision not to translate all seventy-one copies of the newspaper, 
Kangura, which Ngeze edited, and in which it was alleged that he had incited racial 
violence amongst the Hutus and the Tutsis.76  Ngeze alleged that this decision deprived 
him of his right to have the necessary time and facilities to prepare his defence because 
his counsel could not read Kinyarwanda, the language Kangura was written in, and 
therefore could not properly evaluate the evidence against Ngeze.77  The Appeals 
Chamber rejected this argument on the grounds that Ngeze could have assisted in the 
preparation of his own defence and brought the relevant parts of Kangura to the attention 
of his counsel.78  
 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia requires that 
certain documents be translated into a language understood by the accused.  Initially, the 
accused was entitled to receive, in a language he or she understood, the material 
supporting the indictment and all evidence admitted at trial.79   The accused was also 
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entitled to translated copies of all orders and decisions made by the Tribunal in his or her 
case.80  The Court subsequently expanded the scope of the documents that had to be 
translated to include: (a) a copy of the indictment; (b) a copy of the supporting material 
which accompanied the indictment against the accused and all prior statements obtained 
by the prosecutor from the accused, irrespective of whether these items will be offered at 
trial; (c) the statements of all witnesses that the prosecutor intends to call to testify at trial 
along with all written statements taken in accordance with Rule 92bis; (d) discovery 
material which appeared in a language understood by the accused at the time it came 
under the prosecution’s custody or control; and (e) written decisions and orders rendered 
by the Trial Chamber or Appeals Chamber.81     
 The International Criminal Court’s Statute imposes the condition that documents 
be translated to “meet the requirements of fairness”.  Unfortunately, this is a somewhat 
nebulous standard as there is no explanation in the Statute as to what constitutes “the 
requirements of fairness” in this context.  The Pre-Trial Chamber in the Bemba case 
addressed this issue and found that the requirements of fairness entail the translation of 
all documents, without which, the defendant “would not be able to understand the nature, 
cause and content of the charge and thus to adequately defend himself or herself, thereby 
prejudicing the fairness of the proceedings.”82  The Court’s failure to identify specific 
types of documents that must be translated makes it difficult to predict what precise 
actions have to comply with the Court’s Statute.  It is likely that the drafters of the Statute 
made this clause intentionally vague to avoid limiting what evidence had to be translated, 
but this only leads to uncertainty as to what information must be translated for the 
requirements of fairness to have been met.  
 The rule regarding what evidence needs to be translated to allow the accused to 
understand the proceedings followed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia is preferable to the approach of the European Court of Human Rights 
or the International Criminal Court. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia’s rule is more objective by setting forth specific types of documents that must 
be produced to meet the minimum standard for a fair trial.  Conversely, the European 	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Court of Human Rights’ application of Article 6 simply requires the translation of those 
documents necessary for the accused to understand the case being presented against him 
or her so that the trial can be considered fair.  This standard necessarily requires one of 
the participants, likely the court, to make a subjective value judgment as to what 
documents must be translated for the trial to be fair.  A subjective standard is dangerous 
for three reasons.  First, it is incredibly time consuming to require the court to review a 
massive number of documents and determine the relevance of each document to the fair 
trial rights of the accused.  Second, it significantly increases the likelihood of an 
erroneous decision being made about the relevance of some documents and increases the 
danger that important documents might go un-translated.  Third, the rule as it stands fails 
to indicate at what point in the trial proceeding the relevance of the document will be 
assessed.  A document may not seem relevant at the time it is introduced at trial but may 
become so when it is considered in the context of other subsequently presented evidence.   
 International and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals should err on the 
side of adopting objective rules pertaining to the interpretation and translation of oral and 
written evidence.  Objective rules identify a clear and transparent process to be followed 
from the beginning of trial about what evidence will be interpreted or translated, thus 
permitting the defence to adequately prepare its case. Subjective rules are more open to 
interpretation and in this context increase the danger of important evidence going 
uninterpreted or untranslated.  While flexible rules are often preferable as they give 
courts manoeuvrability, in this instance a rule that requires the interpretation or 
translation of all oral and written evidence to be offered against the accused at trial 
ensures that the accused will understand all of the evidence that will be considered when 
determining his guilt or innocence.  That the accused has such an understanding will be 
important when ensuring that his or her fair trial rights have been met.  
8.2 MENTAL FITNESS TO STAND TRIAL 
 An accused who is mentally unfit to stand trial is not present within the meaning 
of the term as it pertains to trial before an international or internationalised criminal court 
or tribunal.83 As a preliminary matter, whether a defendant is mentally unfit to stand trial 
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should not be confused with whether a defendant can plead the defence of insanity.84 The 
former pertains to the defendant’s mental state at the time of trial while the latter relates 
to the defendant’s mental state at the time the alleged crimes were committed. Overlap 
can exist between these two concepts but it is important that they not be understood as 
synonyms.   
 Two of the accused at the Nuremberg Tribunal, Gustav Krupp Von Bohlen und 
Halbach (“Krupp”) and Rudolf Hess challenged whether they were mentally fit to stand 
trial. Krupp maintained that he suffered from “severe physical mental infirmities” and 
requested that the proceedings against him be suspended until he was fit to stand trial or, 
in the alternative, that he not be tried in absentia.85 Krupp’s attorney argued that it was 
not in the interests of justice to try an individual that was not capable of understanding 
the charges against him, who could not instruct council or participate in his own 
defence.86  The Tribunal ordered a medical examination of Krupp, which found that he 
suffered from significant degenerative physical and mental deficiencies that prevented 
him from understanding the trial proceedings.87 As a result of these findings, Krupp’s 
counsel argued that he should not be tried in absentia because his impairments prevented 
him from exercising certain defence rights.88 The Court found that trying Krupp in 
absentia did not serve the interests of justice and suspended the proceedings against 
him.89 Although the charges were not dismissed, Krupp’s infirmities prevented him from 
ever being tried and he died in 1950 while still under indictment.90 
 Unlike Krupp, Rudolf Hess was unable to convince the Nuremberg Tribunal that 
he was not mentally fit to stand trial. On 7 November 1945, Hess’s counsel filed a motion 
expressing “grave doubts” about Hess’s mental capability.91 In response to the motion, 
the Court appointed a commission of ten doctors, drawn from each of the Allied powers, 
to examine Hess and determine his fitness to stand trial.92 Hess was examined multiple 
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times between 16 November 1945 and 20 November 1945 and a variety of reports were 
prepared discussing his mental stability. Although the reports prepared about Hess did 
not all agree about the severity of his condition, they did share one key finding: he 
suffered from hysterical amnesia that would interfere with his ability to conduct his 
defence.93 On November 30, 1945, Hess asked the Tribunal to temporarily suspend trial 
against him and refuse to try him in absentia if he was found mentally unfit to enter a 
plea. 94  After significant argument by the parties as to these issues, Hess himself 
addressed the Court and stated the following:  
Henceforth my memory will again respond to the outside world. The 
reasons for simulating loss of memory were of a tactical nature. Only my 
ability to concentrate is, in fact, somewhat reduced. But my capacity to 
follow the trial, to defend myself, to put questions to witnesses, or to 
answer questions myself is not affected thereby.  I emphasize that I bear 
full responsibility for everything that I did, signed or co-signed. My 
fundamental attitude that the Tribunal is not competent, is not affected by 
the statement I have just made. I also simulated loss of memory in 
consultations with my officially appointed defense counsel. He has, 
therefore, represented it in good faith.95 
 
In light of Hess’s statement the Tribunal found that Hess was capable of standing trial 
and his Motion was denied.96   
 In the end, this was a rather curious decision.  It certainly reflects the Tribunal’s 
desire to try all of the suspects, an inclination that reached its apex with the decision to 
try Martin Bormann despite the fact that much of the existing evidence indicated that he 
was dead.  Despite Hess’ claim that he was fit to stand trial, his assertion seems to run 
counter to the medical experts who examined him. Many of the doctors that examined 
Hess reported that although he might not have been insane, his mental condition would 
affect his ability to properly defend himself against the charges. The Tribunal claimed it 
considered the medical reports when making its ruling, but there is nothing in the written 
decision supporting the veracity of that assertion. The decision to proceed with trial 
against Hess runs counter to the Tribunal’s finding with regard to Krupp, particularly to 
the extent that it is not in the interests of justice to try a mentally unfit defendant in 
absentia.  The decision may reveal a desire to hold Hess responsible for his actions 	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regardless of his questionable mental condition. 
 A third defendant, Julius Streicher, also had questions raised about his mental 
fitness to stand trial.  Streicher’s lawyer, Hans Marx, suggested during a hearing held on 
15 November 1945 that the Tribunal order a psychiatric evaluation of his client.97 
Streicher apparently opposed the request and as a result Marx refused to make a formal 
motion in support of his request.98 Instead, the Soviet Deputy Chief Prosecutor, Y. V. 
Pokrovsky filed a formal motion to have Streicher evaluated.99 Streicher was examined 
the next day and it was unanimously determined that he was sane, fit to stand trial and 
present his defence to the charges against him.100 
 The mental fitness issue re-emerged during the Tokyo Trial.  Ōkawa Shūmei, a 
Japanese author and propagandist, had the charges against him suspended after being 
deemed mentally unable to stand trial.101  During the ceremonial opening of the Tribunal 
on the first day of trial, Ōkawa behaved bizarrely when he struck Hideki Tojo on the head 
and then began praying.102 Ōkawa was removed from the courtroom and subsequent 
medical examinations resulted in a diagnosis of syphilis leading to meningo-encephalitis 
manifested by “overactivity, emotional lability, euphoria, grandiose delusions, visual 
hallucinations, defective judgment and impairment of retention, recent memory, abstract 
thinking and insight” and a conclusion that he was incapable of standing trial.103  The 
Tribunal determined that Ōkawa lacked the intellectual capacity to stand trial, plead to 
the charges against him, instruct his counsel and conduct his defence.104 
 The charges against Ōkawa were suspended although the order did not preclude 
the possibility of trying Ōkawa at a later date should he become competent to stand 
trial.105 No such trial ever took place and after the Tokyo Tribunal closed in 1948, it was 
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announced that all charges against Ōkawa were dropped and that no further charges 
would be pursued.106 By the end of 1948, Ōkawa was declared mentally fit again and 
released from hospital.107 Judge Röling, the Dutch member of the Tribunal, later reflected 
that Ōkawa “was a very clever man.  So clever that he was declared insane.  He came out 
of the asylum at the end of the trial.  He was just cleverer than anyone else, so clever that 
he could play the fool.”108   
 The mental fitness of the accused to stand trial was also an issue at the modern 
international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals with the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia particularly addressing the issue on multiple 
occasions. The most significant opinion with regard to the fitness to stand trial and its 
relationship to the right to be present at trial was made by the Trial Chamber in The 
Prosecutor v Strugar.  During the final pre-trial conference, the Defence requested that 
the defendant, Pavle Strugar be evaluated to establish whether he was fit to stand trial.109 
That request was denied and trial began the next day.110 Approximately two months after 
the start of trial the Defence requested the termination of the proceedings against Strugar 
on the grounds that he was not fit to stand trial.111  The Trial Chamber order further 
medical testing and allowed limited testimony from three doctors regarding Strugar’s 
condition before reserving judgment as to the issue of Strugar’s fitness to stand trial.112 
 In reaching its decision, the Trial Chamber observed that the ability to exercise 
certain rights as a defendant, including the right to understand the indictment, the right to 
defend oneself in person, the right to examine witnesses and the right to be able to 
instruct counsel are all affected or precluded “if an accused’s mental and bodily 
capacities, especially the ability to understand, i.e. to comprehend, is affected by mental 
or somatic disorder.”113  Based on the evidence before it, the Trial Chamber concluded 	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that Strugar was fit to stand trial.114 In explaining its decision the Trial Chamber directly 
equated fitness to stand trial to the right to be present at trial.  The Trial Chamber noted 
that: 
In principle, trials in absentia are not permitted before the Tribunal. This 
rule would appear to be devoid of any substance if it related to the mere 
physical presence of the accused in court. As the presence of the accused 
has been held to be indispensable for the determination of guilt or 
innocence, the requirement of presence appears to be to ensure the 
presence of an accused person who is capable of assisting the Tribunal by 
the presentation of his or her defence. 115  
 
The Trial Chamber also found that the burden of proof, when considering whether an 
accused is fit to stand trial, falls upon the Defence.116  The Appeals Chamber later 
confirmed the Trial Chamber’s decision finding that the Trial Chamber applied the 
correct legal standard when determining whether Strugar was fit to stand trial and it also 
agreed that accused bears the burden of proving whether the accused is fit to stand 
trial. 117  The Appeals Chamber also reiterated that the applicable standard when 
determining fitness to stand trial is that the accused must be capable of “meaningful 
participation which allows the accused to exercise his fair trial rights to such a degree that 
he is able to participate effectively in his trial, and has an understanding of the essentials 
of the proceedings.”118  The test established in Strugar would become the standard other 
international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals would apply when 
considering whether an accused is mentally fit to stand trial. 
 The Trial Chamber’s decision on Strugar’s Motion was followed on 12 April 
2006 by the decision in The Prosecutor v Vladimir Kovačević, which also considered the 
mental fitness of the accused to stand trial.  After an initial examination in which it was 
determined that although Kovačević was suffering from an undisclosed illness he was 
still fit to appear before the Court, a defence request was made raising the issue of 
Kovačević’s mental health.119  At that time the Trial Chamber ordered before the matter 
could proceed a psychiatrist and a psychologist examine Kovačević.120 Both experts 	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concluded that Kovačević was in “urgent need of treatment” and that he should be sent to 
a mental health facility “for an initial period of six months.”121  
 Kovačević was provisionally released for six months to receive treatment after 
which additional examinations were conducted.122   The Court also conducted two 
hearings as to whether Kovačević was fit to stand trial.123 Relying on the decision in 
Strugar, the Trial Chamber determined that the accused had certain defence rights whose 
“effective exercise may be hindered, or even precluded, if an accused's mental and bodily 
capacity, especially the ability to understand, is affected by a mental or somatic 
disorder.”124 The Court found that based on the conclusions of the experts, which are 
redacted from the public version of the opinion, Kovačević lacked the ability to: (a) 
plead; (b) understand the nature of the charges; (c) understand the course of the 
proceedings; (d) understand the significance of the evidence; (e) instruct counsel; (f) 
understand the consequences of the proceedings; and (g) testify.125 As a result the Trial 
Chamber concluded that Kovačević was unfit to stand trial.126  Subsequently, the matter 
was transferred to the Courts of Serbia where Kovačević was indicted in July 2007 
although that indictment was ultimately dismissed due to Kovačević’s lack of fitness to 
stand trial.127   
 In November 2014, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
halted trial against Goran Hadžić when he was diagnosed with glioblastoma multiforme, 
a type of aggressive, malignant brain tumour.128  The initial court ordered medical 
examination indicated that Hadžić would not be able to participate in proceedings for 
four months either during or after treatment for his condition.129 It also suggested that due 
to his illness Hadžić’s ability to be present at trial would diminish over time.130  
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Following a further examination, the Trial Chamber applied the Strugar test and found 
that Hadžić was fit to stand trial but stayed the proceedings to allow him to remain in 
consultation with his physician.131  In so holding, the Chamber conceded that although 
Hadžić may suffer from some cognitive impairments, an accused can be found to be 
operating at less than their peak level and still be fit to stand trial.132 In the view of the 
Chamber, Hadžić’s limitations still permitted him to understand and meaningfully 
participate in the proceedings.133 The Chamber chose to stay the proceedings, rather than 
terminate them out of a concern about the finality of ending the proceedings in the event 
that Hadžić recovered from his illness.134  On 5 April 2016, the Chamber granted an 
indefinite stay of proceedings based on a finding that Hadžić’s deficiencies were such 
that he could no longer effectively communicate with, and instruct his counsel, and 
therefore, no longer meaningfully participate in trial. 135  Trial proceedings were 
permanently terminated on 22 July 2016 following Hadžić’s death.136 
 Other international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals have 
followed the standard set by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia in Strugar, Kovačević and Hadžić. The International Criminal Court’s Statute 
is silent as to how to handle the situation of an accused who is mentally unfit to stand trial 
and the Court has yet to find an accused to be unfit.  Laurent Gbagbo raised the issue and 
the Court relied on some of the criteria set out by the Strugar court when determining that 
Gbagbo was fit to stand trial.137  In particular, the International Criminal Court found that 
to be considered fit to stand trial an accused must: (i) understand the purpose, including 
the consequences, of the proceedings; (ii) understand the course of the proceedings, 
including the nature and significance of pleading to the charges; (iii) understand the 
evidence; (iv) be able to testify or give an unsworn statement (should the accused so 
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choose); and (v) instruct counsel in the preparation and conduct of his defence.138 It also 
reiterated the point that participation alone is not sufficient to meet the requirements of 
the accused’s right to be present at trial.139  Instead, what matters is that the accused can 
meaningfully participate in proceedings.140  The Trial Chamber held that Gbagbo was 
able to stand trial as he met the requisite criteria for physical and mental fitness.141 All 
three experts that examined Gbagbo concluded that he had the cognitive ability to 
understand the nature, cause and consequences of the charges and the details of the 
evidence; to communicate with and instruct his counsel; and to testify or make an 
unsworn statement on his own behalf.142  It is thought that if an accused is found to be 
mentally unfit to stand trial at the International Criminal Court, his or her right to be 
present will likely result in the suspension of the trial pending an improvement in the 
accused’s mental condition.143   
 Rule 135 of the International Criminal Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
regulates the circumstances under which a medical examination of the accused may take 
place.  The Trial Chamber is permitted to order the psychological evaluation of a 
defendant at the request of any party or by its own volition, for any reason but 
particularly to ensure that the accused understands the charges.144  Based on the findings 
of the evaluation, the Trial Chamber is permitted to adjourn trial due to the accused 
mental unfitness to stand trial.145  The Trial Chamber is required to review that decision 
every 120 days and is permitted to order a re-examination of the accused and, if 
appropriate, declare the accused fit to stand trial.146  Rule 135 emphasises the importance 
the Court places on the mental presence of the accused, and demonstrates that the ability 
of the accused to understand the proceedings is directly tied to the accused’s right to a 
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fair trial. 
 The International Criminal Court’s opinion that physical presence is less 
important than mental presence finds support in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence.  Rule 104 indicates that a trial will not be considered in 
absentia where the accused appears by videoconference. 147  This rule implicitly 
recognises that the accused is present to the extent that he or she can follow the 
proceedings, and presumably participate if he or she so desires, without actually being 
present in the courtroom.  By indicating that an accused is considered not absent when 
attending via videoconference suggests that the mental involvement of the accused takes 
precedence over his or her physical presence. 
 It must also be noted that earlier drafts of the International Criminal Court’s 
Statute included exceptions to the right to be present at trial in instances where the 
accused could not attend due to “ill-health.”148 Although mental fitness to stand trial was 
not specifically discussed in that context, it is reasonable to surmise that ill-health would 
encompass mental as well as physical health.  If the accused is mentally unfit to stand 
trial, there is really no way of curing his or her inability to be present at trial.  Even a 
physically ill defendant could be kept apprised of the proceedings using modern 
technology in the same way a disruptive defendant is kept informed.  The fact that the 
Drafting Committee had specific provisions before it that would permit trial to continue 
despite the illness of the accused, and chose not to adopt those provisions, demonstrates 
that the drafters of the Statute did not intend for trials to continue where the defendant 
was mentally unfit to participate. 
 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia also saw fit to apply the 
Strugar test when ruling on whether an accused is mentally fit to stand trial.  The Trial 
Chamber of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia found that although 
Ieng Thirith’s dementia might permit her to enter a plea, understand the charges and the 
evidence and to testify on her own behalf, her impaired long-term and short-term memory 
would prevent her from adequately instructing counsel and participating in her own 
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defence.149 The Chamber therefore concluded that Ieng Thirith was mentally unfit to 
stand trial and ordered that the proceedings against her be severed from the other 
defendants and stayed.150  The Supreme Court Chamber later partially overturned the 
decision due to the Trial Court’s failure to explore all possible measures to improve Ieng 
Thirith’s mental health.151  The Trial Chamber later reaffirmed that Ieng Thirith’s long-
term and short-term memory impairment rendered her unfit to stand trial and added that 
all steps to improve her condition had been tried unsuccessfully.152 
 Despite the procedural challenges to the Trial Chamber’s original decision, it is 
notable for its application and interpretation of the Strugar test.  The decision represents 
the first time that an international or internationalised criminal court or tribunal has found 
that some, but not all, of the Strugar criteria are met and still determined that the accused 
was not mentally fit to stand trial. This reading of the Strugar test means that a person 
can only be considered mentally fit to stand trial if all of the conditions set out in Strugar 
are present.  This is significant as it limits the possibility that the Strugar elements will be 
balanced against one another and possibly result in a finding that so long as the accused 
has some mental capacity he or she can still be tried.  The Trial Chamber’s decision 
strongly emphasises the notion that partial or limited understanding and participation on 
the part of the accused does not constitute a fair trial.  That standard can only be reached 
if the accused can fully understand and participate in the proceedings.   
 The jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Court, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon demonstrates the important 
relationship between the accused’s ability to participate and his or her right to be present.  
The Strugar case sets out the standard whereby an individual can be found mentally fit to 
stand trial. By explicitly describing what components of the trial the accused must be able 
to understand, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia created an 
objective test designed to ensure that a mentally unfit accused would not be forced to 	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stand trial.  The criteria making up this test, as applied at the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia, must be read inclusively, and demonstrate that the accused must 
be able to fully understand and participate in the proceedings. The International Criminal 
Court and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon have also instituted rules indicating a clear 
understanding that the accused’s presence at trial is made effective through his or her 
ability to understand the proceedings and freely participate in them.  Clearly, the 
international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals recognise that the right to 
be present at trial is made effective through the accused’s ability to understand and 
participate in trial and they have taken the steps necessary to make sure that trial will only 
proceed when the necessary understanding and participation is demonstrated.   
8.3 PRESENT WHEN PHYSICALLY ABSENT 
 While it is clear that the accused can be physically present at trial without being 
mentally present, it remains to be seen whether the opposite is also true.  Traditionally, 
the accused’s right to be present at trial required the accused to be physically present in 
the courtroom during trial as there was no other way to guarantee that he or she was able 
to participate in trial.153 The physical presence of the accused also allowed him or her to 
exercise other rights including the right to confront the witnesses against them.154 Recent 
technological innovations like Videoconferencing (also referred to as Video-Link or 
Video-Link Conferencing) have reduced the importance of the accused’s physical 
presence, as it is now possible for the accused to understand and participate in the 
proceedings without actually being in the courtroom.   
 Videoconferencing is the process of establishing a direct video and sound 
connection between the courtroom and a separate location enabling the people in each 
place see and hear one another as if they were in the same room.155 Videoconferencing 
differs from pre-recorded audio or video statements as it permits direct interaction 
between the physically separate participants.156 This technology allows the person in the 
remote location to understand and participate in the proceedings as if he or she was in the 	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courtroom.157 Videoconferencing could play an important role in international criminal 
trials by allowing some or all of the participants to attend trial from their home country 
rather than forcing them to travel long distances to participate. Videoconferencing could 
also expedite trials by eliminating delays caused by absent witnesses or additional 
hearings and filings to authorise remote testimony. Greater use of videoconferencing 
would also reduce the costs associated with transporting and housing witnesses and 
defendants at the seat of the court.  The prospect of shorter, less costly trials would 
improve the standing of international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals 
in the esteem of the international community. 158 It would also allow international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals to hold more trials strengthening rule of 
law enforcement.159 
 International and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals are incorporating 
the use of videoconferencing to allow the remote appearance of the accused. The 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 
the International Criminal Court and the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, all have rules 
permitting the accused to appear at some or all of the trial through videoconferencing.160 
Additionally, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has permitted 
the accused to appear at trial through videoconferencing in at least two different cases 
although it does not have a specific rule permitting electronic appearance. 
 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia took up the issue 
in the Simić case.  Simić’s illness prevented him from attending trial so the Tribunal 
installed a video-link and a two-way telephone line in the Detention Centre enabling 
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Simić to observe proceedings and consult with his counsel in the courtroom.161  This 
shortened the trial by allowing the Trial Chamber to sit for an additional hour 
everyday. 162  In recognition of his absence, the Trial Chamber required Simić to 
habitually execute waivers of his right to be present.163 By obligating Simić to regularly 
waive his right to be present the Trial Chamber demonstrated that it regarded his 
appearance by video-link as an absence from trial necessitating a waiver for trial to 
continue rather than an alternative form of presence.   
 Several years later, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
approached appearance via videoconferencing differently during the Stanišić and 
Simatović case. A medical condition stopped Jovica Stanišić from attending trial either in 
person or through videoconferencing.164 Stanišić ultimately agreed to appear via video-
link and was also eventually able to make some in-court appearances.165 The Trial 
Chamber left his manner of appearance to his discretion, while emphasising that both 
methods enabled him to participate in trial. 166 Stanišić was only required to waive his 
right to be present on those days when he did not attend trial at all and not when he 
appeared by video-link.167  This suggests that the Trial Chamber felt that Stanišić’s 
appearances by videoconferencing were more similar to his being present in the 
courtroom rather than absence.  It also demonstrates an evolving attitude towards 
presence at trial with an increased focus on the accused’s ability to properly participate in 
trial rather than the very literal requirement that he or she be physically present in the 
courtroom.  
 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia incorporated the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s practice of allowing a 
physically unwell accused to appear via videoconferencing into its Internal Rules. The 
Internal Rules specifically permit the accused to participate in trial through 
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videoconferencing when the accused is prevented from being present in the courtroom.168 
Participation by video-link is permitted if the accused is unable to attend trial for “health 
reasons or other serious concerns”, where the accused’s absence from trial would cause 
substantial delay, and when it is in the interests of justice to permit attendance by 
videoconferencing.169 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia had 
holding cells constructed below the courtroom containing a video monitor and a phone 
line to better facilitate the accused’s remote participation in trial.170  
 The physical health of the accused and how it affects his or her ability to 
participate in proceedings has been a particular concern at the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia because of the advanced age of the defendants. The Trial 
Chamber concluded in the Nuon Chea and Others case that it could exclude defendant, 
Ieng Sary from the courtroom and ordered his participation via electronic means.  After 
having initially agreed to waive his right to be present during trial, on 3 December 2012 
defendant Ieng Sary withdrew his waiver and insisted on being physically present in the 
courtroom during proceedings.171 On 4 December 2012, the Trial Chamber ignored 
Sary’s assertion of the right to be present in the courtroom and decided to proceed with 
Sary appearing via videoconferencing. 172 As a result, the Trial Chamber allowed trial to 
continue outside the physical presence of the accused even after the accused specifically 
demanded that he be allowed to participate from within the courtroom. For such an order 
to comply with the accused’s right to be present it is necessary to view participation 
through videoconferencing as an adequate means by which the accused can exercise his 
or her participatory trial rights.     
 In reaching its decision, the Trial Chamber appears to have conflated the terms 
‘following the proceedings’ and ‘participating in proceedings’. In fact, the two concepts 
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are quite different. 173 To follow proceedings is passive; it suggests that one is paying 
attention, but not contributing, to the trial.  This passive act of following proceedings 
does not comply with the accused’s right to be present at trial.  The Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia explained that the right to be present demands that 
the accused be able to ‘meaningfully participate’ in proceedings. 174  Meaningful 
participation has an active and a passive component, both of which must exist for trial to 
continue in the accused’s absence.  The active component necessitates that the accused be 
able to exercise his or her fair trial rights to such an extent that he or she is effectively 
participating in trial.175  The passive component mandates that the accused be able to 
understand the essential aspects of the trial.176  
 The available evidence does not appear to support a finding that Sary could 
participate in his trial. Sary’s doctor reported on the day the Trial Chamber entered its 
order that the slightest movement caused Sary to become easily fatigued, he was 
experiencing chest pains, he could not eat very much, he was vomiting and having 
difficulty concentrating.177 His counsel added that Sary lacked the strength to reach the 
telephone in the holding cell.178 Based on these observations it is reasonable to conclude 
that Sary probably could not effectively observe trial, let alone participate in it. The Trial 
Chamber’s decision to allow trial to continue against an accused in such a weakened 
physical condition disregards the active component of meaningful participation and calls 
into question whether trial should have been allowed to continue under these 
circumstances regardless of whether the accused was physically present in the courtroom 
or appearing via videoconferencing. 
 The Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence permit the 
accused to choose whether he or she wishes to appear at trial through videoconferencing.  
Rule 105 makes that choice subject to two limitations: 1) participation by 
videoconferencing must be authorised by the court; and 2) the accused’s counsel must be 
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present in the courtroom.179 Rule 105 specifically states that the accused “may participate 
in hearings via video-conference”, indicating that the purpose of the rule is to allow the 
accused to do more than just observe or follow the proceedings.  
 The Rules of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon also specify that the accused’s 
appearance by videoconferencing is an alternative form of presence and not a type of 
absence.  Rule 104 unequivocally states that “[p]roceedings shall not be in absentia if an 
accused appears before the Tribunal in person, by video-conference, or by counsel 
appointed or accepted by him.”180 Placing in-person appearance on an equal footing with 
appearance by videoconferencing, without imposing any form of hierarchy, indicates that 
both are equivalent and acceptable forms of appearance at trial. The Special Tribunal has 
effectively dispensed with the requirement that the accused needs to be physically present 
a trial by making these equivalent methods of appearing at trial. 
 The Rules of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers also do not necessarily require the 
accused to appear for trial in person. Article 41 of the Law governing the Specialist 
Chambers addresses all issues arising as a result of the detention of the accused.  
Subsection 12 of the Article permits the accused to attend trial via videoconferencing 
from Kosovo in four different situations.181 They are: (1) when the accused is released on 
bail in Kosovo; (2) when the accused is under house arrest in Kosovo; (3) when the 
accused promises not to leave his place of residence; and (4) when the accused attends 
trial at a police station or other venue in Kosovo.182 In each instance the Specialist 
Chambers will only allow the accused to attend trial via videoconferencing if he or she 
first consents.183  
 There are two direct benefits of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers 
videoconferencing procedure.  First, it keeps costs down; and second, it can act as an 
incentive to ensure the accused’s participation in trial.  Costs are reduced because the 
Kosovo Specialist Chambers will not always be required to transport the accused to The 
Hague and incarcerate him or her during trial. It incentivizes participation because it 
creates a more hospitable environment in which the accused can participate. The Kosovo 	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Specialist Chambers’ system allows the accused to remain in familiar surroundings 
without displacing him or her for the duration of proceedings rather than mandating that 
he or she be jailed in a distant country during trial. This sort of minimal disruption to the 
accused’s life is likely to make him or her more cooperative during trial proceedings. 
Article 41(12) also reinforces the modern trend of allowing the accused to agree to 
participate remotely permitting rather than as a waiver of the right to be present. This 
practice demonstrates that the Kosovo Specialist Chambers does not equate electronic 
participation to absence. Instead, it treats attendance via videoconferencing as an 
alternative form of participation and indicates that the accused’s right to be present is 
being respected so long as he or she can participate in trial.  
 Unlike the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, the 
International Criminal Court has not entirely done away with the need for the accused to 
be physical present during trial although it has begun to move in that direction. Initially, 
an accused at the International Criminal Court could only participate in trial remotely if 
he or she had been removed from the courtroom for being persistently disruptive during 
trial.184  However, in November 2013 the International Criminal Court amended its rules 
and added Rule 134 bis permitting the accused to “be present” for “part or parts” of his or 
her trial via videoconferencing.185  The rule states that appearance through the use of 
video technology allows the accused to be present at trial although the accused still needs 
to request permission to appear in this manner suggests that the Court does not equate 
videoconferencing with physical presence in the courtroom.186 However, Rule 134 bis 
also demonstrates that the International Criminal Court does not consider appearance by 
video technology to be the equivalent of absence from court by permitting the accused to 
appear via videoconferencing without having to explicitly waive his right to be present.  
This deviates from Rules 134 ter and 134 quater, both of which require the accused to 
waive his or her right to be present before allowing them to be absent from trial.187  
Therefore, appearance by video-link as articulated in Rule 134 bis constitutes a middle 
ground between presence and absence.   
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 The International Criminal Court’s Statute may provide an explanation as to why 
a different procedure exists for an accused appearing via videoconferencing under Rule 
134 bis from an accused absenting himself or herself under Rules 134 ter and 134 quater. 
Article 63(2) was the only provision under which trial could take place outside of the 
physical presence of the accused prior to the introduction of Rules 134 bis, 134 ter and 
134 quater. Article 63(2) allows the court to have continuously disruptive defendants 
removed from the courtroom and observe the proceedings via video technology.188 
Because Article 63(2) allows trial to continue outside of the physical presence of the 
accused it has been interpreted as permitting a limited form of trial in absentia. However, 
this may be a misreading of the Statute.  Perhaps Article 63(2) is not meant to delineate 
an instance in which trial is taking place in the absence of the accused.  Rather, Article 
63(2) may be meant to describe an alternative method through which the accused 
continues to be present for trial without being physically present in the courtroom.  When 
read this way, Article 63(2) can be more easily seen to comply with Article 63(1)’s 
mandate that “[t]he accused shall be present during the trial.”189 An accused participating 
in trial electronically is still present during the trial although he or she is not physically 
present in the courtroom. 
 The accused is not entitled to attend the entirety of trial electronically due to the 
internal limitation contained Rule 134 bis indicating that the accused may only request to 
attend “part or parts” of trial by videoconferencing.190 Limiting video participation to 
only “part or parts” of trial gives rise to the implication that any request to attend the 
entirety of trial by videoconferencing would be denied. The decision not to authorise the 
accused to attend the whole trial electronically suggests that the Court believes that there 
are parts of the trial better served by the in-person appearance of the accused.  This 
interpretation is borne out by the Trial Chamber decision in September 2014 to deny 
Uhuru Kenyatta’s request to be excused from a Status Conference or alternatively, to be 
allowed to appear via videoconferencing.  In reaching its decision, Trial Chamber V(B) 
found that the status conference constituted a “critical juncture” in the proceedings during 
which matters directly impacting the accused, the victims and the witnesses would be 
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discussed.191 The Trial Chamber further concluded that “the requirements of justice in 
this case necessitate the physical presence of the accused at the Court” because of the 
important nature of the conference. 192  This decision clearly demonstrates that the 
International Criminal Court, unlike the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, still draws some 
distinction between physical presence and presence by videoconferencing, and considers 
some issues to be of such importance that they can only be properly addressed when the 
accused is physically present in the courtroom.  
 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is unique amongst other 
international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals in finding that the right to 
be present at trial requires the accused to be physically present in the courtroom unless he 
or she waives that right. That principle was established in the Zigiranyirazo case, where a 
Trial Chamber inadvertently found itself considering the relationship between the 
accused’s right to be present and appearance via videoconferencing. The Trial Chamber 
initially determined that although the trial was being held in Arusha, a witness located in 
the Netherlands and seeking to testify via videoconferencing must appear in person, in 
the presence of all of the participants.193 The witness was unwilling to travel to Arusha 
out of a fear for his safety, so the Trial Chamber ordered that arrangements be made for 
him to testify in The Hague with all of the parties present.194 However, Zigiranyirazo was 
denied entry to the Netherlands and the Trial Chamber chose to allow the witness to 
testify outside of Zigiranyirazo’s physical presence although he did appear via 
videoconferencing.195  
 Zigiranyirazo challenged that decision on the grounds that conducting any part of 
the proceedings outside of his physical presence was a violation of his right to be present 
during trial. The Appeals Chamber agreed with him in finding that the accused’s right to 
be present at trial refers to the accused’s physical presence at trial and described it as 
“one of the most basic and common precepts of a fair criminal trial.”196  The Appeals 	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Chamber went on to hold that although the right to be present is not absolute it can only 
be limited when doing so is proportional to the other interest being protected. 197 In this 
case the Trial Chamber’s decision was found to be disproportional and constituted an 
unwarranted and unnecessary restriction on Zigiranyirazo’s fair trial rights. 198  The 
Appeals Chamber reached that conclusion by focusing, in part, on the perceived inability 
of videoconferencing to replicate the experience of being physically present at trial.  Trial 
Chambers at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda relied on a similar rational 
in several future decisions and one went so far as to claim that “[v]ideo-link transmission 
cannot be equated with presence”.199 Admittedly, these latter cases were addressing 
whether witnesses could testify via videoconferencing, however, they tend to demonstrate 
that both the Trial and Appeals Chambers at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda viewed the appearance of any trial participant by video as being qualitatively 
different from he or she being physically present in the courtroom.  This view does not 
accord with the practices adopted at the other international and internationalised courts 
and tribunals and represents a very narrow understanding of what it means to be present 
at trial. 
8.4 CONCLUSION 
 International and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals have largely 
found that the accused’s right to be present at trial extends beyond his or her being 
physical present in the courtroom. It also requires that the accused be able to understand 
and participate in the proceedings. An accused that is physically present but not able to 
understand or participate in the trial is effectively absent from the courtroom.  This most 
often arises under one of two circumstances: when the accused does not speak the 
language of the court and when the accused is mentally unfit to stand trial.  These are 
both involuntary forms of absence as they do not result from the accused’s choice not to 
attend, and therefore courts and tribunals attempt to mitigate or eliminate their negative 
effects rather than continue trial in the accused’s absence.  
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an accused that does not understand the language of the court so that he or she is able to 
comprehend the proceedings. However, the extent to which he or she must be able to 
understand the language in which trial is being conducted so as to be entitled to an 
interpreter is open to debate.  All of the international and internationalised criminal courts 
and tribunals except the International Criminal Court simply require that the accused 
understand the proceedings.200  That right is limited to the extent that the accused does 
not have a right to interpretation into his or her mother tongue but only into a language 
that he or she understands.201 By contrast, the International Criminal Court mandates that 
the accused fully understand the proceedings, which means the accused must be fluent 
either in the language in which the proceedings are being conducted or a language into 
which the proceedings are being interpreted.202 The higher standard adopted by the 
International Criminal Court has largely been ignored by subsequently created courts and 
tribunals meaning that the accused need only understand the proceedings against them. 
Understanding the proceedings also extends to ensuring that certain documents are 
translated into a language understood by the accused.  While most courts recognise the 
importance of translating some documents, there is no settled rule as to what documents 
must be translated leaving it to the discretion of each court and tribunal.  Courts and 
tribunals should use that discretion to guarantee that it is clear from the outset what 
documents will be translated so that the defence has access to the information necessary 
to prepare its case. 
 An accused who is mentally unable to understand and participate in proceedings 
is effectively not present at trial even if he or she is in the courtroom. Most international 
and internationalised courts and tribunals follow the test set out by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Strugar case when determining 
whether an accused is mentally fit to stand trial. The criteria making up this test 
demonstrate that the accused must be able to fully understand and participate in the 
proceedings. The International Criminal Court and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon also 
have rules demonstrating that the accused’s presence at trial is made effective through his 
or her ability to understand the proceedings and freely participate in them.  International 
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criminal law accepts that the right to be present at trial requires more than just physical 
presence of the accused but that it also extends to the accused being able to understand 
and participate in trial.  
 The growing use of video technology allowing the accused to participate in trial 
without being physically present in the courtroom further demonstrates the importance of 
understanding and participation over mere presence.  Generally, international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals are willing to incorporate new 
technological approaches to trial into their legal procedure including innovative ways of 
allowing the accused to participate in trial via videoconferencing. This development lends 
meaning to the conclusion that the accused’s right to be present at trial is meant to protect 
his or her right to participate in trial, and is not limited to just requiring the physical 
presence of the accused. Some courts and tribunals still draw some distinction between an 
accused that is physically present in the courtroom and one appearing remotely, however, 
it has become increasingly clear that appearance via videoconferencing is most accurately 
described as an alternative form of presence rather than a type of absence.  This is likely 
because a remotely appearing accused can still understand and participate in the 
proceedings against him or her thus meeting the underlying purpose of the right to be 
present at trial.   	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Chapter 9: The Right to be Present since the  
Introduction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute 
 
 It is too soon to fully appreciate the significance of the inclusion of trials in 
absentia in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute.  However, one result of the 
decision to allow the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to hold trials in absentia is that it has 
freed other international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals to take a more 
nuanced approach to the accused’s right to be present at trial.  Since the introduction of 
the Special Tribunal’s Statute, two Tribunals possessing some international character, the 
International Crimes Tribunals in Bangladesh and the Extraordinary African Chambers, 
have begun operation, and a third Tribunal, the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, has opened 
although at the time of writing no indictments or arrest warrants have been issued. Draft 
Statutes for two other proposed Tribunals, the Syrian Extraordinary Tribunal and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, have been drafted 
although it is unlikely either Tribunal will ever be brought into existence. Of those five 
Statutes, three specifically authorise the use of trials in absentia, a fourth, the 
Extraordinary African Chambers, has generally required the accused to be present during 
trial, going so far as to force Hissène Habré into the courtroom; and the fifth, the 
Specialist Kosovo Chambers, has largely ruled out trial in absentia.  This suggests that 
the decision to hold trials in absentia at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon has made the 
practice more acceptable at other tribunals but that it has not become universal.  What 
remains in question is whether the use of trials in absentia at these new tribunals 
complies with international law. 
9.1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMES TRIBUNALS (BANGLADESH)  
 The International Crimes Tribunals have the most extensive practices related to 
trials in absentia of all of the tribunals established or proposed after the creation of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Although the International Crimes Tribunals are not 
strictly speaking international or internationalised tribunals, they do rely heavily on 
international criminal law when interpreting their statutory provisions relating to the right 
to be present. The first International Crimes Tribunal was established for the purpose of 
trying the alleged perpetrators of the genocide that took place in Bangladesh during its 
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war for liberation in 1971.1 Considered by some to be the most significant breach of 
human rights during a period of armed conflict since World War II, 8-10 million people 
were displaced during a nine-month period, anywhere from 269,000 to 3 million people 
were killed, and countless people were raped and otherwise injured.2 The International 
Crimes (Tribunals) Act was passed in 1973 in an effort to establish a tribunal that could 
try alleged perpetrators for a wide variety of crimes committed during the Bangladeshi 
liberation war; including crimes against humanity, crimes against peace, war crimes and 
genocide.3   This initial effort to encourage transitional justice in Bangladesh was 
abandoned, although the idea was resurrected in 2009 with the amendment of the 
International Crimes (Tribunals).4  The first Tribunal was established in 2010 pursuant to 
the Act, and a second one was introduced in 2012 to handle the high volume of cases.5 
 In 2012 the Act was amended again and Article 10(A) was added.  Article 10(A) 
specifically authorises the Tribunals to proceed in absentia against any accused believed 
to have absconded or hidden preventing him or her from being present during trial.6 The 
Tribunals’ Rules of Procedure and Evidence require that after the Tribunals take 
cognizance of an offence, they can fix a date and issue a warrant for appearance if 
deemed necessary.7  If the warrant for appearance cannot be served, the Tribunal will 
make an order that notice requesting the appearance of the accused be published in two 
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local newspapers, one in English and the other in Bangla.8  If the accused does not appear 
following the publication of the two notices, and the Tribunal has reason to believe that 
the accused has absconded or hidden so as to evade arrest, and there is no immediate 
prospect of arrest, then trial can take place in his or her absence.9  
 In Chief Prosecutor v Abul Kalam Azad, the second International Crimes Tribunal 
justified its decision to conduct trial in the defendant’s absence on the grounds that trials 
in absentia were now permissible under international criminal law.  It interpreted the 
inclusion of the trial in absentia provision in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute 
as a reversal of United Nations’ policy on the issue.10  It is significant that the second 
International Crimes Tribunal interpreted the decision to allow trials in absentia at the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon as a policy of the United Nations, because the subsequent 
practice of the International Crimes Tribunal appears designed to comply with that 
perceived policy.  However, in so doing, the Second International Crimes Tribunal failed 
to recognise the interconnectedness of the different provisions in the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon’s Statute. This led the Second International Crimes Tribunal to develop of a 
system where the accused can be tried in his or her absence, with little evidence required 
to show that he or she was aware of the proceedings, and that does not grant the accused 
a right to a retrial if he or she later comes under the control of the tribunal. Therefore, 
even to the extent that the International Crimes Tribunals regards Article 22 of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute as representative of United Nations’ policy, its 
approach to the right to be present does not meet the requirements of Article 22. 
 In particular, the International Crimes Tribunals failed to take the necessary steps 
to ensure that the accused had notice of the date and location of trial.  While this mirrors 
a similar issue faced by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon when it omitted the date and 
location of trial from the advertisements aimed at encouraging the Ayyash and Merhi 
defendants to participate in trial, the two situations are factually distinct.  The Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon decided to try the accused in absentia more than two years before 
the trial commenced and the date and location of trial were heavily publicized in the 
Lebanese press once they were determined. This gave the defendants the opportunity to 
learn the date and location of trial well in advance of its start and allowed them to make 	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an informed decision about whether they wished to attend.  By contrast, the notice 
informing Abul Kalam Azad that the International Crimes Tribunals intended to proceed 
in his absence was published on 25 October 2012 with trial beginning just ten days later 
on 4 November 2012.11  This was not a sufficient amount of time to properly notify Azad 
of the date and location of trial, particularly in light of the fact that the notices were only 
published in two Bangladeshi newspapers and he was thought to be living in either India 
or Pakistan.12 
 That the notices were not a genuine attempt to inform Azad of the proceedings is 
further supported by the fact that they were only published on one day and in only two 
different newspapers, both of which are directed at an audience within Bangladesh. The 
jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee requires a court to make ‘all due efforts’ 
to notify the accused of the charges he or she faces before commencing with trial in 
absentia.13 The approach taken by the International Crimes Tribunals to notification by 
publication does not appear to constitute all due efforts, particularly when compared to 
the efforts made by International Military Tribunal and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
when each body used publication to provide the accused with notice. When attempting to 
give Martin Bormann notice about the charges against him and its intention to proceed in 
his absence, the International Military required that a notice be read over the radio once a 
week for four weeks and also had a written notice published in the newspaper in his 
hometown every week for four weeks.14  The Special Tribunal for Lebanon confronted 
this issue by publishing written notices directed at the four defendants in the Ayyash case 
in five different newspapers and three different languages.15 With regard to the fifth 
defendant, Merhi, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon again published print notices and also 
issued an audio recording inviting Merhi to participate in the proceedings.16  
 The relative reach of the publications used by the International Crimes Tribunals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid at paras 20-1. 
12 Ibid at para 20. 
13 Mbenge v Zaire Comm No 16/1977 (25 March 1983) para 14.2; Osiyuk v Belarus, 
Comm No 1311/2004 (30 July 2009) para 8.2. 
14  Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, 
Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 - 1 October 1946, vol 1 (1947) 102-3. 
15 Prosecutor v Ayyash et al. (Order to Seize the Trial Chamber Pursuant to Rule 
105bis(a) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence to Determine Whether to Initiate 
Proceedings in Absentia) STL-11-01/I, PT Ch (17 October 2011) para 12. 
16 Prosecutor v Merhi (Decision to Hold Trial in Absentia) STL-13-04/I/TC, T Ch (20 
December 2013) para 39. 
	   240 
lends credence to the notion that the Tribunal was making nothing more than a cursory 
effort to inform the accused.  In both the Azad case, and the Khan and Uddin case, 
Tribunal Two was aware that the accused were not in Bangladesh when the notices were 
published, and therefore also knew that the notices would be largely ineffectual.  In fact, 
in the latter case, not only were Khan and Uddin not in Bangladesh, the Tribunal was 
aware that both had left the country in 1971 immediately after the war ended.17 This leads 
to the conclusion that the purpose of the notices was not to inform the accused of the date 
and place of trial and the charges against them, but instead, were published in order to 
comply with the rules of procedure and to give the illusion that the right to be present was 
being observed. This conclusion is supported by the Human Rights Committee’s 
disapproval of the court’s failure in Mbenge to serve the accused with notice of the trial 
when the court knew he was residing in Belgium and had notice of his address.18 There is 
no real purpose to publishing a notification directed at the accused and informing him or 
her of the date and time of trial and the charges if it is done without any reasonable 
expectation that it might actually notify the accused. Notice provided in this way is done 
to create the impression that a subsequent trial in absentia is conducted with the 
accused’s tacit assent that trial can proceed without him or her.  This type of notice is 
insufficient and does not adequately protect the accused’s right to be present at trial. 
 One difficulty when evaluating whether the Bangladeshi authorities made all due 
efforts to inform the accused of the charges is that the judgments of the International 
Crimes Tribunals fail to detail what efforts were actually made.  In the Azad case, the 
judgment of the Second International Crimes Tribunal does not discuss the efforts taken 
by the police to locate Azad before returning to the Tribunal with the unexecuted warrant. 
The Second Tribunal allowed the police’s unsupported statement that Azad had 
absconded and left the country to suffice as proof that the warrant could not be served.19 
It also found that Azad had fled Bangladesh in an effort to avoid being arrested without 
offering any explanation as to how it reached that conclusion.20  No evidence was cited to 
indicate whether any attempt was made to actually look for Azad so that the warrant 
could actually be served. Based on these facts, it is difficult to determine whether all due 
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efforts were made to notify Azad that he was the subject of prosecution as the Second 
Tribunal failed to record what efforts, if any, were made. 
 In fact, decisions issued by both Tribunals do not sufficiently identify those 
efforts made to notify the accused before deciding to proceed in absentia.  In the cases of 
Chief Prosecutor v Hossain et al., Chief Prosecutor v Hoque et al. and Chief Prosecutor 
v Ahmed et al., the First International Crimes Tribunal brought charges against 22 
individuals, 16 of whom were ultimately tried in absentia.21 In each case, the First 
Tribunal simply stated that the absent accused could not be arrested and that they did not 
voluntarily surrender.22  No indication is given in any of the decisions of the International 
Crimes Tribunals as to whether any attempts were made to actually arrest any of the 
absent accused, despite the fact that at least some of the accused were known to be in 
Bangladesh.  Once again, the International Crimes Tribunals appears to have taken the 
obligatory step of issuing the warrants without making any real effort to execute them. 
This lends credibility to the notion that the International Crimes Tribunals were trying to 
demonstrate their compliance with the procedural rules pertaining to the accused’s 
presence at trial without making any substantive effort to actually comply with those 
rules.   
 The International Crimes Tribunals’ failure to properly notify the accused before 
agreeing to conduct a trial in absentia is further compounded by a lack of evidence to 
support a finding that the accused, through their behaviour, adequately waived their right 
to be present.  In both Azad and Khan and Uddin, the International Crimes Tribunals 
found that the accused’s decisions to leave Bangladesh indicates that they have 
absconded or concealed themselves so as to avoid standing trial. The Azad Court defined 
an absconding defendant as one who “refuses to appear after an initial appearance.”23 The 
defendants in both cases cannot be described as absconding as none of them ever 
appeared before the International Crimes Tribunals. Therefore, the Second Tribunal must 
have been proceeding on the basis that the accused had concealed themselves to avoid 
being tried.  In Azad’s case, there is evidence to suggest that he fled Bangladesh several 	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hours before the arrest warrant was issued, permitting a supposition that his decision to 
leave the country was tied to his imminent arrest.24  If such a supposition is correct, the 
Second Tribunal could properly imply an unequivocal waiver of Azad’s right to be 
present on the basis of the European Court of Human Rights’ finding that an accused’s 
efforts to allude arrest after learning about the proceedings against him or her through 
unofficial channels constitutes a sufficiently unequivocal action to permit the finding of a 
waiver.25   
 The same cannot be said of Khan and Uddin’s decision to leave Bangladesh.  
Both men left Bangladesh in 1971, decades before the arrest warrants were issued against 
them, making it impossible to find that their decision to leave was predicated on avoiding 
prosecution for these particular charges. In fact, as there was no legal liability for the 
crimes alleged against Khan and Uddin until the introduction of the International Crimes 
(Tribunals) Act in 1973, there is no support for the argument that their decision to leave 
Bangladesh bore any relationship to possible future criminal prosecution. The same is 
true of the absent defendants in several other cases.  
 It is also difficult to suggest that Khan and Uddin were hidden; the International 
Crimes Tribunals knew their addresses and included them in the Decision on Charge 
Framing.26  Further, even if one were to conclude that Khan and Uddin were hidden, the 
act of hiding is not, in and of itself, sufficient to find that the accused may be tried in his 
or her absence.  The Statute also requires that the hiding be done with the intention of 
preventing the arrest and prosecution of the accused. Because there was no possibility of 
prosecution at the time Khan and Uddin their alleged hiding cannot be described as being 
done for the purpose of avoiding arrest and prosecution. The Second Tribunal failed to 
consider any of this, instead relying on the general assertion that there were reasons to 
believe that the accused had absconded or concealed themselves so that they could not be 
arrested or produced for trial.27 This sort of generalised finding is not adequate as it fails 
to demonstrate that the International Crimes Tribunals gave anything more than cursory 
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consideration to the issue.  Ensuring that the procedural and substantive requirements 
have been fulfilled before deciding to proceed in the accused’s absence is necessary to 
guarantee that the accused has been able to effectively exercise his or her rights.  
Procedures that derogate from those requirements raise significant doubts about the 
overall fairness of the trial. 
 The International Crimes Tribunals’ approach to notice and waiver might be 
remedied if it were to allow an accused convicted in absentia to be retried after coming 
under the control of the Tribunal.  The jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee, 
the European Court of Human Rights and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and 
numerous commentators all agree that a person tried in his or her absence should 
generally be granted a retrial in his or her presence before enforcing the sentence 
resulting from the original in absentia trial.28  The European Court of Human Rights has 
found some exceptions to this rule and does not require a mandatory retrial when the 
accused’s absence was the result of an unequivocal waiver of the right to be present or if 
it was the result of an intentional effort to avoid justice.29 The practice of the International 
Crimes Tribunals to enforce punishment without providing the possibility for a retrial 
might accord with international criminal law if either of these exceptions is shown to be 
applicable.  However, the evidence available does not support a finding that those 
accused tried in absentia had either unequivocally waived his or her right to be present or 
that their absences were the result of an intentional attempt to evade trial. Therefore, the 
International Crimes Tribunals’ failure to provide a retrial to those defendants convicted 	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in absentia does not comply, with international criminal law.  The Tribunals’ refusal to 
grant a right to retrial is particularly troubling because the Tribunals have regularly 
sentenced people convicted in their absence to death.  Of the 19 people tried in absentia 
by the International Crimes Tribunals, nine have been sentenced to death, and in each 
case the sentence is to be carried out upon their arrest or surrender to the International 
Crimes Tribunals. The International Crimes Tribunals’ unwillingness to permit the 
accused to appeal a death sentence imposed in his or her absence, or to allow the accused 
to seek a pardon or commutation of the sentence, not only violates the right to be present 
at trial but also the right to life.30 
 The International Crimes Tribunals has chosen to rely on those portions of 
international criminal law that justify its decisions to conduct trials in absentia without 
taking notice of the limitations on those provisions. They permit trial in absentia without 
proper notice and dispenses with the need to establish an unequivocal waiver of the right 
to be present.  They allow punishment to be carried out on the basis of an in absentia 
conviction without any corresponding requirement that an accused convicted in absentia 
have access to a retrial.  They have fashioned a system, allegedly based on accepted rules 
of international criminal law, that can result in an inadequately informed accused, who 
never unequivocally waived his or her right to be present, being executed without ever 
having a chance to be heard.  These practices are antithetical to the underlying purpose of 
the right to be present as it denies the accused the opportunity to make an informed 
decision about whether he or she wishes to appear at trial and they fail to give the 
accused an opportunity to have a new determination of the charges against them. 
9.2  EXTRAORDINARY AFRICAN CHAMBERS  
 The Extraordinary African Chambers have taken a completely different approach 
to the accused’s right to be present at trial.  The Extraordinary African Chambers were 
created as the result of an agreement between the African Union and Senegal to try 
Hissène Habré, the former president of Chad, for human rights abuses committed during 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR)  at art 6; see also United 
Nations Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 6: Article 6 (Right to 
Life) (30 April 1982) U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 6 (1982); United Nations 
Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1984/50 (25 May 1984). 
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his leadership between 1982 and 1990.31 The Extraordinary African Chambers were 
formed after years of negotiations and legal bickering that was only resolved following a 
decision of the International Court of Justice.32  Although the Extraordinary African 
Chambers are characterised as an international legal body, it is felt by many that they are 
only international to the extent necessary to comply with an earlier ruling of the Court of 
the Economic Community of Western African States mandating that Habré be tried by a 
special ad hoc tribunal with an international character.33  The Extraordinary African 
Chambers is described as being more akin to a national court seeking international 
assistance, financing and training, but not possessing the character of other 
internationalized courts and tribunals.34 
 Despite the scepticism about the degree to which the Extraordinary African 
Chambers are actually international, their Statute reflects an international criminal law 
approach to the fair trial rights of the accused. Article 21(3)(d) of the Statute emulates the 
fair trial provisions found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals and it contains the familiar provision that the accused 
is entitled to the minimum guarantee “[t]o be present at his or her trial.”35 The procedural 
rules at the Extraordinary African Chambers not limited to those found in the Statute but 
can also be decided through the application of the Senegalese Code of Criminal 
Procedure.36 This is significant because the Senegalese Code of Criminal Procedure 
approaches the accused’s presence at trial differently from international criminal law.  
 Habré’s trial began on 20 July 2015, with Habré present in the courtroom. His 
appearance was achieved through the use of force and would be short lived, as he was 
removed from the courtroom for being disruptive before the trial could actually 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Konstantinos D. Magliveras, ‘Fighting Impunity Unsuccessfully in Africa: A Critique 
of the African Union’s Handling of the Hissène Habré Affair (2014) 22 Afr J Intl & 
Comp L 420, 422; Reed Brody, ‘Bringing a Dictator to Justice: The Case of Hissène 
Habré’ (2015) 13 JICJ 209, 209. 
32 Questions Relating To The Obligation To Prosecute Or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) 
(Judgment) I.C.J. Reports 2012 at para 122; see also Sarah Williams, ‘The Extraordinary 
African Chambers in the Senegalese Courts: Cases Before International Tribunals: An 
African Solution to an African Problem?’ (2013) 11(5) JICJ 1139, 1143-44. 
33 Emanuele Cimiotta, ‘The First Steps of the Extraordinary African Chambers’ (2015) 13 
JICJ 177, 183; Brody supra note 31 at 212-13; Williams supra note 32 at 1150. 
34 Williams supra note 32 at 1147. 
35 Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers within the Senegalese judicial system 
for the prosecution of international crimes committed on the territory of the Republic of 
Chad during the period from 7 June 1982 to 1 December 1990 (2013) art 21(3)(d). 
36 Ibid at art 17(1). 
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commence. 37 Habré was forced into the courtroom again the following day.38  Trial was 
then suspended for 45 days and when it resumed Habré had to be carried into the 
courtroom by masked security guards and he was forcibly restrained following his 
attempts to disrupt the proceedings.39 The trial continued in Habré’s forced presence until 
its conclusion on February 2016. 
 The approach of the Extraordinary African Chambers to the accused’s right to be 
present stands in stark contrast to the practices of most other international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals. The Extraordinary African Chambers’ 
decision to force Habré to attend trial suggests that it understands presence at trial as a 
duty to be imposed on the accused and not as a right that can be exercised by the accused.  
Compelling the accused’s attendance by force can also be explained through the 
application of Senegalese law.  Article 356 of the Code de Procédure Pénale Sénégalais 
authorises the use of trial in absentia, but only against those absent defendants that are 
not in detention.40 Senegalese law does not contain any procedure that permits an accused 
in custody to be tried in his or her absence, and therefore an accused in custody is not 
afforded the ability to waive his or her right to be present.  In fact, Senegalese law 
authorises the court to issue an order whereby an absent accused can be brought to trial 
by force.41  The natural outcome of this is to require the attendance at trial of an 
incarcerated accused, and to use force to compel that attendance if he or she refuses to 
appear of his or her own free will. 
 Although the Statute specifically permits the Extraordinary African Chambers to 
follow Senegalese Criminal Procedure, it may only do so if the issue being decided is not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Diadie Ba and Daniel Flynn, ‘Chad’s Habré Forced to Appear for Start of Trial in 
Senegal’, Reuters (20 July 2015) < http://news.trust.org//item/20150720085841-
7ft7g/?source=jtOtherNews2>  accessed 3 July 2017; ‘Chad's Hissene Habre removed 
from Senegal court’, BBC News (20 July 2015) < http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
news/world-africa-33592142> accessed 3 July 2017. 
38 Thierry Cruvellier, ‘For Hissène Hibré, a Trial by Refusal’, The New York Times (27 
July 2015) < https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/28/opinion/for-hissene-habre-a-trial-by-
refusal.html> accessed 3 July 2017. 
39 Daniel Flynn and Emma Farge, ‘Former Chadian Leader Carried into Senegal Court for 
Trial’, Reuters (7 September 2015) < http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-senegal-justice-
habre-idUKKCN0R71DP20150907> accessed 3 July 2017. 
40 Code of Criminal Procedure, Senegal (21 July 1965) art 356 (translated from the 
French by the author). 
41 Law No 2014-28 of 3 November 2014 Modifying Law No 065-61 of 21 July 1965 
about the Code of Criminal Procedure, National Assembly of the Republic of Senegal (3 
November 2014) art 275. 
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addressed in the Statute. Therefore, before there can be any recourse to Senegalese 
Criminal Procedure, a determination has to be made that the issue under consideration is 
not addressed in the Statute. There is no guidance as to what degree of specificity is 
necessary when deciding whether an issue is, or is not, covered by the Statute. In the case 
of presence at trial, it could be argued that the minimum guarantee contained in Article 
21(3)(d) is sufficient to support a finding that presence at trial is discussed in the Statute 
and that issues relating to presence cannot be addressed through the application of 
Senegalese Law. Such a finding raises the question of whether the Statute satisfactorily 
addresses presence at trial or whether its provisions are too vague, necessitating recourse 
to Senegalese procedure to give meaning to either the right or the duty to be present. By 
contrast, one could argue that the Statute only discusses the right to be present at trial and 
fails to address whether there is a duty to be present. If that is the case, the Senegalese 
Code of Criminal Procedure should control any decisions regarding the duty to be present 
as it is an issue about which the Statute is silent.  The Extraordinary African Chambers’ 
actions suggest that it did not feel that the issue was adequately addressed in the Statute 
thus compelling recourse to Senegalese criminal procedure.  
 The Extraordinary African Chambers also had an interesting approach to Habré’s 
repeated disruptions during the trial. On the first day of trial he was removed from the 
courtroom and trial was continued in his absence.  This was in keeping with the common 
practice in international criminal law when dealing with a disruptive accused.  However, 
the Extraordinary African Chambers abandoned that practice after the first day and 
instead chose to restrain Habré in the courtroom following any subsequent disruptions. 
While this approach heeds Michael Scharf’s warning that courts and tribunals should be 
cautious before excluding a disruptive accused, using force to minimise Habré’s 
disruptions is most likely outside of the scope of permissible behaviour.42  International 
and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals are typically authorised to remove a 
disruptive accused from the courtroom and continue trial in his or her absence and there 
are no instances of force being employed to restrain a disruptive accused so that he or she 
can continue to be physically present in the courtroom.43 The Statute of the Extraordinary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Michael P. Scharf, ‘Lessons from the Saddam Trial: Chaos in the Courtroom: 
Controlling Disruptive Defendants and Contumacious Counsel in War Crimes Trials’ 
(2007) 39 Case W Res J Intl L 155, 167-68. 
43 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) art 63(2); Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (as amended 8 
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African Chambers and the Code de Procédure Pénale Sénégalais as originally written, 
also do not contain explicit provisions addressing how the Extraordinary African 
Chambers should deal with a disruptive accused.  However, the Code de Procédure 
Pénale Sénégalais was modified in November 2014 and new provisions were added 
directly addressing how the court should treat a disruptive accused. Article 278 of the 
Amendment specifically states that any person disrupting the trial should be removed 
from the courtroom, and Article 279 extends the application of that rule to the accused.44  
Therefore, the appropriate procedure under Senegalese law was to remove Habré from 
the courtroom rather than to physically restrain him and force him to remain present.  
This is further confirmed through reference to Article 274, which restricts the function of 
the guards in the courtroom to preventing the accused from escaping and does not 
authorise them to physically restraining a disruptive accused.45  There was no legal basis 
for the Extraordinary African Chambers to allow the forcible restraint of Habré during his 
disruptions. 
 Of all the international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals, the 
Extraordinary African Chambers has been the most aggressive in requiring the accused to 
conform to a duty to appear at trial.  This was best demonstrated through the decision to 
use physical force to bring Habré to the courtroom and to restrain him while in the 
courtroom to prevent him from disrupting trial. While there may be some justification for 
bringing Habré to the courtroom by force under Senegalese law, there is no identifiable 
domestic or international criminal law basis for restraining him while in the courtroom. 
The absence of an explicit authorisation supporting its approach to forcing Habré’s to 
remain in the courtroom should have led the Extraordinary African Chambers to pursue 
less aggressive measures more in keeping with international and domestic law. 
9.3 KOSOVO SPECIALIST CHAMBERS 
 The Kosovo Specialist Chambers has its own approach to the accused’s right to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
July 2015) rule 80; Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for 
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be present at trial.  The Specialist Chambers were established to “ensure secure, 
independent, impartial, fair and efficient criminal proceedings” committed during and 
after the conflict in Kosovo between 1998 and 2000.46  They resulted out of an 
investigation conducted by the Special Investigative Task Force, an entity formed with 
the specific purpose to study alleged crimes committed in Kosovo between 1998 and 
2000.  The Special Investigative Task Force concluded that sufficient evidence existed to 
indict former senior members of the Kosovo Liberation Army for crimes of persecution, 
sexual violence and ethnic cleansing because these alleged crimes were not the acts of 
rogue individuals but were organised and sanctioned by senior members of the military.47   
 The Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, adopted by 
the Kosovar Parliament on 3 August 2015, governs the Kosovo Specialist Chambers.  
Article 21 of the law is largely modelled on Article 14 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and sets out the same minimum guarantee that the accused 
“shall be tried in his or her presence”.48  It does not contain any mention of trial in 
absentia, suggesting that trial will generally take place in the accused’s presence. The 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide some nuance to this position, and clarify that 
trial in absentia will only be permitted if the accused is in custody and refuses to appear 
or where he or she is too ill to attend trial.49 In the latter situation the Trial Chamber is 
under a duty to make provisions for the accused to follow the proceedings, and instruct 
counsel, from outside the courtroom.50 The Specialist Chambers’ approach to the right to 
be present is more similar to the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals than it is to more 
contemporary Statutes.  This similarity to the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia’s Statute may be a politically motivated decision to provide the 
accused at the Kosovo Specialist Chambers with similar rights to those provided to the 
defendants at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia so as to 
avoid any suggestion that the accused at the former are being treated differently than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (3 August 2015) arts 1 
and 7. 
47 Clint Williamson, Statement of the Chief Prosecutor of the Special Investigative Task 
Force (29 July 2014) 2 < http://sitf.eu/index.php/en/news-other/42-statement-by-the-
chief-prosecutor-clint-williamson> accessed 3 July 2017.  
48 Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office supra note 45 at art 
21(3)(e). 
49 Rules of Procedure and Evidence Before the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (28 March 
2017) rule 65. 
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those at the latter.   
 Despite this somewhat dated approach to the accused’s right to be present, the 
Law on Specialist Chambers takes a very modern approach to permitting the accused to 
appear at trial through the use of video technology.  Article 41(12) of the Law sets out the 
measures the Specialist Chambers is permitted to take to ensure the presence of the 
accused at trial. Article 41(12) permits the accused to attend trial via videoconferencing 
from Kosovo in four different situations.51 They are: (1) when the accused is released on 
bail in Kosovo; (2) when the accused is under house arrest in Kosovo; (3) when the 
accused promises not to leave his or her place of residence; and (4) when the accused 
attends trial at a police station or other venue in Kosovo.52 In each instance the accused 
must consent to attending trial via videoconferencing before the Specialist Chambers will 
allow it.53  
 The way the Law on the Specialist Chambers is written indicates that remote 
appearance is viewed as an alternative form of appearance rather than a type of absence.  
The conditions under which an accused can appear via videoconferencing are not listed 
amongst the situations giving rise to a trial in absentia. Therefore, a trial is not in 
absentia if the accused is appearing by video-link. This is very much in keeping with the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s approach to videoconferencing as its Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence also distinguish a remotely appearing accused from one being tried in 
absentia. Approaching video participation in this way supports the position that an 
accused is present for trial so long as he or she can understand and participate in the 
proceedings and does not depend on the physical location of the accused. 
9.4  PROPOSED TRIBUNALS 
 Two additional tribunals, the Syrian Extraordinary Tribunal and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, have been proposed, but not 
established, since the introduction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute. The 
Statutes drafted for each Tribunal both contain provisions authorising trial in absentia.  
Both of these provisions borrow heavily from Article 22 of the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon, and in the case of the Syrian Extraordinary Tribunal, copied the Special 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office supra note 46 at art 
41(12). 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
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Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute verbatim.  
 It is unlikely that either The Syrian Extraordinary Tribunal or the Flight MH17 
Tribunal will ever come into being, particularly as both will probably necessitate bringing 
charges against high ranking Russian officials, and the Syrian Extraordinary Tribunal 
could also very well result in American and British officials being charged. The probable 
indictment of citizens of permanent Security Council member states suggests that any 
effort to create either Tribunal will be vetoed by one or all of these permanent members.  
This was borne out when Russia vetoed a draft resolution to establish an ad hoc criminal 
tribunal addressing the downing of flight MH17 and another to refer human rights 
violations allegedly committed during the Syrian War to the International Criminal 
Court.54 Although the latter draft resolution did not involve the establishment of an ad 
hoc tribunal, Russia’s veto of the measure can be interpreted as opposition to any solution 
involving an international or internationalised criminal court or tribunal.  
 9.4.1 THE SYRIAN EXTRAORDINARY TRIBUNAL 	  
 While these are only draft statutes, and unlikely to be enacted, they remain 
significant as a reflection of how the world legal community currently regards the 
permissibility of trials in absentia. The draft statute for the Syrian Extraordinary 
Tribunal, developed out of an on-going discussion of a group of international criminal 
law experts, is an effort to propose “the structure, mandate and functioning” of a possible 
future tribunal designed to prosecute those most responsible for atrocity crimes 
committed during the war in Syria.55  Article 26 of the Syrian Draft Statute follows 
Article 22 of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute almost exactly, and as such, 
specifically authorises the use of trial in absentia.56 
 Interestingly, when addressing trial in absentia in the Annex appended to the 
Statute, the drafters express a much broader right to retrial than that found in the text of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Provisional Transcript, 7198th Meeting, United Nations Security Council, Doc. No. 
S/PV.7198 (29 July 2015), p. 4; Provisional Transcript, 7180th Meeting, United Nations 
Security Council, Doc. No. S/PV.7180 (22 May 2014) 4. 
55 The Chautauqua Blueprint for a Statute for a Syrian Extraordinary Tribunal to 
Prosecute Atrocity Crimes (27 August 2013) 1 < http://www.publicinternational 
lawandpolicygroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Chautauqua-Blueprint-2014.pdf> 
accessed 3 July 2017. 
56 Draft Statute For A Syrian [Extraordinary][Special] Tribunal To Prosecute Atrocity 
Crimes (27 August 2014) art 26 and footnote 36.  
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the draft Statute.57 The Annex suggests that retrial should be consistent with Syrian law, 
which permits the retrial of any accused that finds him or herself in custody in Syria.58 
However, that rule does not apply to all crimes in Syria. Bashar al Assad partially 
abrogated the right to retrial in a decree establishing a Counter-Terrorism Court with 
jurisdiction over alleged acts involving terrorism.  In his decree, Assad announced that 
any person convicted in absentia by the Counter-Terrorism Court would only receive a 
retrial if he or she voluntarily surrendered to the authorities.59 In the Annex appended to 
the Syrian Draft Statute, the drafters indicate that the proposed Tribunal should be able to 
conduct trials in absentia to address fears that some of the worst alleged perpetrators 
would avoid prosecution by fleeing Syria following the war.60  The annex does not 
address what purpose is served by conducting trial in absentia other than to prosecute 
those alleged perpetrators who flee Syria following the war.  
 9.4.2 THE MH17 TRIBUNAL 	  
 By contrast, the draft Statute for the proposed tribunal to prosecute those involved 
in the downing of Flight MH17 approaches trial in absentia somewhat differently than 
the proposed Syrian Tribunal.  The MH17 Tribunal also uses Article 22 of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute as a starting point, but omits some portions of that Statute 
from its own Statute.  Unlike Article 22 of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute, 
Article 38(1) of the proposed MH17 statute contains two, and not three, grounds upon 
which a trial in absentia may be conducted.  Gone is the provision that a trial in absentia 
can be conducted if the accused has expressly and in writing waived his or her right to be 
present.61 This leaves two situations in which a trial in absentia can occur; where the 
accused has not been turned over to the Tribunal by the state in which he or she is located 
and where the accused has absconded and all reasonable steps have been taken to secure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 ‘Annex: Discussion Of Questions Related To An Extraordinary Tribunal For Syrian 
Atrocity Crimes’, Draft Statute For A Syrian [Extraordinary] [Special] Tribunal To 
Prosecute Atrocity Crimes (27 August 2014) para 14.  
<http://www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/01/Chau
tauqua-Blueprint-2014.pdf> accessed 3 July 2017. 
58 Ibid; see also Code of Criminal Procedure, Syria (1950) art 251. 
59 Decree 22 issued by Bashar al Assad, Syria (26 July 2012) art 6 <https://www.global-
regulation.com/translation/syria/3371574/law-22-of-2012-juvenile-court-to-look-into-
cases-of-terrorism-based-in-damascus.html> accessed 3 July 2017. 
60 Annex supra note 56 at para 14.  
61 Draft Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 
(19 June 2015) art 38. 
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his or her appearance and inform him or her of the charges.  
 The decision to allow trials in absentia at the proposed Flight MH17 Tribunal has 
been interpreted as an attempt to create a system able to overcome the expected 
challenges of gaining custody over the anticipated accused.62  This is a plausible theory, 
particularly in light of Russia’s predicted lack of cooperation with the Tribunal.  
Concerns over the Tribunal’s inability to gain custody over the accused is also likely 
behind the decision not to include explicit waiver of the right to be present as an instance 
in which a trial in absentia can be conducted.  This decision may appear anomalous when 
compared to the regular practice in international criminal law however, the decision must 
be understood in the appropriate context.   
 First, it should be considered in light of a decision made by Trial Chamber V(A) 
of the International Criminal Court in Ruto et al.  There, the court found that it may not 
be in the interests of justice for the accused to waive his or her right to be present for the 
entirety of trial.63 The Trial Chamber grounded its decision in the notion that the victims 
have an interest in trial taking place in the accused’s presence.64 This decision suggests 
that international criminal law disapproves of waivers of the right to be present that act to 
allow the accused to be absent from the entire trial. Second, by refusing to try individuals 
that explicitly waived his or her right to be present, the MH17 Tribunal may be trying to 
avoid a situation in which the accused will simply waive their right to be present and 
allow the trial in absentia to take place without any concern for the consequences.  In this 
scenario, the accused declines to participate in trial because he or she anticipates that 
national governments refusing to support the work of the Tribunal will protect the 
accused from any consequences that might result from the trial.  This is somewhat akin to 
the concerns expressed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Case of 
Valle Jaramillo et al. v Colombia and can be seen as another form of impunity making a 
mockery of international criminal justice. 
 Article 38(1) also states that a trial in absentia may not be conducted against an 
accused that waives his or her right to retrial. It also does not allow for the automatic 
retrial of an accused whose absence is the result of a waiver of the right to be present.  At 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Sarah Williams, ‘MH17 and the International Criminal Court: A Suitable Venue?’ 
(2016) 17 Melbourne J Intl L 210, 225-26. 
63 Prosecutor v Ruto et al. (Reasons for the Decision on Excusal from Presence at Trial 
under Rule 134quater) ICC-01/09-01/11, T Ch V(A) (18 February 2014) para 74.  
64 Ibid at paras 73-4. 
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the proposed Tribunal an accused tried in absentia is entitled to a retrial unless he or she 
accepts the tribunal’s judgment or if her or she expressly and unequivocally waived his or 
right to be present at trial.65 This accords with the rules set out by the European Court of 
Human Rights when determining the necessity of a retrial.  However, the proposed 
tribunal and the European Court of Human Rights diverge to the extent that the European 
Court considers a trial conducted following the accused’s waiver of the right to be present 
to be a valid form of trial in absentia while the proposed tribunal does not.  The inclusion 
of trials conducted in the absence of the accused following a waiver of the right to be 
present in Article 38(3), and its omission from subsection 1, suggests the accused’s 
decision to waive his or her right to be present may not give rise to a trial in absentia.  It 
is clearly not a basis for a trial in absentia under Article 38(1), and it does not create a 
right to retrial under Article 38(3), like other sorts of trials in absentia.  From that it can 
be extrapolated that the proposed Tribunal assigns some other status to trials that take 
place as the result of a waiver. It is possible that the Statute’s drafters feel that the 
accused’s waiver of his or her right to be present means trial may proceed as normal and 
not be considered an in absentia proceeding. 
 The MH17 Tribunal’s Draft Statute also indicates that those accused receiving 
notification about the trial via publication are entitled to an automatic retrial.  Under the 
Statute, whether an accused waiving his or her right to be present is entitled to a retrial 
turns on the accused’s waiver being expressed and unequivocal.  The requirement that the 
waiver be expressed eliminates any form of implicit waiver, including waiver assumed 
following notification by publication, from preventing the accused from accessing a 
retrial. This suggests that the Tribunal is not emphasising the act of waiver when 
determining whether the accused is entitled to a retrial, but instead is trying to assess the 
degree of the accused’s knowledge about the practicalities of trial and the charges against 
him or her before allowing a retrial.  Instead of creating a new category of absence, it is 
more likely that the proposed MH17 Tribunal wants to avoid denying the right to retrial 
to any accused that may not have known about the trial.  Conversely, those that positively 
did know about the trial, and refused to participate, are forced to bear the burden of that 
decision and are not accorded the possibility of a reassessment of the evidence against 
them. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Draft Statute MH17 Tribunal supra note 69 at art 38(3).  
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9.5 CONCLUSION 
  Prior to the introduction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon Statute, all of the 
Statutes of international or internationalised criminal courts and tribunals identified the 
accused’s presence at trial as one of the minimum guarantees of a fair trial.  In fact, other 
than the International Criminal Court’s Statute, the statutes of all of the other courts and 
tribunals contained essentially the same clause, borrowed from the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, concerning the accused’s right to be present at 
trial. That all changed after the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute was introduced. 
The five international or internationalised courts or tribunals that have been established or 
proposed since the Special Tribunal for Lebanon have taken a more nuanced approach to 
the accused’s presence at trial and have sought to draft provisions designed to work in 
their own particular contexts.  This demonstrates that the strict adherence to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights approach to presence at trial is 
diminishing in favour of adopting practices that respect the interests of the accused while 
also fulfilling the needs of other trial participants. 
 It is encouraging that new international and internationalised criminal courts and 
tribunals are taking creative approaches to the accused’s right to be present, but it is 
essential that they do not use the inclusion of trials in absentia in the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon’s Statute as a blanket justification for holding trials in absentia of their own. As 
the International Crimes Tribunals in Bangladesh have demonstrated, trials in absentia 
conducted without the appropriate safeguards lead to suspect trials that do not comply 
with international law.  That being said, courts and tribunals should not err too far on the 
side of requiring presence at trial.  By using force to ensure Haber’s presence in the 
courtroom during trial, the Extraordinary African Chambers guaranteed that there were 
no questions about whether his right to be present was being respected.  However, the 
Extraordinary African Chambers’ use of force violated other rights held by Habré, 
particularly as the type of force used to keep him in the courtroom may not be authorised 
by international or domestic laws. 
 The right to be present at trial dictates that there must be adequate notice and 
unequivocal waiver before a trial in absentia can be conducted.  The necessity of these 
two components is reinforced in the statutes and practices of the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon and the others that have emerged in its wake. It is only when courts fail to pay 
adequate attention to notice and waiver that the validity of trials in absentia is called into 
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question. This problem is exacerbated when courts and tribunals do not permit the 
unconditional retrial of the accused after he or she comes under the control of the court.  
It is through retrial that any taint associated with lack of notice or insufficient waiver can 
be removed. The Statutes of the proposed Syrian and MH17 Tribunals seem to 
understand the importance of notice and waiver and the essential part both play in 
ensuring that trials are seen as being fair. Hopefully, those courts and tribunals yet to be 
established will also understand this and ensure that their statutes will include safeguards 
sufficient to protect against the infringement of the accused’s right to be present at trial.  
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
 
 The accused’s right to be present at trial is an ancient right dating back at least to 
the first millennium BCE in what is now modern day Israel.1  Its incorporation into 
international human rights law occurred more recently with the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights containing the first explicit reference to the right found in an 
international convention or statute.2  Thereafter, the right to be present was included in a 
number of regional human rights conventions and is explicitly set out in the Statute of 
every international or internationalised criminal court or tribunal introduced since 1993.  
 The right to be present at trial can generally by defined as follows: any person 
accused of a crime falling under the jurisdiction of an international or internationalised 
criminal court or tribunal has the right to understand and participate in the proceedings 
against them.  That right entitles the accused to participate in the trial and imposes a 
corresponding duty on the court with jurisdiction over the matter from preventing the 
accused from participating in the trial if he or she wishes. The right to be present at trial 
is not absolute and it does not preclude trial from continuing without the accused if he or 
she does not want to be present.  There is also a growing recognition that the accused has 
a duty to be present at trial that exists alongside the right to be present.  The duty exists 
because the accused is expected to play an active role in proceedings, a role that goes 
unfulfilled if he or she is not present during trial.  Those courts and tribunals that allow 
trial to take place entirely in the accused’s absence often do so as a punishment imposed 
on the accused for failing to comply with his or her duty to participate.  The right and the 
duty to be present must not be viewed as being co-extensive as the mandatory aspect of 
the duty would subsume the voluntary nature of the right.  The accused should be given 
the opportunity to exercise his or her right to be present before a decision is made to 
punish the accused by proceeding with a trial in absentia.  
 The near universal recognition of the accused’s right to be present in international 
criminal law should not be mistaken as suggesting that the right is uncontroversial.  
Contentious debates arose during the process of negotiating the Statutes of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Gullie B. Goldin, ‘Presence of the Defendant at Rendition of the Verdict in Felony 
Cases’ (1916) 16 Colum L Rev 18, 18; citing S. Mendelsohn, The Criminal 
Jurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews (M. Curlander 1891) 128.   
2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 
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Court about the parameters of the right and how it should apply.  While it was generally 
felt that the accused has the right to be present at trial, significant disagreement existed 
about the circumstances under which trials can be conducted in the absence of the 
accused.  This disagreement is thought by many to be based on the difference between 
inquisitorial and accusatorial approaches to criminal law.  However, the argument is 
better understood as one between different countries, with different attitudes towards 
criminal procedure, wanting to see their own national system adopted as part of 
international law out of a conviction that their approach is better than that of other 
countries. The right to be present as it is appears in statutory law does not reflect a 
negotiated position between nations, but rather, signals the failure of those nations to 
compromise and develop a system best able to address the challenges arising during 
international criminal trials.  
    Whether it is appropriate to hold trial in the accused’s absence is largely 
dependent on which aims a particular court or tribunal is attempting to satisfy.  
International criminal trials are meant to serve a variety of purposes including: 
retribution, deterrence, reconciliation, peace building, truth telling, reparations and 
enhancing the rule of law. Some, but not all, of these goals can be accomplished in the 
absence of the accused. Therefore, it is necessary for a court or tribunal deciding to 
proceed in the accused’s absence to not only consider whether doing so is legally 
permitted but also what goals it hopes to achieve by conducting a trial against the 
accused. Such a determination requires an analysis of the interests the trial is intended to 
serve.  Two distinct groups, the victims of atrocity crimes and the international 
community as a whole, receive the greatest benefit from international criminal trials. 
Both of these groups have an interest in seeing all of the identified trial objectives 
accomplished, but each group prioritises them differently. Those courts and tribunals that 
emphasise more victim-oriented goals are less likely to conduct trials outside of the 
accused’s presence because the needs of the victims are often best served when the 
accused participates in trial. By contrast, courts and tribunals that focus on the demands 
of the international community as a whole are more likely to accommodate trial in 
absentia. Therefore, whether the presence of the accused at trial is necessary to realise 
the goals of international trials is dependent on which groups the particular court or 
tribunal is most interested in serving and which goals that particular group is most keen 
to have fulfilled. Only if those goals can be achieved in the accused’s absence should a 
court proceed with a trial in absentia. 
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 Trial in absentia should not be understood as a blanket term referring to any type 
of trial conducted outside of the accused’s presence. Such an approach lacks nuance and 
fails to account for the different procedural effects created by different types of absences.  
Instead, there are four different types of absences from trial: 1) trial in absentia; 2) trial 
by default; 3) absence occurring after trial has commenced; and 4) absence resulting from 
an inability to understand or participate in trial. The first two types of absences, trial in 
absentia and trial by default, both involve the entire trial taking place in the absence of 
the accused. The latter two types of absences, those occurring after trial has begun and 
those resulting from an inability to understand or participate in proceedings, generally 
involve a defendant that is physically present in the courtroom for at least some part of 
the proceedings.  Many international and internationalised courts and tribunals do not 
allow trials in absentia or trials by default although all international and internationalised 
criminal courts and tribunals permit portions of the trial to occur outside of the accused’s 
presence.   
 A common thread runs through all of these types of absences.  Before trial can 
continue under any of these circumstances a determination must be made about whether 
the accused had adequate notice of the charges against him or her and the date and 
location of trial and whether his or her failure to appear constitutes a waiver of the right 
to be present.  An accused has adequate notice when he or she learns about the trial with 
enough time to enable him or her to prepare his or her defence to the charges.  The right 
to be present is waived when an accused has adequate notice and does not appear for 
trial.  Such waiver can be either explicit or implicit but the effect is the same, trial can 
continue outside of the presence of the accused and without his or her participation.  
 Those international and internationalised courts and tribunals that do not permit 
trial in absentia and trial by default largely avoid having to decide whether the accused 
received sufficient notice about the proceedings. Because trial can only continue in the 
accused’s absence at those courts and tribunals if he or she has appeared before the court 
or tribunal at some point during the process, the need to provide them with notice is 
discharged as their appearance demonstrates an awareness of the proceedings.  Courts 
and tribunals that do permit the entirety of trial to take place in the accused’s absence 
have a more difficult task because they must determine whether the accused have actually 
received notice of the charges and whether their failure to appear is the result of a 
conscious decision not to participate. Making such a determination can be difficult as 
demonstrated by the experience of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.  There, in the 
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absence of affirmative evidence demonstrating that all of the accused were aware of the 
proceedings, notice had to be assumed from the overwhelming notoriety surrounding the 
case.  Ultimately this was found to be sufficient notice, however an accused learning of 
the charges against him or her in such an indirect manner can lead to questions about 
whether the accused had been properly notified about the substance of the proceedings.  
 A safeguard has been developed to prevent those questions from threatening the 
legitimacy of trials held without the accused’s participation. Trials conducted when the 
accused has not received proper notice are not per se violations of the right to be present. 
However, a requirement has been adopted to combat the impact such a trial may have on 
the accused’s right to be present. An accused who does not receive notice of the charges 
against him or her must have the opportunity to have a new trial or other fresh 
determination of the charges after he or she comes under the control of the trial court. 
Although this right to a new trial is subject to some limitations, its existence highlights 
that the right to be present at trial means that trial should only continue outside of the 
accused’s presence when he or she makes a conscious choice not to attend as evidenced 
by a waiver of the right to be present.    
 Once the notice requirement is met, a court or tribunal seeking to proceed with 
trial in the absence of the accused must find that his or her absence is the result of a 
waiver of the right to be present. To that end, courts and tribunals distinguish between 
voluntary absences that are the result of an accused opting not to participate in trial and 
involuntary absences over which the accused has no control.  The voluntary absences 
include: removal from the courtroom following a disruption; refusing to attend trial, 
absconding and requesting excusal from trial.  When presented with these situations 
courts and tribunals have generally found a waiver of the accused’s right to be present 
and continue trial in the accused’s absence. Involuntary absences falling into the latter 
category can include those caused by: illness, death, detention in another place and 
unexplained disappearance. When these types of absences occur the court or tribunal will 
often suspend trial until the accused is again able to attend.  The conflicting approaches to 
these two sorts of absences demonstrate that courts and tribunals believe there is a 
qualitative difference between them produced by the motivation underlying the reason for 
the absence.  It also provides affirmative evidence that the accused’s absence was meant 
as a waiver of his or her right to be present. Treating voluntary and involuntary absences 
differently also helps to bring meaning to the underlying notion that the accused’s right to 
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be present at trial means that he or she must have the opportunity to participate in trial if 
he or she so desires. 
 The fourth category of absence is distinct from the other types as it involves an 
accused that is physically present in the courtroom but functionally absent because of an 
inability to understand or participate in the proceedings.  Absences caused by an inability 
to understand and participate are involuntary and therefore international and 
internationalised courts and tribunals confronted with this sort of absence will attempt to 
eliminate or mitigate the harm caused by it.  When courts and tribunals are confronted 
with an accused that cannot understand the language in which the trial is being conducted 
it takes steps to have oral statements interpreted and written evidence translated so that 
the accused can know what is happening during the proceedings and participate in his or 
her defence. In circumstances where an accused’s mental state prevents him or her from 
understanding and participating in the proceedings trial is usually halted in its entirety 
because there is often no way to allow the accused to effectively participate in trial.  By 
attempting to overcome the impediments created by these involuntary absences, courts 
and tribunals have signalled that the accused’s physical presence alone, without the 
ability to understand and participate, does not satisfy the accused’s right to be present at 
trial.  It demonstrates that being present means more than just appearing for trial, it also 
requires that the accused can actively understand and participate in trial.  This conclusion 
is reinforced by the growing practice of a number of different international and 
internationalised criminal courts and tribunals that have increasingly permitted the 
accused to appear at trial remotely through the use of videoconferencing technology.  
This practise is significant because it prioritises the accused’s ability to understand and 
participate in the proceedings over his or her presence in the courtroom.   
 The evolution demonstrated through the increased use of videoconferencing 
technology is significant as it is indicative of the changing understanding of the right to 
be present since the introduction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Statute in 2007.  
All of the Statutes of those international and internationalised criminal courts and 
tribunals that preceded the Special Tribunal for Lebanon drew their understanding of the 
right to be present from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with 
some copying the International Covenant’s provision verbatim.  However, the inclusion 
of trial in absentia in the procedure of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon has apparently 
signalled to future international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals that 
they are free to try and find an approach to the right to be present at trial that is most 
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suitable to its own particular needs.  Of the five international or internationalised criminal 
courts and tribunals established or proposed since 2007, only the Kosovo Specialist 
Chambers’ provisions on the right to be present are closely based on the International 
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.  The other four use a variety of different starting 
points and three of the four contain trial in absentia provisions.  It is encouraging that 
these new courts and tribunals are attempting to take a more nuanced approach to the 
right to be present at trial rather than mechanically applying the provisions of the past. 
 What is clear is that the right to be present at trial can accommodate a variety of 
approaches so long as certain basic precepts are followed.  The accused must be given the 
choice to attend trial, which includes the ability to understand and participate in the 
proceedings, if he or she wishes, and any absence from trial should be the result of a 
conscious choice not to participate.  The best way to test whether the accused’s absence is 
the result of his or her own decision not to attend is to consider whether the accused had 
adequate notice of the charges against him or her and the location and date of trial.  Once 
proper notice has been established the court or tribunal deciding the issue should then 
examine the voluntariness of the accused’s absence to determine whether he or she has 
waived the right to be present and it should only proceed in the accused’s absence when it 
is found that he or she voluntarily waived that right.  When a question exists as to 
whether there was adequate notice or waiver the accused should be given the right to a 
new trial or some other fresh determination of the charges to ensure that he or she had the 
opportunity to participate that is guaranteed by the right. Following this procedure will 
help to guarantee that international and internationalised criminal courts and tribunals 
properly protect the accused’s right to be present and eliminate the threat a violation of 
that right might pose to the fair trial rights of the accused while also ensuring that the 
interests of other trial participants are fulfilled. 
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